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Abstract 
This thesis is a contribution to moral psychology, the systematic study of the cognitive processes underlying 
moral judgment. It has two main aims. First, it attempts to show that the so-called Linguistic Analogy (LA) 
is the most productive framework for the study of moral cognition. As its name suggests, LA has it that moral 
psychology can be fruitfully modelled on linguistics, in particular on the Chomskyan project of detailing the 
architecture of the Language Faculty (FL)—a domain-specific cognitive system dedicated to language. This 
means, amongst other things, that the fundamental task of moral psychology is to discover and detail the 
representations, principles, and computational operations of the Moral Faculty (FM)—a domain-specific 
cognitive system that underpins the human capacity for moral judgment. Second, the thesis argues that the 
“Ought Implies Can” principle (OIC)—according to which if an agent ought to perform an action, then she 
can perform that action—is one of the central principles of FM, and proposes a novel account of how OIC is 
implemented in FM. To achieve this second aim, the thesis presents novel empirical evidence on intuitive 
moral judgments of ordinary people and argues that the best explanation of these data is to consider OIC as 
a processing constraint on the operations of FM. 
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Introduction 
Moral judgment is a ubiquitous aspect of our everyday lives. We naturally judge our own actions and (perhaps 
even more so) those of others in terms of their perceived moral status, such as ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘obligatory’ or 
‘forbidden’. What are the cognitive processes that render us capable of making such judgments? This is the 
fundamental question of moral psychology, an interdisciplinary research project spanning philosophy, 
psychology, computer science, neuroscience, anthropology, and evolutionary biology.  The present thesis is 
a contribution to this overarching research project. In it, I defend two main claims.  
The first one concerns what the best way of doing moral psychology is. I defend the so-called Linguistic 
Analogy (LA), that is, I argue that moral psychology should be modelled on linguistics—in particular, on 
generative, Chomskyan linguistics. Accordingly, the main task of moral psychology should be conceived of 
as follows: to discover and detail the representations, principles, and computational operations of the Moral 
Faculty (FM), a specific-purpose cognitive system that underpins the capacity for moral judgment. Here is 
another way to articulate my first claim: 
(i) the human mind/brain contains a cognitive mechanism, FM, specialised for generating moral 
judgments. FM takes representations of actions as input (e.g., “John was bored, so pulled Mary’s hair 
to have some fun”), and, on the basis of a body of rules or principles, it outputs a moral judgment 
(“John did something wrong”); 
(ii) the main aim of moral psychology is to find out what the principles of FM are, how they are 
computationally implemented, and how they are acquired. 
My second claim is not methodological, but substantive: I propose that “Ought Implies Can”—according 
to which if an agent ought to perform an action, then she can perform that action—is one of the fundamental 
principles of FM, and I put forward a novel account of how OIC is implemented in FM. To argue for this 
second claim, I adopt the following two-pronged strategy. First, I present the results of empirical studies I 
conducted in collaboration with Holly Lawford-Smith (Melbourne University) and Paulo Sousa (Queen’s 
University Belfast), which indicate that the intuitive moral judgments of ordinary people conform to OIC. 
Second, I argue that the best explanation is to posit OIC as a processing constraint on the operations of FM. 
 
The thesis is divided into two main parts. In the first one (Chapters 1 and 2), I argue in favour of LA as 
the best framework for the study of moral cognition. I begin by introducing and motivating LA (Chapter 1). 
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Then I show the superiority of LA over a very influential framework for moral psychology—namely, the 
framework behind Joshua Greene’s dual-process theory—and I defend LA against popular objections in the 
literature (Chapter 2). The second part of the thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) turns to OIC. In Chapter 3, I present 
experimental evidence for the claim that OIC is descriptively adequate—that is, for the claim that it captures 
patterns of ordinary moral judgment. Finally, in Chapter 4, I argue that the best explanation of these results 
is that OIC is a processing principle of FM. Below, I provide a slightly more detailed summary of each chapter. 
Chapter 1: The Linguistic Analogy as a Framework for the Study of Moral 
Cognition 
The phenomenon of moral judgment raises many questions worth investigating. In Chapter 1, I first take 
account of some of these and zero in on the one that forms the topic of this thesis, namely, the question of 
what cognitive mechanisms and processes underlie moral judgment. Then, I introduce the framework, the 
Linguistic Analogy (LA), that I believe is best suited for the study of moral cognition. LA provides substantial 
hypotheses about the nature of moral cognition, the terms in which this phenomenon is to be accounted for, 
and the ways in which theories about it are to be evaluated. I review these hypotheses one by one, introducing 
the relevant arguments, concepts and distinctions along the way. Of particular importance is the Argument 
for Moral Grammar, according to which the productivity of moral judgment suggests that its explanation will 
have to appeal to abstract principles and representations over which those principles are defined. To a large 
extent, this argument sets much of the explanatory agenda of the present thesis. I review this argument in 
detail and argue for a modified version of it, which preserves the crucial part of its conclusion, namely, the 
theoretical necessity of appealing to principles. The discussion of what the form of these principles is 
constitutes the final part of this chapter. 
Chapter 2: The Linguistic Analogy—Comparisons, Objections and 
Replies 
In Chapter 2, I introduce a rival explanatory framework, the Dual Process framework (DP), and a specific 
theory that has been proposed from the perspective of this framework, namely, Joshua Greene’s dual-process 
theory of moral judgment. I assess Greene’s theory critically and point out some of its shortcomings. 
However, my central point here is not so much that Greene’s DP theory per se is problematic, but that—in 
contrast to LA—the DP approach is an inadequate theoretical framework, in that it does not provide the 
tools, theoretical concepts, and distinctions needed for the study of moral cognition. In the final part of the 
chapter, I respond to similar concerns raised against my favoured framework. Since its inception, LA has been 
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subjected to serious criticism in the literature. I discuss and evaluate these from the point of view of the version 
of LA that I endorse in Chapter 1. The conclusion will be that none of the objections present a serious 
obstacle to LA.  
Chapter 3: The “Ought Implies Can” Principle and Descriptive Adequacy  
One of the important consequences of adopting LA as an explanatory framework is that explanation in 
moral psychology is expected to proceed by identifying the principles of FM. I propose that a viable strategy 
to individuate such principles is to consider ethical principles on which there is considerable philosophical 
agreement. A principle that until quite recently enjoyed a great deal of consensus in moral philosophy is the 
“Ought Implies Can” principle (or “OIC” for short), according to which if an agent ought to perform an 
action, then the agent in question can perform it. In this chapter, I propose that OIC is descriptively adequate, 
that is, it correctly describes the competence of an idealised individual in terms of his or her moral judgments, 
and thus it is plausible to take it as one of the principles of FM. To establish this, I discuss recent purported 
evidence that ordinary people do not reason in line with OIC. However, I show that much of this evidence is 
methodologically problematic and/or inconclusive. I also present the results of my own empirical studies, 
conducted in collaboration with Holly Lawford-Smith and Paulo Sousa, which provide evidence in favour 
of the descriptive adequacy of OIC. 
Chapter 4: OIC Meets Cognitive Science—Hypotheses, Old and New 
In this final chapter I provide a novel explanation of the descriptive adequacy of OIC. While standard 
approaches have attempted to explain OIC in terms of some aspects of language—namely, either its semantics 
or its pragmatics—, I argue that such accounts are on the wrong track. Instead, I propose that OIC is 
grounded in the nature of the computational operations peculiar to FM. I propose two types of ways in which 
this claim can be cashed out based on the approach defended in the first half of the thesis. According to the 
first, OIC is a synchronic processing principle, that is, it reflects the online operations of FM. According to 
the second, OIC is a diachronic acquisition principle constraining the types of moral rules (or “faculty 
principles”) that are acquirable by FM. Given the currently available evidence, it is difficult to judge how these 
proposals will fare in the future. Nevertheless, they provide viable alternatives to the accounts available in the 
literature. 
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Chapter 1: The Linguistic Analogy as a 
Framework for the Study of Moral Cognition 
Overview 
The present thesis addresses aspects of moral-deontic thinking from the point of view of the Linguistic 
Analogy, a particular way of pursuing the inquiry into the nature of moral cognition, famously suggested by 
John Rawls (1971) and most comprehensively articulated by the philosopher and legal scholar, John Mikhail 
(Mikhail, 2000, 2009, 2011). According to the Linguistic Analogy, the study of moral cognition can be 
fruitfully modelled on the study of language as undertaken in the generative tradition in linguistics, 
inaugurated by Noam Chomsky in the 1950s. This chapter is devoted to illustrating the main aspects of the 
Linguistic Analogy as well as defending its viability as an appropriate and worthwhile approach to the study 
of moral psychology. 
The chapter is structured as follows. First, in Section 1, I introduce the variety of questions that may come 
to mind when terms such as “morality” or “moral judgment” are mentioned and single out the problems that 
will be central in this thesis—namely, questions concerning moral cognition—whilst mentioning a few that 
will not be addressed at all—namely, questions concerning normative ethics and metaethics. I defend the 
position, which may be referred to as the “independence thesis”, according to which the kind of inquiry I am 
interested in pursuing can be done so without confronting and taking sides in normative and metaethical 
controversies. Second, in Section 2, I introduce the Linguistic Analogy as a substantive framework for the 
study of moral cognition, focusing on its assumptions concerning the character of the explanandum, the 
nature of explanation, and the empirical standards of evaluation of theories. As for the first, in Section 3, I 
argue that the proper explanandum for moral psychology is moral competence (or I-morality), intended as a 
computational system that underlies the productivity of moral cognition. In Section 4, I propose that the 
natural explanation for such an explanandum is computational in nature. In Section 5, having taken the core 
arguments of the Linguistic Analogy seriously, I address the question of how to deal with the core implication 
of the productivity argument as outlined earlier in Section 3, namely, the idea that the notion of moral 
principle should be at the heart of theories of moral psychology. In the final section, I discuss what the 
Linguistic Analogy has to say concerning the ways in which theories in moral cognition (and computational 
theories more generally) ought to be evaluated. 
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1. The multiplicity of questions about morality 
Picture Roy, who is having a stroll in the forest on his own. Soon, he happens to stumble by a charming 
little pond. To his dismay, he notices a small girl who appears to be drowning. There is no one else around, 
and the closest village is miles away. Roy doesn’t know who the girl is; he has never seen her in his life. Even 
in the absence of considering any further details of the case, one thing seems crystal clear: Roy must do 
something. He must help the little girl. It is his moral obligation. 
There are many deep questions raised by this little story. For example, it seems to be more than simply a 
matter of opinion that Roy has an obligation to help the little girl: it appears true. But what makes this the 
case? If I say “Paris is the capital of France”, there is a simple way of verifying or falsifying my claim. Is there 
anything analogous with deontic or moral claims, such as “Roy must help the little girl”? And, relatedly, how 
do we have access to truths of this kind, assuming they exist? More generally, how can it be a matter of truth 
rather than opinion that Roy should do certain things and refrain from doing others in a way that is 
independent of what he (or anyone else for that matter) wants to achieve? Shifting to a more practical point 
of view, if Roy has this obligation, he presumably also has others. And so do we. But what are they? And, 
perhaps more urgently, how do we find out about them? Can we deduce them from some first principles? Or 
should we just follow our emotions or intuitions? There is no shortage of attempts to tackle these and other 
related problems of course. Such attempts are subsumed under the scope of metaethics, which investigates 
questions about the semantics, epistemology and metaphysics of morality, or normative ethics, which deals 
with questions about what we ought to do. 
The thesis, however, will focus on a third type of question. Namely, what is it about our minds that makes 
it the case that we can think in such terms—namely, in terms of what is right and what is obligatory—to begin 
with? To be more precise, I will be concerned with our capacity to assign moral-deontic value to actions.1 (If 
I use terms such as “moral judgment” along the way, this is what I mean.) There is good reason to believe that 
this capacity is underlain by a dedicated cognitive system of sorts due to some properties of moral judgment, 
such as its early emergence in ontogeny (Baillargeon et al. 2015; Hamlin, 2015), its universal occurrence 
(Brown, 1991), the automaticity with which such judgments are made (van Lier et al., 2013), aspects of its 
neural organisation (Zinchenko & Arsalidou, 2018), and aspects of its content (e.g. Turiel, 1983; Mikhail, 
                                                                    
1 By “deontic” here I mean the standard set of deontic concepts as interdefined by the deontic hexagon (see e.g. 
McNamara, 2018; Joerden, 2012). That is, OBLIGATORY, FORBIDDEN, and DISCRETIONARY, plus the 
negation of each. By “moral”, I mean simply that the relevant obligations and prohibitions  are intuitively seen as of the 
“moral” type, whatever exactly that comes to (see more on which in the next chapter). 
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2011; Haidt,2013). The present inquiry concerns the description of some features of this putative system, 
which I will sometimes refer to as the moral faculty (or FM) from a cognitive science perspective, or, more 
specifically, from the perspective of the Linguistic Analogy (or “LA” for short). More generally, this thesis is 
a work in moral psychology—it is a study of some aspects the psychological capacity for morality. 
The presumption that cognition about moral issues can be legitimately studied from a psychological 
perspective is not controversial. In fact, this presumption is by no means a recent invention: it is deeply rooted 
in the history of the study of morality. To take but one example, some philosophers of the Enlightenment, 
collectively referred to as “the moral sense philosophers”, such as Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, or the 3rd 
Earl of Shaftesbury, speculated amply about the psychology of moral judgment as well as its origins. In fact, 
some of the conclusions of contemporary empirical studies were anticipated by these thinkers, such as the 
automaticity or involuntariness of moral evaluation: we cannot but see the world in moral terms, and our 
judgments are often unaffected by our explicit ideas about morality. It is worth mentioning that based on 
such considerations, these philosophers concluded that humans are endowed with a moral sense analogous 
to our linguistic and visual cognitive capacities. 
What may be slightly more controversial, however, is whether we can do moral psychology without saying 
anything substantive about metaethics or normative ethics at all. It would be concerning if taking a position in 
respect of the problems raised by these disciplines were a necessary preliminary step in the study of moral 
psychology, partly because there is nowhere near a general agreement about some of the most basic ones of 
these, including the questions raised above. However, I believe there is no reason to worry. Take the 
psychology of vision, which is a success story in cognitive science if there ever was one. Notice that 
philosophers still disagree about the epistemology and metaphysics of colours. This is not a problem for 
psychologists, however. They can detail the mechanisms responsible for colour perception even though they 
are unsure as to what colours really are. This analogy—along with the assumption, put forward above, that 
moral thinking is a natural phenomenon—suggests that not taking sides in metaethical or normative issues 
need not prevent one from tackling questions in moral psychology: the explanandum for moral psychology 
seems independent from substantive views in metaethics and normative ethics (as also noted by the moral 
sense theorists). Consequently, the success of the former enterprise is not predicated on success of the latter 
ones. For better or worse, I shall proceed under this additional—somewhat stronger—presumption, which 
we may refer to as “the independence thesis”. 
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2. Two approaches to the Linguistic Analogy 
At its simplest and most straightforward, the Linguistic Analogy is an approach to studying moral 
cognition with tools borrowed from the systematic study of language as pursued in the framework of 
generative linguistics launched and developed by Chomsky and his colleagues in the decades following the 
1950s.  
Chomsky’s approach was novel on account of being explicitly mentalistic in contrast to the then prevalent 
behaviouristic approach to language: Chomsky contended that it is facts about the mind that explain our 
ability to speak and understand language. Mentalism about language has two important consequences. First, 
since the mind is by all accounts finite, and since we nevertheless have the capacity to understand, evaluate 
and produce any number of novel sentences, knowledge of language has to consist of more than a list of words 
and sentences: it has to contain combinatorial principles that are capable of generating all that variety. I shall 
refer to this as the Argument for Mental (Linguistic) Grammar. Second, children have no trouble acquiring 
these principles despite not being explicitly taught. But since children succeed in selecting the actual rules and 
principles of their language despite the fact that many different generalisations would be equally consistent 
with the linguistic data that is available to them (i.e. the so-called primary linguistic data or PLD), children 
must have an innate component that forms the basis of the process of language acquisition. Chomsky referred 
to this innate component as Universal Grammar (or UG). This, in a nutshell, is the Argument for Universal 
Grammar.  
One approach to the Linguistic Analogy is thus to construct analogous arguments in the case of moral 
cognition. First, it does not seem to be the case that the number of actions and situations we can evaluate in 
moral terms has an upper limit. Second, the acquisition of moral rules, principles, and distinctions often seem 
to proceed without instruction or conscious awareness, on the basis of the arguably fragmentary data available 
to the child (i.e. what we may refer to as the “primary moral data” or PMD). On this approach to the 
Linguistic Analogy, the success of LA is predicated upon the extent to which these arguments are successful. 
A second way to understand the Linguistic Analogy is to see it as a heuristic tool for the study of moral 
cognition. The strength of this approach can be understood as varying along a continuum, the extremes of 
which correspond to a weaker and a stronger version of this view. The weaker version merely assumes that 
some of the technical concepts and distinctions made by generative linguists might help make sense of the 
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data in moral psychology.2 The stronger version has it that the parallel will be robust; on this view, moral 
cognition is expected to be much like language relative to some relevant dimensions of similarity. Relatedly, 
all or most distinctions made by Chomsky and his followers will have a counterpart in the moral domain.3 
To summarise, the Linguistic Analogy can be conceived of as an endorsement of the applicability in the 
case of moral cognition of (a) one or both of the two central arguments of Chomsky’s programme or (b) some 
or most of the distinctions made by Chomsky in respect of language. In fact, a combination of (a) and (b) is 
possible as well, and this is the approach to moral psychology that I favour. In particular, I will endorse the 
following: (i) the mentalistic (qua computationalist and representationalist) approach to morality, (ii) a 
version of the Argument for Moral Grammar, (iii) the relevance of the competence-performance distinction 
as well as (iv) the relevance of the perception-production distinction. I introduce these elements in sections 3-
4 below. I will argue that the joint endorsement of these distinctions and arguments warrants an approach to 
the study of moral cognition that involves the search for moral principles and the representational repertoire 
they are specifiable in terms of. Towards the second half of the chapter (Section 5), I will go into some detail 
as to how “principle”—one of the core terms of LA—ought to be understood in the context of moral 
psychology. Finally, in Section 6, I illustrate how a theory of moral cognition (and more loosely, hypotheses 
about particular moral principles) ought to be evaluated as suggested by the Linguistic Analogy. 
3. The character of the explanandum 
My reading of the Linguistic Analogy has it that (i) the study of moral cognition needs to subscribe to 
mentalism (in the form of computationalism and representationalism), (ii) the capacity for moral judgment 
is in some sense combinatorial, (iii) moral competence should be distinguished from moral performance, and 
                                                                    
2 Here is a sample of expressions of this weaker version of LA from the literature: “On the weak version, the Linguistic 
Analogy is merely a heuristic for posing the right sorts of questions about the nature of our moral competence. On this 
version, it matters little whether morality works like language. What matters is that we ask about the principles that guide 
mature competence, work out how such knowledge is acquired, understand whether and how competence interacts 
with both mind internal and external factors to create variation in performance, and assess how such knowledge evolved 
and whether it has been specially designed for the moral sphere” (Hauser et al., 2008a, p. 139). “At the very least, analogies 
[such as LA] suggest questions and shape the direction of research” (Roedder & Harman, 2010, p. 273). “At least in 
terms of its main questions, fundamental conceptual distinctions, key methodological commitments, and overarching 
theoretical goals, the theory of moral cognition would benefit from drawing on the basic terminology and theoretical 
apparatus of Universal Grammar” (Mikhail, 2011, p. 308). 
3 “On the strong version, language and morality work in much the same way: dedicated and encapsulated machinery, 
innate principles [guiding] acquisition, distinctions between competence and performance, inaccessible and 
unconscious operative principles, selective breakdown due to [selective brain] damage, and constraints on the evolvable 
and learnable languages and moralities” (Hauser et al., 2008a, p. 139). 
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(iv) the problems of moral perception and moral production should be kept distinct. Here, I argue for each 
claim in turn. 
3.1. Mentalism 
3.1.1. From behaviourism to cognitive science 
It is a characteristic assumption in cognitive science that “intelligent” behaviour can only be properly 
explained by attributing internal mental states and processes to the organism whose behaviour we are 
interested in making sense of. For historical reasons, this view is often contrasted with behaviourism, the 
proponents of which either deny the reality of internal mental states altogether or else they argue that mental 
states cannot be the proper object of scientific investigation, despite the indubitable success of mentalistic 
explanation both in the domain of scientific psychology and in ordinary reasoning about behaviour. Unlike 
behaviourism, mentalism assumes that the most straightforward, and indeed the best, account of the success 
of explaining and predicting intelligent behaviour by reference to internal mental states is that such mental 
states do in fact exist and play a genuine causal role in the generation of behaviour. 
To take a toy example, consider a very basic aspect of our mathematical competence: keeping track of the 
numerosity of a small number of objects. For instance, when we see two identical objects successively 
disappear behind a screen, we can form the expectation that there are (at least) two objects behind the screen. 
How do we go about explaining this apparently simple inference, which, as a matter of fact, even 5-month-
old infants are capable of (cf. e.g. Wynn, 1992)? Mentalism (qua computationalism and representationalism) 
suggests that we entertain mental representations of the relevant objects and manipulate them according to 
some laws or regularities, such as the one according to which “1 + 1 = 2”. 
The computational premise in the Chomskyan type of mentalism assumes that thinking is computation, 
where computation is understood as a form of symbol manipulation, the symbols being the mental 
representations over which cognitive processes (such as additive inferences) are defined. This traditional 
picture entails that the explication of cognition proceeds along the following lines: identify the computational 
principles and processes that the relevant kind of thinking (such as addition) consists in and identify the 
representations which those computations presuppose. 
This much is little more than the recapitulation of an orthodoxy in the philosophy of cognitive science. 
The reason why I highlight mentalism is simple: even though practically everybody agrees that moral 
cognition consists in some psychological processes, it is also the case that researchers sometimes overlook that 
psychological processes are manipulations of representations. But by overlooking this, they fail to focus on 
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the proper task of moral psychology: studying what representations are involved in moral thinking and how, 
that is, according to what principles, these representations are manipulated. In contrast, the Linguistic 
Analogy makes these important assumptions explicit—unlike other popular frameworks, such as the dual-
process theory of moral judgment (discussed in the next chapter). 
3.1.2. E vs. I 
The Chomskyan shift from behaviourism to mentalism about language can be illustrated in terms of 
Chomsky’s distinction between E-language and I-language (Chomsky, 1986). The former had been the 
traditional object of study of pre-Chomskyan linguistics, which took language, albeit mostly implicitly, as an 
external entity independent of the workings of individual minds. Thus, language would be viewed either as 
some sort of an abstract entity or to exist (in some unspecified form) in the community. Chomsky instead 
argued that the primary object of inquiry for linguistics is the cognitive system rooted in individuals 
mind/brain that makes them capable of linguistic communication. In Chomsky’s view, the former 
conception of language, to the extent it is a coherent conception at all, should be regarded as parasitic on the 
latter one. The former he referred to as E-language, or “externalised language”, the latter I-language, or 
“internal language”. 
In fact the “I” in I-language stands for three features: internalised, individualised, and intensional 
(Mikhail, 2011; Chomsky, 2018). I-language is internalised because it is taken to be internal to the mind 
(rather than being an emergent social or cultural phenomenon). I-language is individualised on account of 
the assumption that the explanation of an individual’s capacity to process (speak and understand) his or her 
language is logically prior to that of a larger group of individuals (such as a dialect group). Finally, I-language 
is intensional in the sense that properly characterising the computations performed by the mind when 
processing language (or some narrower task, such as mapping a set of phonemes to syntactic structures), we 
are interested in those computations as they are performed rather than the way in which they could be 
performed given functional/extensional equivalence, that is, identical input-output mapping. 
The analogy with morality is tempting: we can distinguish between, on the one hand, the cognitive 
structures that enable an individual to cognise in moral terms and, on the other hand, morality in the sense of 
culturally shared codes of conduct. That is, we may distinguish I-morality and E-morality, respectively 
(Mikhail, 2011, pp. 24-26). In contrast to an I-morality, that is, a person’s cognitive structures and 
mechanisms that subserve his or her moral judgments, an E-morality may be understood as the property of a 
community made up of individuals with more or less identical I-moralities, such as libertarian Americans, for 
 22 
example (to the extent that they can be said to be a relatively “morally homogeneous” group).4 Since it may 
easily be the case that it is more or less the latter sense that many of us have in mind when we talk about 
morality, the distinction between I- and E-moralities is an important one worth bearing in mind. In keeping 
with the mentalist approach of Chomsky as well as modern cognitive science, the proper explanandum for 
moral psychology must be I-morality.  
There is one point that is worth clearing up before we go on. One may assume that if the primary goal of 
moral psychology is to describe and explain an I-morality, then there is no need to investigate populations, 
just one individual will do. This argument is based on a mistaken conception of the utility of idealisation in 
science. As Chomsky has pointed out, from a scientific perspective, an individual’s language, along with all  
of its idiosyncrasies, is utterly uninteresting per se. The need to describe an I-language first and foremost 
derives from the mentalist premise. According to Chomsky, the ultimate goal of linguistics is to account for 
how humans’ mind/brain makes it possible for individuals to acquire a language (in the sense of I-language) 
based on the available data (i.e. the PLD) they are exposed to in the course of ontogeny. But, clearly, this can 
only be done once we have an accurate description of the system that is acquired. Since that system is a mental 
system, we need to understand it in mentalistic terms. Studying what patterns of judgments populations of 
individuals make is a necessary step towards specifying the robust elements of I-languages: only phenomena 
exhibiting sufficient stability and universality (at least in terms of a chosen population) are worth investigating 
seriously. 
 Of course, there is a significant assumption lurking in the background, namely that there will be stability 
in terms of I-moralities/languages in the population. This assumption is not seriously questioned in modern 
linguistics. An analogy may help understand the above point. Consider our model of the human skeleton. It 
is a structure of immense complexity, involving hundreds of bones (206 in the adult human body), and three 
different types of joints and cartilages. When we look at a model skeleton, what is embodied in the model is a 
generalised understanding of an idealised human (in terms of its skeletal properties). There is no assumption 
to the effect that the model perfectly represents all humans, nor in fact any one human in particular. What is 
important, though, is that it captures the universal aspects of the structure of the human skeletal system, that 
is, those that are widely shared across individuals. In this respect, a model is a collection of statistical averages 
                                                                    
4 This is just one reading of what an E-morality may be. In Chomsky’s original formulation, the concept of E-
language subsumes formal conceptions of language as well, such as Lewis’s (1975), whereby language is seen as an 
abstract mapping between sentences and meanings. The crucial property of an E-language, however, is that it is 
“understood independently of the properties of the mind/brain” (Chomsky, 1986, p. 20). Similar considerations apply 
in the case of E-moralities. In any case, here the focus in on I-morality, not on E-morality, so—in keeping with the spirit 
of the independence thesis—we need not pronounce definitively on this issue. 
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across a population. For this reason, it is important that no idiosyncratic features are built into the model, 
such as supernumerary digits, for instance. 
3.2. Productivity in moral cognition: The Argument for Moral Grammar 
3.2.1. The Argument for Mental (Linguistic) Grammar 
Consider the following sentence: 
The reason why I am writing this chapter is that my best friend, the alcoholic aardvark, who was 
calculating the derivative of the natural logarithm on my brother’s mantelpiece yesterday, told me to 
do so 
 I am fairly sure that neither the reader nor anyone else has ever heard, read or uttered this sentence before. 
Nevertheless, and this is one of the fascinating facts about language and thought, understanding the sentence 
will not have posed any substantial difficulties. This sentence gives testimony to the unbounded capacity of 
language to express an incalculable—strictly speaking, infinite—number of thoughts.5 This unbounded 
capacity, referred to as the productivity of language, is a crucial explanandum for theories of (I-)language. 
Let us consider a short illustration of the productivity of (the English) language. Take the sentence: 
(1) [[the aardvark] [that [solved [my homework]]]] [ate [my breakfast]]6 
Traditional grammatical analysis interprets this sentence as consisting of a subject (“the aardvark that 
solved my homework”) and a predicate (“ate my breakfast”).7 At the syntactic level of analysis, the subject is 
taken up by what linguists refer to as a noun phrase (NP). Crucially, the subject NP of (1) contains a relative 
clause, “that solved my homework” (technically a complementiser phrase or CP) which itself contains an NP: 
“my homework”. This is an example of recursive embedding, because a phrase of a given type (NP in our case) 
is embedded in a phrase of the same type. Infinity follows from properties of I-languages such as recursive 
embedding. (See Jackendoff, 2002, pp. 38-67 for other examples of linguistic productivity.) 
One significant technical consequence of the productivity of language is that, contra some theories of 
language and the mind (such as linguistic structuralism, behaviourism or connectionism), language 
competence (I-language) cannot consist in a mere enumeration of grammatical sentences: to account for the 
                                                                    
5 This formulation is somewhat loose, because it could be the case that the number of possible sentences is infinite, 
while the number of thoughts is not. But it is very probably not the case, as I will suggest below. 
6 The square brackets indicate phrase boundaries. 
7 In modern syntax, the predicate is the verb, the subject and object(s) being its arguments. We can ignore this 
complication for present purposes. 
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ability to understand not to mention produce a potentially infinite number of novel sentences, the theorist 
needs to posit (a) a lexicon, that is, a store of a large but finite number of basic lexical elements out of which 
sentences can be built and, crucially, (b) a closed set of rules or principles of combination that specify how 
these elements can be assembled to form grammatical sentences.8 Additionally, notice that it is not sufficient 
for the lexicon to consist of a mere list of words: it is also necessary to specify these words in terms of syntactic 
(as well as other linguistic-functional) categories, because the rules of syntax are defined over these 
representations (and mutatis mutandis for morphological and other types of linguistic rules), rather than the 
words themselves (see fn. 8); this is what is referred to as the structure dependency of linguistic principles, that 
is, the property of such principles to make reference to structural constituents—rather than lexical items or 
ordinal positions—in a sentence. Clearly, if the rules were defined over the words themselves, then there 
would be as many rules as there are words—not a desirable or tenable theoretical position. 
The structure of the foregoing argument has been something along the following lines: a fundamental 
property of language, namely productivity, that is, the ability to parse and produce a potentially infinite 
number of novel expressions, places certain constraints on theories of language, such that they are required to 
account for this property on pain of being prima facie disfavoured. The best explanation of productivity—
and in fact the only one we are aware of—is that there is a mental-linguistic grammar specifying a set of 
representations (such as NPs and CPs) and the syntactic rules that are defined over them (cf. Jackendoff, 1994, 
Chapter 2), which jointly have the power of accounting for linguistic productivity, at least in principle.9 
3.2.2. The Argument for Moral Grammar 
As suggested by the Linguistic Analogy, there is an analogous case to be made in the domain of moral 
cognition. The guiding thought is that moral judgment appears potentially infinite too, suggesting that some 
sort of productivity might also characterise the moral faculty. If there are productive processes in moral 
cognition, this would indicate the existence of a “moral” grammar, that is, a set of generative principles from 
                                                                    
8 Examples of such a rule are the so-called rewrite rules (or phrase structure rules) specifying the legitimate (i.e. 
grammatical) ways in which phrases can be formed out of the syntactic categories of the constituents. So, for example, 
to capture our example in the text (1), an NP rewrite rule is: “NP → NP CP”, that is, an NP may consist of the 
concatenation of an NP and a CP.   
9 Jackendoff points out, quite rightly in my view, that the word representation is somewhat unhelpful here (as well 
as other related intentional terms, such as knowledge or information). For example, an NP is not a representation of 
anything: it is simply a mental symbol that the theorist needs to posit to explain certain mental-linguistic phenomena 
(e.g. Jackendoff, 2007, pp. 5-7). For this reason, Jackendoff has suggested alternative terms, such as “mental structure”. 
Though I am sympathetic to Jackendoff’s terminological worries, I shall stick to the more traditional nomenclature (cf. 
also Chomsky, 2000, Chapter 6; Collins, 2004, pp. 512-3). 
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which particular moral judgments can be derived in more or less the same way as whether particular sentences 
are grammatical can be derived from principles of syntax. 
The argument for a principles-based moral cognition is by no means novel. For example, Hume made the 
following remarks in his Treatise of Human Nature: 
“It may now be ask’d in general, concerning this pain or pleasure, that distinguishes moral good and 
evil, From what principles is it deriv’d, and whence does it arise in the human mind? To this I reply, 
first, that ‘tis absurd to imagine, that in every particular instance, these sentiments are produc’d by 
an original quality and primary constitution. For as the number of our duties is, in a manner, 
infinite, ‘tis impossible that our original instincts should extend to each of them, and from our very 
first infancy impress on the human mind all that multitude of precepts, which are contain’d in the 
completest system of ethics. Such a method of proceeding is not conformable to the usual maxims, 
by which nature is conducted, where a few principles produce all that variety we observe in the 
universe, and every thing is carry’d on in the easiest and most simple manner. ‘Tis necessary, 
therefore, to abridge these primary impulses, and find some more general principles, upon which all 
our notions of morals are founded.” (Hume, 1739, p. 473) 
Hume’s argument is an ostensibly empiricist one: rather that innately possessing numerous (or an infinity 
of) principles that make us capable of morally appraising novel actions or situations, it is more plausible to 
posit only a few of such principles to account for this unbounded capacity. It is also possible to turn the 
argument on its head, thereby producing a rationalist version of it: it is wildly implausible to assume that we 
have been exposed to a “replica” of each situation we are nevertheless readily capable of evaluating in moral 
terms. Indeed, completely novel situations present themselves on a daily basis and are judged about as 
effortlessly as in the case of the perception of novel sentences such as the one about the alcoholic aardvark—
or indeed all the others in this thesis. Irrespective of which version of the argument one is in favour of, the 
pertinent point here is that Hume recognised the productivity of moral judgment as an important 
explanandum for a naturalistic theory of moral cognition and he also made a defeasible inference to the 
existence of (a limited number of) principles guiding moral judgment. On this view, just as in the case of 
language, what is required is a set of principles from which the judgments can be derived; grammaticality 
judgments in the case of language, permissibility judgments in the case of the moral sense. 
It is probably not a coincidence that the notion that moral judgment may be in some sense productive 
became the subject of considerable discussion in the wake of the inception of the burgeoning literature on 
the “trolley” dilemmas, in which the question is whether it is permissible to interfere in various ways to stop 
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a trolley from killing (usually) five people thereby killing one (see the next chapter, Section 1 for more). Two 
notable observations with respect to the trolley dilemmas in this context are the variety of novel situations the 
literature on them engendered (see e.g. Greene et al. 2009; Mikhail, 2011) and the obvious novelty (and 
artificiality) of each of the cases from the point of view of ordinary experience. Nevertheless, evaluating the 
dilemmas—unlike explaining the principles on which such evaluations are based—rarely produces any 
notable challenge for experimental subjects, and there is remarkable consistency and systematicity in the 
results. 
To return to the main point, what is referred to by Mikhail as the Argument for Moral Grammar (AMG), 
which is more or less explicit in the above paragraphs, holds that, parallel to the case of I-language, I-morality 
contains (a) a finite and presumably small set of principles as well as (b) a finite although quite possibly large 
set of representations over which the principles are defined. It is worth quoting Mikhail for his formulation 
of AMG: 
“The novelty and unboundedness of moral judgment, together with its frequent predictability, 
stability, and other systematic properties, implies the existence of a moral grammar, because to 
explain how an individual is able to project her finite experience to entirely new cases, we must 
assume that she is guided, implicitly, by a system of principles or rules. Without this assumption, her 
ability to make these novel judgments – and our ability to predict them – would be inexplicable” 
(Mikhail, 2011, p. 72).10 
Thus far, I believe that Mikhail’s reasoning is unassailable. However, elsewhere, he writes that “the 
properties of moral judgment imply that the mind contains a moral grammar: a complex and possibly 
domain-specific set of rules, concepts and principles that generates and relates mental representations of 
various types. Among other things, this system enables individuals to determine the deontic status of an 
infinite variety of acts and omissions” (Mikhail, 2007, p. 144; emphasis added). It is apparent from this latter 
quote that Mikhail takes the Argument for Moral Grammar to be more or less exactly parallel to the 
Argument for Mental (Linguistic) Grammar (as clearly articulated by Jackendoff, 1994, pp. 8-20, for 
instance). That is, Mikhail believes that the bottom line of the argument is that moral competence (I-morality) 
                                                                    
10 Jackendoff also proposes a similar but more general argument: “The basic observation is that humans manage to 
participate in and understand an unlimited number of social interactions, most of which they have never encountered 
before in exactly the same form. The ability to interact socially must therefore involve a combinatorial system of 
principles in each individual’s mind/brain, which make it possible to build up understanding of particular situations 
from some finite stock of stored elements” (2007, p. 149). 
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consists in a generative capacity, and the principles of I-morality are analogous to the principles of syntax.11 I 
doubt, however, that this strong conclusion is warranted by the above argument. In the next section, I hope 
to make clear in what sense I think moral cognition not to be generative.12 
Issues with the Argument for Moral Grammar 
With an eye on amending the above argument, let us begin by considering some relevant disanalogies 
between language and moral cognition. First, although grammaticality judgments are in one sense analogous 
to permissibility judgments, the parallel is misleading.13 To begin with, in language, the fact that a sentence is 
perceived as ungrammatical is an epiphenomenon that is due to whether the arrangement of functional 
elements in the sentence happens to conform to the principles of syntactic combination. In other words, there 
is no analysis of grammaticality per se, only an analysis of a sentence that is either successful or it isn’t. In the 
latter case, that is, if the analysis fails because the constituents are not appropriately arranged relative to the 
rules of syntax, then the sentence is perceived as ungrammatical.14 In other words, as far as we know there is 
no dedicated mechanism that takes as input a sequence of words (phonemes, sounds, syntactic categories), 
and outputs a binary valued variable representing the sentence in terms of its (un)grammaticality.  In contrast, 
in the moral case, presumably, the whole point of the analysis is to appraise acts in terms of their deontic 
status, so a judgment of impermissibility is not due to a “failure” of the analysis, quite the contrary.15 
The second crucial difference is between the respective sources of productivity. In the case of language, 
the sources of productivity are the principles along with the representations they are applied to, which 
formally guarantee that the sentences of a language can be generated.16 In other words, once the principles are 
properly formulated, productivity follows. Prima facie at least, the same is not true in the case of moral 
cognition: it appears that an exhaustive description of moral principles and the relevant representations will 
                                                                    
11 Cf. also Hauser: “To attain its limitless range of expressive power, the principles of our moral faculty must take a 
finite set of elements and recombine them into new, meaningful expressions or principles” (2006, p. 47). 
12 To be fair to Mikhail, elsewhere, he acknowledges that the analogy may not be perfect: “language is an infinite 
combinatorial system in a way that morality (as distinct from the cognitive systems by which actions are mentally 
represented) may not be” (Mikhail, 2017, p. 241).If this is the case, the two arguments cannot be completely isomorphic. 
13 Cf. also Dwyer (2008) who expresses some doubt concerning the equivalence between the respective roles of these 
judgments in linguistic vs. moral theory. 
14 Technically, “unacceptable”, but in this case, the unacceptability is due to ungrammaticalness (see Chomsky, 
1965, p. 10ff). 
15 Mikhail is of course aware that the analogy between grammaticality and permissibility is not perfect, but he only 
makes the less theoretically relevant point that “recognizing whether a given structure is grammatical is less central to 
everyday behavior than the ability to recognize whether particular conduct is morally permissible” (2017, p. 240; 
emphasis added). 
16 Although as Chomsky often points out, how they are actually generated is something of a mystery to do with the 
interface between language and thought. 
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not guarantee productivity, only that, in principle at least, moral cognition can “harness” the productivity of 
the representations providing input to the moral faculty. In other words, we don’t generate representations 
of situations or actions based on moral principles. Of course we do generate moral evaluations, but these, in 
contrast to the representations of actions and events that are the subject of evaluation, are neither potentially 
infinite nor in fact do they appear to be open ended.17 
A friendly amendment 
Mikhail might try to defend his version of the Argument for Moral Grammar as follows. It seems 
reasonable to accept that human thought is capable of producing a potentially infinite number of 
representations of actions (and presumably other things too, like states of affair, events, and so on). An 
informal way of illustrating this productivity is by considering works of fiction: although there is some 
repetition of themes and motifs in the history of literature, we never seem to run out of things to write, read, 
and thus more generally to think about, notably so in the domain of human action. Just as a whole book can 
be written in a single sentence (a recent example is Mike McCormack’s Solar Bones), so can a whole book be 
written about a single action (Odysseus’s journey home comes to mind). 
A slightly more formal illustration of this point is provided by Jackendoff’s analysis of action (see 
Jackendoff, 2007, especially Chapter 4). To cut a rather long story (very) short, action representations can be 
best understood as having complex hierarchical structure involving recursive embedding at different levels of 
the “action tree”. For example, preparing coffee may involve taking the coffee out of the fridge (that is where 
my flatmate keeps it). This latter representation (which is itself an action!) is part of the former action, 
embedded in a complex structure consisting of a Preparation (preparing the ground for the main action), a 
Head (the part that constitutes the goal of the action), and sometimes an optional Coda (restoring the status 
quo). On Jackendoff’s account, these are the proprietary representations of the action representation system 
(analogous to NPs and CPs in the case of syntax; see above). Irrespective of whether one wants to buy into 
the details of Jackendoff’s account, the point of recursive embedding stands: I can think of the action of taking 
the coffee out of the fridge as a complete action and an end in itself, for example because I don’t think it makes 
sense to keep it there. I can also entertain the thought of the action of preparing coffee for some visitors, in 
                                                                    
17 Trivially, one could say that “Jim’s killing the Indian is impermissible” is a novel representation compared to “Jim’s 
killing the Indian”, by reason of which moral cognition may be said to be a source of productivity. But intuitively, this 
is not the interesting kind of productivity observed in the case of language and thought. Still, how novel situations and 
actions can be evaluated effortlessly and automatically is a genuine problem for a theory of moral cognition (as pointed 
out in the text). 
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which case the representation of the whole action as considered thus far (making coffee) would be embedded 
in a larger structure of the same type, for example, welcoming the visitors. And so on, in both directions. 
To return to the original point, in spite of this productivity (and despite the potential novelty of action 
representations), at no point do we stop being able to evaluate actions in moral-deontic terms. In other words, 
moral cognition deals with the productivity of the “grammar of action”, even though as argued above it 
doesn’t account for it.18 Nevertheless, moral judgment clearly needs some resources to tackle the productivity 
of the representational system the products of which its operations take as input. Just as Hume suggested, 
principles of some description appear to be the best candidates for this purpose—as long as there exists a 
representational format (analogous to NPs and CPs) that abstracts away from the vagaries of “fully explicit” 
action representations—otherwise positing principles would only delay rather than solve the productivity 
problem; much like positing syntactic rules defined over particular words would in the case of language. These 
representations do need to be “generated” by what Mikhail refers to as conversion rules, that is, rules that 
dictate how sensory and perceptual representations are turned into a more abstract representational format 
(involving representations of causes and intentions) that principles evaluate actions in terms of. But it would 
be odd to suppose that the product of conversion rules is potentially infinite: the very point of conversion 
rules is to reduce variability after all, not to create it (nor as a matter of fact are conversion rules likely to be 
specific to FM, on any plausible individuation of FM). 
As usual, an analogy with language helps here: we parse sound waves into a finite set of phonemes. The 
conversion rules that achieve this feat reduce the variability of and eliminate noise from the input by means 
of ignoring some features of it and magnifying others (this process is called “categorical perception”). The 
details won’t have to detain us here, the point is merely that the output is a finite set of representations (the 
set of phonemes in the given I-language), and there is no need for combinatorial rules at this stage. (To be 
sure, this analogy is also imperfect, since the variability of the sound signal is of a different kind from that in 
the input to moral evaluation. Also, some aspects of phonology—referred to as phonotactics—do contain 
combinatorial rules defined over phonemes, but, again, there is no analogy for that in moral cognition as far 
as I can tell.) Also relevant is the fact that for language processing to take place, the input activating the early 
                                                                    
18 Note that syntactic productivity doesn’t account for the productivity of thought, either. Nevertheless, the former 
clearly has its own source of productivity (e.g. rewrite rules), which is perhaps part of what makes it capable of dealing 
with the productivity of thought. But note that the two kinds of productivity are not entirely overlapping: many well -
formed sentences can be generated which nevertheless have no obvious semantic interpretation (“colourless green ideas 
sleep furiously” is one such popular example). And vice versa, I assume there are many thoughts that are impossible to 
express in language. In any case, the important point here is merely that unlike I-language, it is far from obvious that is 
I-morality has its own source of productivity. 
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auditory system has to be transformed into this format. Similarly, if I represent Frank hitting Roy merely as a 
physical event, I won’t be evaluating it morally. 
Thus, the difference between principles of I-language (particularly, principles of syntax) and principles of 
I-morality is that, prima facie at least, only the former are (or need be) principles of combination. I shall have 
more to say regarding the question of just what types of principles a theory of moral cognition should be 
expected to posit in Section 5. 
3.3. Competence vs. performance 
3.3.1. Language 
As discussed above, Chomsky noted that there are rules of grammar that entail that the set of possible 
grammatical sentences is infinite. Yet, obviously, no human can ever produce more than a finite set of 
utterances, and there are very many (in fact an infinite number of) grammatical sentences that speakers of a 
given language would find very hard to understand19 or would never understand20 in spite of all the 
considerations in favour of their “knowing”21 the principles from which those sentences can be generated (as 
in fn. 19). However, it is clear that some of these limitations derive not from our knowledge of language (i.e. 
our I-language) per se, but from other sources. 
In part to capture such constraints imposed by language-external considerations, in the 1960s Chomsky 
introduced the distinction between competence, that is, those aspects of the mind responsible for the 
generative principles, or the “knowledge of language” (which later came to be referred as I-language) and 
performance, that is, the overall behaviour that results from other extraneous factors partially constraining the 
expression of that knowledge, including limitations of memory, shifts of attention and interest, as well as 
aspects of language processing (Chomsky, 1964, 1965; Miller & Chomsky, 1963).22 This distinction was 
especially relevant in the historical context of the birth of generative grammar, because the then prominent 
                                                                    
19 Classical examples are constructions involving repeated centre embedding, such as in the sentence: “the person 
who the girl who my colleagues mentioned fell in love with walked past the cafe”. In Chomsky’s terminology, such 
sentences are “unacceptable” but clearly grammatical (in the sense of being entailed by the rules of I-language). A serious 
difficulty with these constructions is that while one has to process them, one has to keep multiple subjects in mind as 
well as connect them subsequently with the correct predicate (Miller & Chomsky, 1963; for another theory, see 
Jackendoff, 2002, p. 32). 
20 Infinite sentences would be prime examples of this latter category.  
21 Jackendoff refers to this kind of “knowing” as f-knowledge (f for “functional”). The point is that there is no 
propositional knowledge implied by “knowledge” in Chomsky’s sense (see also Chomsky, 2018).  
22 Note that although the concepts of I-language and competence are closely related (see the text), the same is not 
ture in the case of the concepts of E-language and performance (for instance, only the former is supposed to be mind 
independent). 
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language theorists, namely behaviourists and structuralists, failed to draw such a distinction, which resulted 
in their inability (often explicitly endorsed) to distinguish between aspects of the data requiring explanation 
in terms of linguistic theory proper from aspects of the data for which theoretical explanation would more 
appropriately be expected from other domains of inquiry (a “theory of performance”). In other words, for 
behaviourist linguistic theory, there was no principled difference between data and explanandum.23 
One intuitive way to illustrate the ineluctability of the distinction is by considering the case of a person 
with acquired deafness and muteness. Although in connection with such a person, there is no overt language 
use to speak of, neither on the perceptive nor on the productive side, one would naturally assume that the 
cognitive structures used to subserve the person’s capacity to speak and understand language would not cease 
to exist subsequent to the onset of his or her disabilities. Intuitively, one would assume that the relevant 
cognitive structures still in place are more central to explaining the person’s language capacity even prior to 
the onset of the disabilities than whatever caused them not to be able to exercise their language skill. The 
former are aspects of language competence, the latter are aspects of language performance. The empirical 
details of how to outline just what needs to be included in competence are murky and controversial, but that 
a line ought to be drawn somewhere is not so contentious (indeed, in the case of language, a great deal of the 
disagreement over competence vs. performance is where to draw the line, not whether it should be drawn; see 
e.g. Culicover, 2013). 
3.3.2. Moral cognition 
With respect to the study of moral cognition, the distinction between competence and performance can 
be understood in two ways. The first is to see it as the desired shift away from paradigms openly or covertly 
influenced by the behaviourist paradigm whereby, as in the linguistic case, performance on a task is mistaken 
for the explanandum of the theory of moral cognition (Mikhail, 2011). This interpretation is in line with the 
spirit of this section. The other way of seeing the relevance of the distinction is from the perspective of 
distinguishing between the contribution of moral competence from that of other mental faculties and 
processes that are often involved in moral reasoning or tasks designed to assess moral cognition. Both of these 
views are legitimate and they are in no way mutually exclusive. 
Of course, as in the case of language, identifying and isolating the functions performed by (dedicated 
faculties of) the mind is by no means a straightforward procedure. To take an example from another cognitive 
                                                                    
23 To be sure, data have to be explained by any theory worth its salt, irrespective of the particular empirical enterprise, 
but it is rarely if ever the case that all aspects of the data are—or should be—treated with equal attention. In particular, 
it is a virtue to be able to separate noise from relevant aspects of data. 
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domain, carrying out even the simplest of behavioural tasks, such as multiplying a pair of two-digit numbers, 
involves the operation of both “horizontal” or relatively domain general faculties (such as memory) and 
“vertical” or relatively domain specific faculties (such as reading). Implicated in the transition from input to 
output are myriads of complex processing steps from the transduction of light into electrical signals through 
the transformation of the ensuing visual information into abstract numerical representations over which the 
mathematical operations are performed, all the way to the motor response (jotting down the result or saying 
it out loud). Intuitively, some of these will be crucial from the perspective of the study of mathematical 
cognition, but others will be only partially of interest or entirely irrelevant. In this example, the former 
category constitutes the competence for multiplication, the latter are aspects of the performance of the task 
that partially draw on that knowledge—as well as many other perceptual and cognitive abilities and processes 
besides. 
Similarly, it is not controversial that certain elements of the complete set of processing steps of arriving at 
a moral judgment will be of limited interest from the point of view of the study of moral cognition. In an 
experimental situation, for example, the subject is typically exposed to a stimulus, usually in the form of a 
description of a story he or she is expected to read. This involves the visual system and the system dedicated 
to reading, inter alia. Neither of these systems seems to be essential for moral cognition: for example, blind 
and illiterate people can think in moral terms. (Imagine assessing the moral capacities of an illiterate individual 
by means of a test involving reading a story, and, based on their failure to provide the appropriate answers 
concluding that they are deficient in terms of their moral faculty.) Some aspects of judgment clearly belong 
to performance, but the inverse question, again, is a difficult ultimately empirical one. Even if we narrow 
down moral cognition to the ability to assign a moral-deontic value to an action, it is far from straightforward 
what cognitive structures and operations exactly moral competence should be understood to encompass. To 
take but one example, it is famously unclear whether emotions play an essential role in the generation of moral 
judgment (cf. Huebner et al., 2009). One way to phrase this question is to ask whether emotions are part of 
moral competence or performance. 
A complicating factor is that some cognitive components may be necessary but not unique to the normal 
exercise of the cognitive capacity being investigated—as indeed in the case of emotion. With regard to 
language, there is an ongoing debate over what cognitive mechanisms contributing to language perception 
and production are specific to language competence—referred to as FLN, that is, the Narrow Language 
Faculty—and which ones are shared across other domains—referred to as FLB, that is, Broad Language 
Faculty (Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 2002; Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005, Jackendoff & Pinker, 2005; Fitch, 
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Hauser, & Chomsky, 2005).24 The same question can be raised with respect to morality. For example, it forms 
the basis of practically universal agreement that aspects of social cognition contribute to moral cognition. 
Thus, while the representation of intentions is often claimed to be central from the point of view of moral 
cognition (e.g. Wellman & Miller, 2008, but see Barrett et al. 2016, for example), we clearly think about 
intentions in contexts not involving moral considerations. A persistent quest in moral psychology has been 
to identify the “FMN” (Narrow Moral Faculty), although the debate is rarely phrased in such terms. I shall 
return to this issue further below. 
In the moral domain, at the very least, the distinction is useful as a heuristic device that draws attention to 
the fact that moral judgment is likely the result of an interaction between numerous cognitive processes and 
systems, only some of which constitute the appropriate object of inquiry as far as the study of moral cognition 
is concerned. I believe this point is generally often overlooked in the literature, which is connected to the 
phenomenon that psychologists often look for interesting effects rather than investigating and developing an 
understanding of mental competences (see also Cummins, 2000). Nevertheless, the distinction between 
competence and performance (as well as the related—though conceptually distinct—separation of I-morality 
and E-morality) has some serious repercussions with respect to what we take morality to consists in. In 
particular, as discussed in the next chapter, it makes no sense to draw either of the relevant distinctions if 
moral cognition is not a natural kind. Irrespective of whether that assumption is correct, however, the 
distinction will be useful in making sense of proposed explanations of certain patterns of moral-deontic 
reasoning (in Chapter 4). 
3.4. Production and perception 
An aspect that is part of performance in the Chomskyan tradition is language processing.25 Consider a 
sentence, such as “octopi are erudite”. There are two different ways of arriving at the linguistic (phonological, 
syntactic, etc.) structures that enable us to understand this sentence: having the thought first and “translating” 
it into language (this was the way I came up with it) or being exposed to it in a written or auditory format 
(this is how you did it). Although these routes involve rather different cognitive processes, the linguistic 
structures we arrive at eventually are supposed to be identical (which is part of what makes communication 
possible). The fact that both (constructive and perceptual) processes need access to the relevant 
                                                                    
24 A relevant additional complication is the question of the extent to which aspects of FL are shared across species 
(e.g. vocal imitation). I’ll ignore that topic here (but see e.g. de Waal, 1996). 
25 “When we say that a sentence has a certain derivation with respect to a particular generative grammar, we say 
nothing about how the speaker or hearer might proceed, in some practical or efficient way, to construct such a 
derivation. These questions belong to the theory of language use—the theory of performance” (Chomsky, 1965, p. 9). 
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representations (albeit from different directions) motivates the relegation of processing to the theory of 
performance. Consequently, a theory of performance on this view can be constructed insofar as we have a 
good theory of competence (otherwise, it is unclear what the representations are the construction of which 
processing theories are expected to explain). However, the relevant point I wish to emphasise here is that 
perception and production bifurcate: despite the shared representations they make use of, they require 
different kinds of explanations, as they involve different kinds of processes. 
The distinction between perception and production has a direct analogy in the case of moral cognition, 
and it similarly bisects the inquiry into two related but importantly different explanatory endeavours in a way 
that has often been overlooked even in modern moral psychology and also in evolutionary approaches to 
moral cognition, which often equate a tendency towards cooperation or altruism with morality (but see e.g. 
Joyce, 2006). The main problem of perception in the case of moral cognition is the problem of how we 
evaluate other agents’ actions in moral terms. This question has its own proprietary explanandum (such as 
the appraisal problem—see the next chapter), which is characteristically different from production problems, 
a typical example of which is the task of integrating the outputs of the moral faculty into an overall decision 
making process.26 Thus, there are two points suggested by LA with respect to the relationship between 
production and perception. First, both processes will access at least some of the same representational 
repository. Second, production and perception, although overlapping problems, will require importantly 
different explanations.27  
To connect two significant points, ideally, principles might be some of those cognitive structures 
characterising competence (or I-morality) that are accessed by both productive and perceptual processes. Of 
course there is no guarantee that on the discovery of a principle which correctly generates moral judgments 
of a particular type, those judgments are best explained by reference to competence or performance factors 
(see e.g. Nichols, 2005—more on this in the following chapter). Nevertheless, the ideal of searching for 
principles characterising moral competence (i.e. competence for moral judgment) is an ideal that is worth 
                                                                    
26 Jesse Prinz, a passionate critic of the Linguistic Analogy, acknowledges the utility of this distinction: “Laudable 
behavior can exist without the capacity to praise it as such. One of the exciting features of [LA] is that [it directly 
investigates] moral judgments, rather than morally praiseworthy behavior” (2008, p. 165). Ironically, the clear division 
between the problems of production and perception is one of the aspects of LA that would not be suggested by a “vision 
analogy”, which is recommended by Prinz as an equally valid analogy for the study of morality (see the next chapter), 
although a “motor analogy” (also mentioned by Prinz) would perhaps fare better in this respect (though not so in many 
others). 
27 This is commensurable with some evolutionary arguments concerning the primacy of perception in this domain 
(cf. e.g. DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013). Thus, this might be one example of the many potential disanalogies between 
language and morality (which is noticed only if the analogy is acknowledged first). 
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aspiring to, I believe. This brings us to the question of just what a principle in the context of the current 
framework. This question is answered in Section 5 below, after considering the question of what shape 
explanation is to take in the theory of moral cognition if we take LA seriously. 
4. The nature of explanation 
A theory of moral cognition needs to do more than analyse the nature of the phenomenon it attempts to 
explain (namely, moral thinking): its success will be predicated on those of specific explanatory proposals for 
particular aspects of moral thinking. But how are such theories to be formulated? So far, I have been 
concerned only with outlining the substantive assumptions of the Linguistic Analogy in terms of the nature 
of the explanandum: the phenomenon we are trying to understand and explain. In this section, I go on to 
unpack some of the implications of this model with respect to the shape of the broader explanatory project.  
4.1. Computationalism and the search for moral principles 
A substantive theory of what thinking—and ipso facto moral thinking—is (i.e. mentalism qua 
computationalism and representationalism) rather directly sets the agenda for the explanans: the terms in 
which the phenomenon is to be explained. To reiterate, the (rather) general consensus in cognitive science is 
that thinking is a form of symbol manipulation. Once this picture is taken seriously, it follows that 
explanation of cognitive processes such as thinking—and ipso facto moral thinking—will have to be 
computational. Fortunately for us, there exist detailed accounts dedicated to fleshing out what form 
computational explanation is to take, in particular with respect to a theory of mental structure. 
Although we could illustrate the same points by reference to explanation in linguistics, for historical 
reasons, I will use David Marr’s ground-breaking analysis of explanation in the cognitive science of vision as 
outlined in his book, Vision. This analysis applies equally well in other areas of cognitive science, such as 
linguistics or problem solving. Marr conceived of explanation in cognitive science as involving three 
fundamental levels: the functional level, the computational-algorithmic level, and the level of implementation 
(Marr, 1982).28 At the functional level, the main task is to characterise the function carried out by a mental 
mechanism in terms of an input-output relation. That is, the focus is on what it is that the mechanism does. 
                                                                    
28 I slightly depart from Marr’s terminology, who describes the first level as the level of computational theory and the 
second level as the algorithmic level. My only reason for doing so is that, for better or worse, I find referring to the firs t 
level as “computational” slightly misleading. Marr’s use of the term is somewhat unusual, referring to computational 
tasks rather than computational processes in the sense of symbol manipulation (see Miłkowski, 2013, p. 114; also see 
Sterelny, 1990, who refers to the first level as “ecological”). 
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At the computational-algorithmic level, the analysis involves the particular representations involved as well as 
the processing steps that are used to carry out the transformation of the input into the output. That is, the 
focus is on how the mechanism does what it does. Finally, at the level of implementation, the aim is to explain 
how the mechanism as well as the representations involved are physically realised or implemented in the 
physical structure that carries out the computation (the brain in our case). 
As an analogy, consider how we might go about investigating a mathematical function of a calculator in a 
case in which our initial epistemic access is limited to the input and output of the function. First, we try to 
find out what the function does [try f(2) = 4; f(3) = 9; etc. → f(a) = a2] and what its domain and range are 
[try f(–2.5) = 6.25 → a; f(a)∈ℚ]. Then, the next step is to decide what algorithm realises the generation of the 
output [f(a) = a × a; or f(a) = (a–1) × (a+1) + 1, which are extensionally equivalent]. Finally, the last step 
towards a complete understanding of the function is the investigation of how the algorithm is physically 
realised (e.g. how a calculator’s transistor controls the movement of electrons, and so on) 
This is analogous to the investigation of the human mind in general or aspects (i.e. mechanisms) of the 
human mind. On the most general interpretation of this framework, this work may proceed in the following 
way: we provide the human a proximal stimulus in the lab, and record what it does with it. But instead of 
stopping at describing the input and the (behavioural) output, we speculate what processing steps are 
involved, and what operational principles these are constrained by. Finally, once we are fairly certain that our 
analysis is correct, we have a look at how the brain carries out the identified processing steps. Of course, this 
picture is far too oversimplified, because it treats the human as the function, yet we know that any carrying 
out a behavioural task will involve multiple processing steps. Nevertheless, in an ideal state of cognitive 
science, each of these steps would be described in functional and computational-algorithmic terms based on 
data gained from sophisticated experimental procedures.29 
                                                                    
29 An illustrative example is the theory of early (low- and intermediate level) visual processing, which has achieved a 
fairly sophisticated understanding in terms of all of Marr’s levels (see e.g. Kandel et al. 2012, pp. 577-620). Many argue 
of course that this type of explanation gets more and more unachievable as we move from “peripheral” perceptual 
processes to more “central” ones. The paradigm case is Fodor (1983; 2000). But many disagree (see e.g. Barrett, 2015; 
Carruthers, 2006; see also Chomsky, 2018). This is one of those (very many) fascinating topics that will not be settled in 
this thesis. Suffice it to say that Fodor’s worries about central cognition did not stop researchers from making remarkable 
progress in these domains. Furthermore, regarding our topic here, it is unclear as to what extent moral cognition is 
properly regarded as central, however one might proceed in terms of establishing the boundary. 
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Figure 1.1: The function machine 
In the broadest sense, the study of moral cognition is the study of the functions that are implemented by 
the mind/brain in the course of moral thinking and reasoning, involving the characterisation of input-output 
relations as well as an algorithmic description of what computations those relations are performed by. As 
mentioned earlier, and as suggested by even the modified, more modest version of the Argument for Moral 
Grammar endorsed above, the preliminary search for representations and functions is based on the 
assumption that moral judgment is driven by rules and principles, accounting for the productivity and 
unboundedness it is designed to harness. The hope is that by identifying candidate principles that have a 
running hope of achieving descriptive adequacy, and by subjecting them to systematic empirical and 
theoretical inquiry, eventually we can explain those principles in rather more explicit computational terms. 
5. What is a principle? 
Thus far, I have not said much about what form principles are expected to take, nor what principles are 
to begin with, beyond pointing out that they are part of the solution to the productivity problem and that, 
contrary to what AMG is generally taken to show, they need not be combinatorial. Although in general I 
don’t think it is a very good idea to start explicating a technical term by reference to a dictionary definition, I 
cannot resist that temptation here, because the following dictionary entry happens to prove rather 
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instructive.30 According to the Oxford Dictionary a principle is “a natural law forming the basis for the 
construction or working of a machine” (sense 2.1). I find this definition a reasonable start as it draws attention 
to the two central ways in which a principle can feature in the description and explanation of a mechanism or 
a system, namely, as guiding its construction or operation (see below). But of course for our purposes it is far 
from being sufficiently nuanced.  
Chomsky characteristically uses the term with a “systematic ambiguity”, one not unlike that involved in 
his use of the terms grammar or theory of language (1965, p. 25).31 “Grammar” may either refer to an 
individual’s mental or internal grammar (i.e. the “knowledge” characterising linguistic competence—see 
above), or to the linguist’s model of it (a generative grammar capable of generating all and only the 
grammatical sentences of a given language). Analogously, “theory of language” may refer either “to the child’s 
innate predisposition to learn a language of a certain type and to the linguist’s account of this” (ibid.). 
Similarly, principle may denote either something that is built in the cognitive machinery (an internally 
represented “principle”), or it may refer to something that is part of the cognitive scientist’s model of it; a 
“model principle”, something that helps establish the appropriate functional (input-output) relations 
whether or not it describes an algorithm that corresponds to cognitive structures and processes operative in 
the modelled speaker’s mind. Those concerns correspond to Marr’s first and second levels, respectively (see 
Section 4). In a successful case, that is, when an aspect of (mental) grammar is appropriately characterised or 
explained in the form of an explanation pitched at the computational-algorithmic level, the two kinds of 
principles will be strictly isomorphic. At the outset of the inquiry, though, there is no assumption to the effect 
that the linguist’s principles are explicitly (or otherwise) represented in individuals’ minds. That is, as per the 
normal course of an explanatory endeavour, the explanation begins at the functional level (see more on this 
topic in the next chapter). 
A second distinction is related to the equivocation in the above quoted definition, namely, whether the 
principle concerns the “construction” or “working” of the machine—or the mind in our case. As noted in 
Section 2 above, a central problem in language (as well as in moral psychology) is to explain how we get to the 
mature state of linguistic (or moral) competence. To reiterate, Chomsky’s answer to this question involves 
                                                                    
30 Still, it should be born in mind that this section is most definitely not an exercise in conceptual or linguistic analysis. 
The present aim is to develop an understanding of the ways in which it makes sense to talk about principles in the context 
of the study of moral cognition as suggested by LA (by contrast, in the context of law, other constructs may be more 
appropriate, see e.g. Robinson 2016, pp. 38-42). The intention is that by drawing these distinctions, it will be easier to 
make sense of some claims we will encounter in later chapters. 
31 In fact, it was due to the persistent misunderstandings and misinterpretations on account of this ambiguity that 
Chomsky eventually introduced the term I-language (in Chomsky, 1986).  
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positing an innate system of the mind/brain (the initial state of the language faculty or FL) that, in its 
interaction with the data the child is exposed to in the course of his/her ontogenetic development (or the 
“primary linguistic data” or PLD), is responsible for the acquisition of the I-language the child ends up with 
(the adult state of FL). Thus, FL (in its initial state) is what the mind contributes specifically to the task of 
language acquisition.32 The task of the linguist is to provide an abstract model of the initial state of FL (hence, 
there is an ambiguity with respect to FL that is akin to that with respect to either a grammar or a principle—
see also Collins, 2004). This model involves principles that capture or guide the diachronic development of 
FL (for example by specifying what data it requires to arrive at the construction of particular mental 
grammars). Analogously, proponents of LA have hypothesised that the initial state of FM is non-zero, that is, 
the mind is innately prepared to develop what eventually ends up being the adult state of FM: I-morality.  
An instructive classification scheme is advanced by Dwyer, who distinguishes between norms, rules, and 
principles in a way that is not customarily done in the moral psychology literature (Dwyer, 2008, pp. 411-414). 
According to Dwyer’s proposal, norms should be regarded as emergent, group-level phenomena; those 
standards of conduct that are publicly accessible and (to varying degrees) collectively enforced by means of 
shared public attitudes towards violators and in some cases even legal sanctions. In contrast, rules are 
understood as individual level phenomena: they are represented in individuals’ minds and thus guide their 
behaviour (production) and/or the evaluation of other agents’ conduct (perception).33 Consequently, 
although norms and rules may share content, it is technically possible for them to be doubly dissociated: a 
member of a moral community may privately (explicitly or otherwise) disagree with a prevailing norm while 
“having” idiosyncratic rules that are not widely shared. It may be apparent that the distinction between 
systems of norms and systems of rules is very similar to the distinction between E-languages and idiolects, that 
is, I-languages. On this conception, therefore, the study of E-moralities has norms as its proper subject, while 
the study of I-morality consists to a large extent of an inquiry into the nature and content of rules. That leaves 
us with principles, which, for Dwyer, characterise the moral faculty. More specifically, principles characterise 
the initial state of FM such that they explain the kinds of (I-)moralities we end up with—thus, they define the 
                                                                    
32 As mentioned in the previous section (Section 4.2.2 to be exact), there emerged a subsequent distinction between 
a FLN and FLW in the literature. To reiterate, the first is the language faculty in the narrow sense, i.e. system(s) that are 
entirely domain specific in the sense of being dedicated to language acquisition or knowledge and nothing else. FLW is 
not dedicated to language per se but it comprises the systems that contribute crucially important functions to language, 
whether in terms of acquisition or knowledge. On some extreme empiricist models (e.g. Christiansen and Chater, 2008), 
there is no need for positing FLN (or UG), because what the mind contributes to language is never exclusive to language 
itself, namely, general purpose or domain general learning principles and processing capacities. There is a hotly debated 
analogous question with respect to morality (see the next chapter). 
33 Thus, somewhat confusingly, rule more or less corresponds with what Sripada and Stich (2006) refer to as norms 
(although at times they are somewhat ambiguous in the use of the term). 
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space of possible I-moralities (cf. Moro, 2008 in the domain of language). That is, they guide and constrain 
the ontogenetic development of moral competence. 
Dwyer rightly criticises moral anti-nativists (i.e. those that doubt whether there is an FM in the narrow 
sense) such as Prinz (see e.g. Prinz 2008, 2009) for not adequately identifying the explanatory level at which 
they believe innateness claims ought to be made or contested. As Dwyer points out, it makes little sense either 
to entertain or reject the possibility that E- and/or I-moralities, and, a fortiori, norms and rules might be 
innate. The only legitimate target of nativist claims and their rebuttals is if they are addressed at the faculty 
level (both in the case of language and morality), that is, if they concern principles in the way in which Dwyer 
defines them.34 
Given how little we know concerning the constraints that regulate the development and acquisition of I-
moralities, it is not surprising that Dwyer is uncertain as to how much at present there is to be said in 
connection with them. It is worth quoting Dwyer on this at some length: 
“To be frank, the form and content of the principles that I claim characterize the moral faculty 
remain a mystery. But what this approach predicts is that the articulation of such principles is 
unlikely to involve the use of terms with which moral philosophers are currently familiar. [...] As to 
the form of principles, I think we need to think more creatively about the nature of constraints in 
general. Not all constraints take the form of imperatives like “No flip-flops allowed in the front bar!” 
In cognitive science, we can think of constraints as ways of blocking a cognitive movement; a sort of 
“you-can’t-get-there-from-here” admonition. Consider the moral judgment that it is good to torture 
small babies for fun. That has the feel of something no “normal” moral creature could generate. At a 
really fundamental level, then, the idea is that the principles of the moral faculty are what explain why 
such judgments cannot be generated” (Dwyer, 2008, p. 414).35 
Although, as I have suggested, Dwyer’s tripartite distinction is useful (for example on account of rendering 
the moral nativism versus anti-nativism debate more tractable), it misses an important point that reaches 
beyond the mere exegetical fact that other proponents of LA, such as Rawls and Mikhail (and indeed 
Chomsky himself), customarily make use the term principle in a rather different fashion, namely as being 
                                                                    
34 Claiming that a rule (such as the “I-prohibition” against killing) is innate might be seen as roughly equivalent to 
claiming that an English speaker’s past tense formation rule is innate (and mutatis mutandis for norms). (Although 
notice that even such rules could be properly described as innate for instance under the “innateness as canalisation” view; 
e.g. Ariew, 1999). 
35 Or, to put it in terms of the current discussion, why I-moralities consistently lack the rule “torturing babies for fun 
is morally good”. 
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more or less synonymous with Dwyer’s rule, that is, a denizen of our mental lives that serves the purpose of 
guiding or generating moral judgment—or as formal tool of a model of moral judgment.36 Rather, the 
problem is that exclusive emphasis on the explication of rules and principles (in Dwyer’s sense) as the primary 
aim of moral psychology overlooks the fact that an exhaustive characterisation of rules (again, in Dwyer’s 
sense, that is, qua mentally represented “injunctions”) is unlikely to be sufficient to solve the problem of the 
productivity of moral cognition (see Section 3.2), for example since reasoning about and passing judgment 
on novel morally salient actions does not reduce to categorising them as instances of morally significant act-
types, such as murder or theft.37 For instance, principles such as the Action Principle (according to which 
harm caused by an action is morally worse than that caused by an omission) or the Principle of Double Effect 
or PDE (which determines overall permissibility given a prima facie wrong and a morally desirable outcome 
that is achieved through it) are not specified over particular action types at all. Inputs to these principles 
apparently involve deontic statuses of acts (prohibited or impermissible), and they arbitrate over the 
permissibility of such acts given a set of circumstances taken into account by the principle in one way or 
another.38 
Thus, with an eye on a more nuanced (though not necessary exhaustive) topography of the possibility 
space, I distinguish between three broad types of principles. First, as alluded to before (and as will be discussed 
more extensively later in the thesis), there are constraints on what types of representations are potentially 
subject to moral-deontic evaluation. For example, my suspicion is that representations of events not involving 
agents—though their consequences may be “morally” undesirable (think of wildfires or earthquakes)—fall 
outside the moral domain (as understood in this thesis). Principles regulating the mental properties of the 
input to moral-deontic evaluation will be referred to as constraint principles. Constraint principles determine 
the kinds of things are subject to moral evaluation. Second, there are regularities concerning what deontic 
values particular acts are understood as having. These are supposed to be captured by faculty principles. 
Faculty principles—such as the prohibition of intentional homicide—are perhaps the closest to rules in 
Dwyer’s sense. Finally, I shall refer to principles determining overall permissibility given situational 
constraints (such as the Action Principle or PDE—see the above paragraph) as conflict principles, because they 
                                                                    
36 Take Rawls, for example: “what is required is a formulation of a set of principles which, when conjoined to our 
beliefs and knowledge of the circumstances, would lead us to make these judgments with their supporting reasons were 
we to apply these principles conscientiously and intelligently” (1971, p. 47). 
37 Although it is also possible that rules go well beyond that simplistic characterisation. The representational format 
of norms/rules is far from being a settled issue in cognitive science (cf. e.g. Sripada & Stich, 2007). 
38 Mikhail (2002, 2011); Donagan (1977); Rawls (1971); see further below. 
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resolve a conflict between two (or more) apparently incongruous deontic rationales, that is, prima facie 
obligations or prohibitions.39  
I should note in passing that there are other related but distinct classifications in the legal or moral 
philosophy literature regarding norms (i.e. Dwyer’s rules and our faculty principles), but I find them in this 
context not especially helpful. For example, in their attempt to classify the “Ought Implies Can” principle 
(see chapters 3 and 4), Fox and Feis (2018) consider distinctions such as that between primary and secondary 
norms. The first difficulty is that different authors use these terms in somewhat diverging ways. For instance, 
in Kelsen’s terminology, primary norms are descriptive in the sense that they specify the sanctions warranted 
by different types of wrongdoing, such as ‘the hand of a thief is cut off’. In contrast, secondary norms specify 
what one should do in order to avoid the relevant sanctions, such as ‘thou shalt not steal’ (Kelsen, 1967; 
Navarro, 2013). Hart, on the other hand, regards norms of the latter type as primary norms; for him, 
secondary norms are those that bestow the power of the authorship of primary norms on a lawgiver. (Fox and 
Feis also discuss related concepts, such as those of “iterated norm” and “higher order norm”—see von Wright 
1983). More importantly, although these distinctions are instructive, and they clearly bear some relevance for 
our purposes here, they are not particularly well suited for the study of moral cognition. For this reason, I 
shall rely on my own terminology, because it is designed to deal with moral judgment in the context of 
cognitive architecture and as such it is more helpful from the perspective of the issues discussed in this thesis. 
Notice that in distinguishing between three different types of principles (constraint, faculty and conflict), 
we did not leave room for principles in Dwyer’s proprietary sense, that is, qua principles characterising (the 
initial state of) FM. To reiterate, these principles (the form and content of which remain subject to 
speculation given the current state of the inquiry—see the quote from Dwyer above) are supposed to regulate 
the acquisition of the moral sense; or as a bona fide Chomskyan would put it, the growth of the moral faculty. 
To capture this sense of the term, I distinguish between acquisition principles, that is, principles in Dwyer’s 
sense, and processing principles, that is, principles in more or less the senses we have been considering in the 
previous paragraph (and also in Rawls’s and Mikhail’s sense, for instance).40 Thus, this latter category includes 
constraint, output and conflict principles. A standard assumption would be that processing principles 
develop as a function of acquisition principles plus the external input that shapes the development of FM (in 
which sense the two types of principles are systematically related). As we will see further below (Section 6), 
                                                                    
39 A related term is ordering principle (Mikhail, 2002, p. 25; Donagan, 1977, pp. 157-164). 
40 By referring to these principles as processing principles, I am deliberately ignoring an intricate issue that we touched 
upon above (Section 3.4), namely, that theories of processing may be understood as theories of performance rather than 
competence, as it involves the use of information stored or supplied by FL/FM. I merely raise this issue to put it to one 
side: including this distinction here would further complicate an already rather complex classification scheme. 
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these two types of principles, acquisition principles and processing principles, form parts of different, albeit 
related, explanatory endeavours, namely, those dedicated to solving the problems of explanatory and 
descriptive adequacy, that is, the problem of explaining synchronic and diachronic aspects of moral cognition, 
respectively. The distinction will also be important from the point of view of chapters 3 and 4. 
Despite Dwyer’s pessimism regarding our current understanding of the nature of acquisition principles, 
we might speculate a bit further. For example, there is what we might refer to as principles of derivation that 
purport to drive ontogenetic development, and perhaps even beyond. A principle of this kind, although never 
explicitly articulated as such, may be that which is held to distinguish the moral from the non-moral domain 
according to some theories. On a typical view of this kind, such as social domain theory, for example (e.g. 
Turiel, 1983; Nucci, 2001), moral violations share the property of involving unprovoked harm, right 
violation or injustice against an innocent agent, where “moral violations” are operationally defined as those 
instances of wrongdoing which are seen as general in scope (in terms of spatial and temporal applicability), 
authority independent, and more serious than other types of non-moral/conventional norm violations. 
Actions of such description are pan-culturally regarded as moral violations by children as young as 3 years old. 
The point here is not so much to defend or attack this view (for that, see e.g. Fessler et al. 2015 vs. Sousa & 
Piazza, 2014; Piazza et al. 2018) as to introduce one way of understanding its central claim within the present 
framework. The idea is that entertaining an abstract description of an action on top of a more “concrete” one, 
such as [A causes injustice to P], engages the FM in such a way that the action will be stored as morally 
forbidden.4142 On more ambitious proposals of this kind, all and only rules (faculty principles) of I-morality 
will share this abstract structural description (we will consider a recent theory in this vicinity in the next 
chapter). It may be an open question whether principles of derivation (if they exist) have a critical or sensitive 
period, or they remain operative in adults. This latter possibility (invariably assumed in the debates 
mentioned) is why derivation principles may overlap with processing principles: (a) they might be seen as 
constraint principles of a special kind, and (b) they might be taken to obviate the need for faculty or even 
                                                                    
41 Or it will enter a Sripada & Stich (2007) style norm database automatically (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2), that is, 
without the presence of the usual cues indicating the presence of a norm, such as different kinds of norm implicating 
behaviour. Again, such a story is speculative and provisional, and there is no assumption as to the mechanism that makes 
it the case that the relevant actions will be seen as morally significant. 
42 Notice also that there are two potential issues not strictly separated here: how a “more concrete” act description 
(such as X kills Y—which is still terribly abstract by the way) can be ontogenetically assigned a deontic status, on the one 
hand, and how an action is judged “on-line” in terms of this deontic status, on the other.  
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conflict principles altogether (the latter only if there is a single derivation principle, which is not the case in 
pluralistic theories, such as Haidt’s, for instance).43 
How do we know what the principles guiding moral cognition are? Perhaps we only need to ask. In fact, 
this reasonable looking assumption dominated some of the earliest attempts at a systematic scientific inquiry 
into moral cognition, such as Piaget’s (1932) or Kohlberg’s (1969, 1984), whose developmental theories were 
constructed on the basis of interviews in which children were asked to reason through moral scenarios in an 
attempt to discover the principles driving their moral judgment, such as Heinz’s dilemma: 
A woman was on her deathbed. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a 
form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to 
make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to produce. He paid $200 for 
the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went 
to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half 
of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him 
pay later. But the druggist said: “No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it.” So 
Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's laboratory to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz 
have broken into the laboratory to steal the drug for his wife? Why or why not? 
Based on patterns in children’s responses to such dilemmas, Kohlberg theorised that moral development 
consists of three levels (each of which he further subdivided into two “stages”). The classification went along 
the following lines. If the child appealed to Heinz’s self-interest, then he or she would be said to be at the “pre-
conventional” level (i.e. the lowest one). Second, appeal to what is accepted and required by the community 
would place the child at the “conventional” level. Finally, reasoning in terms of a social contract or universal 
ethical principles would be taken to indicate that the child is at the “post-conventional” level. Strikingly, what 
the child’s actual answer was did not matter for Kohlberg’s purposes, only the way the judgment (whatever it 
was) was justified. 
This approach contrasts rather starkly with that assumed in this thesis. For a start, in linguistics, the 
principles driving grammaticality judgments are rarely if ever assumed to be available to conscious reflection, 
which is why surveys in grammaticality studies rarely even ask participants why they think a certain 
                                                                    
43 If they were descriptive theories, Kantian and utilitarian ethics could be understood as proposing their respective 
derivation principles; one very abstract principle explaining why particular acts are (seen as) morally right or wrong (cf. 
Section 6). 
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construction is (un-)grammatical.44 Indeed, more recently, the Kohlbergian assumption has been quite 
radically challenged in empirical moral psychology due to the recognition that the justifications subjects 
provide for their judgments are often thoroughly insufficient to account for the patterns in their judgments 
(see e.g. Haidt, 2001; Hauser et al., 2007). (Haidt famously termed the related phenomenon whereby a person 
is surprised to find out that he or she cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of their judgment moral 
dumbfounding.) 
To capture the difference between principles we appeal to in justifying our judgments and those that are 
causally responsible for the generation of the latter, Mikhail distinguishes between express and operative 
principles, respectively (Mikhail, 2011, pp. 19-21; see also Hauser, 2006, pp. 37-8 and Hauser et al., 2008a, p. 
109, who talk about “expressed” and operative knowledge). It should be rather evident that the primary goal 
of a science of moral cognition is aimed at discovering the operative principles of moral judgment. As with 
many of the other distinctions introduced by LA, this observation need not depend on a close analogy between 
language and moral cognition. Indeed, the distinction is customarily observed in many areas of cognitive 
science, such as the study of probabilistic thinking, visual perception, or mathematical cognition. For 
instance, purported (operative) principles of probabilistic reasoning, such as the representativeness 
heuristic45, are not discovered by asking experimental subjects to identify the inferential steps via which they 
arrive at their particular probability judgments, rather, it requires the systematic study of the patterns in their 
judgments. Nevertheless, as with other distinctions introduced in this chapter, it will be prudent to avoid 
being dogmatic about the divide. In particular, there are no obvious conclusive theoretical or empirical 
reasons in favour of the assumption that the two types of principles cannot collapse in particular cases—that 
is, it remains a live possibility that in some instances, operative principles may also be express—see for example 
Cushman, Young, & Hauser (2006), where some principles that accurately explained judgment also proved 
accessible to conscious reasoning. We shall return to this problem in Chapter 3.46 
                                                                    
44 Compare Chomsky regarding this issue: “Obviously, every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized a 
generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of his language. This is not to say that he is aware of the rules of the 
grammar or even that he can become aware of them, or that his statements about his intuitive knowledge of the language 
are necessarily accurate. Any interesting generative grammar will be dealing, for the most part, with mental processes 
that are far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness; furthermore, it is quite apparent that a speaker's 
reports and viewpoints about his behavior and his competence may be in error. Thus a generative grammar attempts to 
specify what the speaker actually knows, not what he may report about his knowledge” (1965, p. 8). 
45 According to the representativeness heuristic, “the subjective probability of an event, or a sample, is determined 
by the degree to which it: (i) is similar in essential characteristics to its parent population; and (ii) reflects the salient 
features of the process by which it is generated” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, p. 430). 
46 One reason for this possibility in the case of moral judgment is noted Malle and colleagues, who point out that, at 
least in the case of blame, “only if people generally have access to the informational basis of their blame judgments [...] 
can they demand, offer, and negotiate such information as warrants for their acts of blaming” (Malle et al., 2014, p. 149, 
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As an aside, I rather like the way in which seeing theories of moral psychology more explicitly as theories 
of different kinds of principles and their corresponding representational planes allows for the understanding 
and framing of old debates in new and potentially constructive ways. Consider, for example, “monist” 
derivational theories (those proposing a single derivation principle) and their potential implications about the 
nature of other kinds of principles. I mentioned above that such views, if correct, might obviate the need for 
faculty or conflict principles. Now we can add a qualification: this elimination would only reach as far as 
operative principles of those kinds. We clearly have a repository of express—both faculty and conflict—
principles, which, if the derivation principle is unavailable to conscious reflection, might be the product of 
inductive inferences (post hoc rationalisation) over the situations in which we have found ourselves judging 
actions in a certain way. We talk about principles such as the prohibition against intentional homicide, but 
really, on a monist account it is not homicide that is the relevant structural description responsible for our 
moral judgment, but that, at least prototypically, by killing someone, we commit an injustice, as it might be 
(e.g. on Sousa and his colleague’s deflationary theory, see Sousa et al. 2014, 2018). 
Figure 1.2 below has been constructed to help make sense of—and navigate between—the distinctions 
introduced in this section. 
 
Figure 1.2: The proposed distinctions regarding the term principle in the context of the 
study of moral cognition. The first bifurcation (model vs. mental) captures the 
                                                                    
fn. 2). Indeed, more generally, that many aspects of moral cognition ought to be consciously available more or less 
follows from some of its presumed functions, such as social persuasion (see e.g. Haidt, 2013; Sterelny, 2010). 
Nevertheless, such arguments are far from conclusive, of course. 
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characteristic systematic ambiguity of the Chomskyan framework (cf. the same type of 
ambiguity regarding the referents of terms such as generative grammar or generative rule; 
see the text): the scientist’s task is to describe internal principles by constructing models of 
these. Model principles are asymmetrically dependent on internal principles, since the 
interest in the former is derivative of that in the latter. The second bifurcation (acquisition 
vs. processing) concerns the aspect of I-morality that is regulated by the principle. In the 
case of a processing principle, what is regulated is the (synchronic) state of FM, that is, I -
morality. In the case of an acquisition principle, what is regulated is the (diachronic) 
development of FM. Acquisition principles may be subdivided between the “mysterious” 
Dwyer-type acquisition principles, and less mysterious derivation principles (the potency 
of which might not be limited to diachronic acquisition—see the main text). Looking at 
the third division of the rightmost branch, there are three types of processing principles 
(characterising I-morality): constraint (which can be understood as governing what 
representations are potentially subject to deontic valence assignment), output (which can 
be understood as rules governing the process of what deontic value is assigned to an action 
representation), and conflict (which are principles that guide the resolution of deontic 
conflicts). This latter trifurcation is based on both presumed temporal order and logical 
primacy of processing. Finally, each branch of the processing node further splits into 
operative and express principles, depending on whether they are appealed to in the course 
of justification of judgment or they actually guide it (or, potentially, both; see text). Note 
that the model branch replicates all the distinctions within the internal branch, although 
the nodes to the left have been omitted for the sake of simplicity. 
6. Empirical standards of evaluation 
On the basis of the preceding discussion, we might already have a few ideas as to how to assess (aspects of) 
a theory of the moral faculty. First of all, we noted the productivity problem, and the consequent requirement 
that a theory of moral competence specify some means by which to account for our ability to assess entirely 
novel situations in moral terms. We also concluded that the best way of doing so is by appeal to (not 
necessarily combinatorial) principles, such as the types of principles discussed in the previous section, as well 
as specifying the representations that those principles are defined in terms of. So we require that we have a set 
of judgments that humans actually make47 and the characterisation of a set of principles and representations 
                                                                    
47 Ideally cross-culturally, but I promised I would ignore this complication. 
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from which these can be derived. This is very much as it should be, with the addition of a further criterion: 
an explanation of how these principles develop; more accurately, a characterisation of the inherent properties 
of the mind that enable the acquisition of the relevant principles and representations given the external 
information that is ontogenetically available to the organism. We shall briefly consider each of these steps in 
turn. 
The first juncture at which the “adequacy” of a theory can be assessed is whether it provides a correct 
account of the relevant data points. A theory that satisfies this requirement is referred to as observationally 
adequate. In linguistic theory, the relevant data points are judgments of grammaticality. When a generative 
grammar (in the model sense) satisfies the criterion of observational adequacy, it lists sentences along with 
their grammaticality status and thus forms a sort of grammatically annotated corpus. In the domain of the 
study of moral cognition, on one conception of observational adequacy, the sentences are action descriptions, 
and grammaticality is replaced by a deontic status (obligatory, forbidden, etc.) that is attached to each of those 
descriptions.48 Although this level of adequacy may appear rather trivial, it is logically necessary: it is what a 
theory of I-language/morality must account for.49 
Another way of thinking of observational adequacy is not as requiring an exhaustive list of data points and 
grammaticality/permissibility judgments (which would not be possible to achieve anyway), but as a basis 
from which inquiry can proceed; after all, scientists and philosophers need to agree on what the data that 
needs to be accounted for are. Thus, observational adequacy can be achieved relative to a closed set of 
sentences/cases (see the example further below). Once we agree on the content of the relevant judgments, we 
can carry on to the more interesting part of the inquiry that involves theorising about the processes and 
mechanisms that synchronically or diachronically give rise to our dataset. 
As for the synchronic task, given the productivity of both language and action representation (Section 
3.2), what is required is to devise generalisations that not only describe but predict or generate the relevant 
data points as described by an observationally adequate theory.50 These generalisations, as argued before, 
come in the form of a set of (posited) representations and principles defined over them. In the case of 
language, the representations are a closed set of functional—for example, syntactic or phonological—
                                                                    
48 Of course, due to the productivity of both domains, the list can never be exhaustive. 
49 This is a narrow conception of the task of moral psychology; there are other legitimate questions to be asked (such 
as questions about responsibility and virtue, for instance). 
50 It should be rather obvious that a theory that only addresses the problem of observational adequacy can hardly be 
appropriately referred to as a theory. Maintaining the opposite would be tantamount to claiming that explanation in 
physics is a list of meter readings (to adapt Chomsky’s critique of the practice  of referring to psychology as “behavioural 
science” to a slightly different phenomenon). 
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categories bound to lexical items and the principles may be combinatorial, such as rewrite rules in syntax or 
phonotactic principles in the case of phonology (the latter of which define admissible combinations of 
phonemes taking into account, inter alia, place of articulation or position within syllabic structure). In the 
case of morality, the representations are also arguably from a closed class—often taken to be causally and 
intentionally structured action and outcome representations (e.g. Cushman, 2008; Greene, 2013; Mikhail, 
2011), while the nature of the principles is best understood as derivational, faculty, conflict, or a combination 
of these, as argued above. When these criteria are satisfied, the theory has reached descriptive adequacy.  
Two additional points are worth making with respect to descriptive adequacy. The first is that descriptive 
adequacy concerns the output; that is, it is all about producing the generalisations that predict or generate the 
data we observe. In principle, there can be many different descriptively adequate theories generating the same 
data points (in practice, producing one such theory for either language or moral cognition is an enormously 
difficult task). Second, on a fully demanding conception, a theory of language is descriptively adequate if and 
only if it generates all and only the grammatical sentences of a given language; and mutatis mutandis for moral 
cognition. This is an unrealistically high expectation with respect to language, not to mention moral 
cognition. It makes sense, therefore, to speak of descriptive adequacy regarding a more circumcised set of cases 
or judgments (this is the strategy in Mikhail, 2011, for example)—just as I suggested above with respect to 
observational adequacy. 
Sticking with language for the moment, it is perhaps easy to see that a system of principles and 
representations that satisfies both observational and descriptive adequacy still does not constitute a complete 
theory of language from a cognitive science point of view. This is because the ultimate explanandum for 
linguistic theory in this framework is the language faculty, which is not accounted for even if we have an 
observationally and descriptively adequate grammar for all known languages (which of course we do not). A 
complete theory would have to explain how FL allows for the development of particular I-languages given 
the linguistic data children are exposed to (that is, PLD as mentioned before). This is the diachronic task 
discussed in the previous paragraphs. A successful theory satisfying this criterion (over and above 
observational and descriptive adequacy) could be said to have achieved explanatory adequacy, the deepest 
constraint on a theory of language. (In the parlance of the previous section, the goal of explanatory adequacy 
is to discover the acquisition principles that, when conjoined with PLD, explain why we end up with the 
particular language specific grammars posited by descriptively adequate theories.) 
Turning our attention to the domain of moral cognition, informally, aiming for explanatory adequacy 
requires an explanation of how children develop into creatures having the capacity to think and reason in 
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moral-deontic terms; or minimally, to make moral judgments concerning permissibility or right and wrong 
given the relevant data they are exposed to during ontogeny; that is, what we might refer to as the “primary 
moral data” (or PMD).51 Less informally, the goal is to discover the principles guiding acquisition (i.e. 
acquisition principles) that, conjoined with PMD explain and predict the development of particular I-
moralities (as characterised by representations and processing principles). As in the case of language, in fact 
even more so, as things stand, this is more of an ideal given the current state of inquiry (and, again, not for 
lack of trying). 
I mentioned above that it is in principle possible to have two (even fully) descriptively adequate theories 
at the same time, namely, those that generate the “list” as described by observationally adequate theories (and 
beyond). On Chomsky’s view, explanatory adequacy enables us to choose between such a hypothetical set of 
descriptively adequate grammars in a principled way; that is because a theory satisfying the criterion of 
explanatory adequacy explains why a particular grammar is successful out of a set of extensionally equivalent 
grammars of a particular I-language.52 Chomsky certainly appears to hold not only that explanatory adequacy 
helps select between such extensionally equivalent grammars, but also that the only way to arbitrate between 
them is by reference to an explanatorily adequate theory of language, which, if true, would be unfortunate 
given the rather unrealistic prospect of developing such a complete linguistic theory.53 And, as usual, the 
situation would be even more difficult in the case of moral cognition. 
Nevertheless, I would argue that it is possible to disagree in a meaningful way more or less independently 
of questions about explanatory adequacy over which of two theories describes better the mechanism which 
results in a set of observations about linguistic or moral judgment (and indeed this has been the case in the 
                                                                    
51 The question of just what it takes to be a creature capable of moral judgment is subject to much controversy, made 
even more difficult by the dubious legitimacy of determining the answer to this question ahead of inquiry. Here, in line 
with the discussion in Section 3.3.2 (see also Joyce, 2006), we concentrate on the problem of perception. 
52 In fact, an explanatory adequate theory rules out all the other grammars: such grammars would fail to satisfy UG 
and would thus constitute descriptions of humanly impossible hypothetical languages despite the hypothesised 
extensional equivalence. Of course, this is a rather theoretical point, since, as alluded to above, the existence of such 
extensionally equivalent grammars is highly implausible given the complexity of I-languages. 
53 This is perhaps the most relevant quote from Aspects: “on the one hand, the grammar can be justified on external 
grounds of descriptive adequacy—we may ask whether it states the facts about the language correctly, whether it predicts 
correctly how the idealised native speaker would understand arbitrary sentences and gives a correct account of the basis 
for this achievement; on the other hand, a grammar can be justified on internal grounds if, given an explanatory linguistic 
theory, it can be shown that this grammar is the highest-valued grammar permitted by the theory and compatible with 
given primary linguistic data. In the latter case, a principled basis is presented for the construction of this grammar, and 
it is therefore justified on much deeper empirical grounds. Both kinds of justification are of course necessary; it is 
important, however, not to confuse them. In the case of a linguistic theory that is merely descriptive, only one kind of 
justification can be given—namely, we can show that it permits grammars that meet the external condition of descriptive 
adequacy. It is only when all of the conditions [of explanatory adequacy] are met that the deeper question of internal 
justification can be raised” (Chomsky, 1965, pp. 40-41; see also pp. 18-27). 
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literature over moral judgment—see the next chapter). That is, since descriptive adequacy is best described as 
concerning the functional level of explanation (see Marr’s levels in Section 4), and since, as in the case of 
vision, a full computational explanation of a psychological mechanism simultaneously addresses both the 
functional and the algorithmic levels (without necessarily relying on solving problems concerning the 
problem of acquisition), it seems reasonable to expect that a theory (whether of language or morality) go 
beyond achieving descriptive adequacy in this functionalistic sense. (Although of course, to reiterate, in 
practice, different theories will not be strictly equivalent, and they will usually make divergent predictions at 
least in some cases.) To mark this point, in what comes below, I will refer to a theory that is both descriptively 
adequate in Chomsky’s sense and is also successful in terms of the postulation of mechanisms that explain 
why the theory is descriptively adequate (without thereby implicating a solution to the problem of 
explanatory adequacy) as having achieved “strict” descriptive adequacy. 
 
To put some flesh on this rather abstruse discussion, let me introduce a toy example; sentences (1)-(4).54 
Consider the following ways in which a theory of language may proceed. First, it requires a specification of 
the set of sentences that are well-formed or not well formed in a given language (full observational adequacy) 
or regarding a set of sentences (partial observational adequacy). Thus, an observationally adequate theory will 
state that sentence (4) is ungrammatical (and so is (1) on the reading on which her refers to the subject of the 
sentence).55 It will also state that sentences (2) and (3) are grammatical (and so is (1) on the reading on which 
her does not refer to the subject of the sentence). A descriptively adequate theory would analyse each of 
sentences (1)-(4) in terms of the relevant abstract categories instantiated by them as well as their structural 
arrangements, and posit principles accounting for the grammaticality status of each, and many more besides 
(fully descriptively adequate theories would do this for all sentences of the given language, and a strictly 
descriptively adequate one would actually posit the representations and principles that are operative in the 
mind).56 Finally, explanatory adequacy requires (acquisition) principles that, in their interaction with PLD, 
entail the ontogenetic emergence of the principles and representations as described by the (strictly) 
descriptively adequate theory.  
 
                                                                    
54 A similar set of examples is also provided by Greene (2006). 
55 Indices in common indicate coreference. I used the exclamation mark to indicate that grammaticality depends on 
coreference. The asterisk indicates that the relevant sentence is ungrammatical (as is the usual practice in linguistics). 
56 Thus, we can see that full and strict descriptive adequacy concern different dimensions: extent of completeness 
and degree of mechanistic isomorphy, respectively. 
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(1) !Bethi finds heri/j cute 
(2) Bethi finds herselfi cute 
(3) Bethi thinks that shei/j is cute 
(4) *Bethi thinks that herselfi is cute 
More concretely, as for descriptive adequacy, the grammaticality of (1)-(4) is determined by reference to 
principles regulating the behaviour of anaphors (such as reflexive pronouns like herself and reciprocals like 
each other) and non-anaphoric pronouns or pronominals (such as pronouns like her). What we are interested 
in with respect to (1)-(4) is what structural elements her, she, and herself can take their reference from, that is, 
what is a potential “binder” for these words; in these sentences, whether Beth can bind her/she or herself (or 
whether these lexical items can refer to Beth). In government and binding theory (e.g. Chomsky, 1986), the 
relevant principles are articulated in terms of locality.57 For present purposes, let us assume that local binding 
means binding within the same clause (in the first two cases, the anaphor/pronoun is in the same clause as the 
subject NP, in the last two cases, it isn’t). The first principle states that anaphors (e.g. herself) must be bound 
locally (this is more or less Chomsky’s “Principle A”). The second principle states that non-anaphoric 
pronominal expressions (e.g. her) must be free within their local domains (Chomsky’s “Principle B”). Notice 
that these principles explain the grammaticality of arbitrarily many sentences beyond the ones under 
consideration.58 
The challenge of explanatory adequacy in this case is to propose principles of sufficient abstractness to 
capture the behaviour of anaphors and pronouns not just in English but in all actual and potential languages, 
and to do it in a way that, when conjoined with PLD, they provide enough information to the child to acquire 
the principles regulating the distributional patterns of these linguistic elements in his or her relevant I-
language. The introduction of the notion of a single local binding domain is a step in this general direction. 
Having considered the standards of evaluation, and before moving on to the next chapter in which I 
demonstrate the usefulness of LA and defend it against criticisms advanced in the literature, let me return to 
principles for a moment. The above example illustrates that, in the case of linguistics, the principles specific 
to (I-)languages are often accounted for by more general (model-acquisition) principles that are supposed to 
be broad enough to capture the variation exhibited by all (actual and possible) languages—and thus to solve 
                                                                    
57 Additionally, the NP (here, Beth) and the anaphor/pronoun have to “agree” in terms of person, number and 
gender (thus, Beth can potentially bind her, while it couldn’t even potentially bind him). 
58 Two examples: (a) ‘Sophiei thinks that Lewisj should marry herselfi’ is predicted to be ungrammatical because 
herself is not in Sophie’s binding domain; (b) ‘Lewis likes him’ is predicted to be grammatical only if him is not 
coreferential with Lewis, since, as a pronoun, him cannot be bound in its local binding domain. 
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the problem of explanatory adequacy. In this tradition, (processing) principles may be seen as something like 
special cases of acquisition principles, which is another way of illustrating the general point advanced in 
Section 5 above, namely that the two kinds of principles (acquisition vs. processing) are intimately related. 
Whether this is a useful way of thinking of the relation between acquisition and processing principles in the 
moral domain remains to be seen. 
Having shown what LA has to offer, in the next chapter, after considering and criticising one alternative 
framework for the study of moral cognition, I examine five objections to LA and reply to each of these. 
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Chapter 2: The Linguistic Analogy—
Comparisons, Objections and Replies 
Overview 
In the previous chapter, I introduced and articulated LA as a viable approach to the study of moral cognition. 
In the present chapter, I do two things. First, I introduce and evaluate a popular theory of moral judgment—
Joshua Greene’s dual-process theory—which Greene articulates within an influential alternative 
framework—namely, the Dual Process framework (“DP”). I criticise both the theory and the framework, and 
conclude that LA is superior to the latter. Second, having made a case for LA vis-a-vis DP, I defend LA from 
popular objections that have been levelled against it in the literature. 
I proceed as follows. In Section 1, I present Greene’s dual-process theory in some detail, including its 
motivations and how it fits into the broader DP framework. Then, in Section 2, I survey some of the empirical 
evidence advanced in favour of Greene’s theory, and assess the extent to which such evidence makes a good 
case for the theory—which, as I will argue, is limited. In Section 3, I introduce a central problem for the dual-
process theory (as well as other theories of moral cognition), namely, the appraisal problem, which asks a 
question about the nature of the connection between our intuitive judgments and the stimuli eliciting them. 
In the same section, I consider Greene’s response to this problem and assess whether it is motivated either by 
his theory, or the DP framework in general. My answer will be in the negative. At the end of this section, I 
compare LA favourably against DP. In the final section—Section 4—I consider five objections levelled 
against the Linguistic Analogy and reject them one by one. 
1. The dual-process theory: Background and 
motivations 
1.1. The bare bones 
According to Joshua Greene’s dual-process theory (Greene, 2013; Greene et al. 2001), moral judgment 
relies on two separate cognitive systems: an emotion system, concerned with how we feel about a particular 
action, and a reasoning system, concerned with bringing about the best possible outcome. The idea in a 
nutshell is that when we confront a “moral” scenario containing a potential or actual action, the two systems 
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may be engaged to different degrees in evaluating that action in terms of whether it is obligatory, permissible 
or forbidden.59 Thus, we have two potential outputs emanating from the two systems. These may be identical 
or divergent. In the former case, that is, when the outputs support the same judgment, other things being 
equal, that judgment is made by the individual. In the latter case, that is, when the outputs are not convergent, 
a conflict resolution mechanism resolves the conflict depending on various factors, such as the individual’s 
relative reliance on the respective systems (i.e. the “cognitive style” of the individual), or the “strength” of the 
respective outputs. In both cases, the integrated output (or decision) is what we normally refer to as a moral 
judgment.60 
As with theories of moral judgment in general (cf. Chapter 1, Section 6), the dual-process theory takes as 
its primary explanandum a closed set of cases, and it generalises on the basis of these. In the case of Greene’s 
dual-process theory, the set of cases is that mentioned in the previous chapter (Section 3.2.2), namely, the pair 
of dilemmas making up the so-called “trolley problem”. This set of well-known moral dilemmas was initially 
conceived of by Philippa Foot (1967) and subsequently developed and elaborated by Judith Jarvis Thomson 
(1985) and others. 
In the first scenario, an empty trolley61 is heading towards five people, who will be killed if nothing is done. 
However, a bystander (call him ‘Hank’) happens to be standing next to a switch, which, if thrown, turns the 
trolley onto an alternative track, where there is one person, who will be killed if Hank decides to act. At issue 
is whether we judge it permissible for Hank to throw the switch, thus saving five people but killing the person 
on the alternative track. Most of us do—including lay people as well as philosophers, such as Foot or 
Thomson themselves.62 Let us refer to this first scenario as the switch case. 
In the second scenario, there is no switch or alternative tracks. This time, a person (call him ‘Ian’) is 
standing on a footbridge, where there is a very large man standing in front of him with an enormous rucksack. 
If Ian pushes him off the bridge and onto the track, his body will stop the trolley, and the five people on the 
                                                                    
59 Of course, as per Chapter 1, Section 3.4, there is a perception and a production version of this question. I shall 
ignore that complication here. 
60 Notice right at the outset that it is not entirely clear what makes such a judgment moral, beyond the fact that the 
situation about which the judgment is made is seen as a morally charged one (e.g. when we are asked to make a decision 
that has fatal consequences for innocent people—see below). On Greene’s theory, this is not necessarily a shortcoming, 
however, since Greene holds that moral judgment is unified only at the evolutionary-functional level, not at the cognitive 
level—that is, any of Marr’s levels (discussed in Chapter 1, Section 4). (See Greene, 2013, 2015; see also Section 4.2 and 
Section 4.5 below for related comments). 
61 A trolley is what is referred to as a ‘tram’ in UK English and so in Foot’s original paper. I’ll stick to the term ‘trolley’ 
though, because that is the description under which the dilemmas became well known. 
62 Thomson later changed her mind, however. See Thompson (2008). 
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track will survive. However, the large man will die as a result of Ian’s action. The question, again, is whether 
we judge it permissible for Ian to push the man off the bridge, thus saving the five but killing him. Most of us 
do—including philosophers as well as laypeople. Let us refer to this second scenario as the footbridge case. 
Explaining the contrasting moral judgments in these two cases constitutes (the original version of) the 
“trolley problem”.63 Although in both cases, the outcome seems to be exactly identical (one man dead, five 
saved—or vice versa), as mentioned above, it is common to judge that it is permissible to act in the switch case, 
but it is mostly seen as impermissible to act in the footbridge case (see e.g. Greene et al. 2001; Cushman et al., 
2006; Hauser et al. 2007; though see also Ahlenius & Tännsjö, 2012).64 
The dual-process theory hypothesises that the two proposed cognitive systems may have divergent outputs 
with respect to the trolley cases. The reasoning system calculates the best possible outcome. In both cases, it 
calculates that 5 deaths is worse than 1, so in both cases, its output is a rationale in favour of performing the 
action—or judging that the performance of the action is acceptable or required. However, and here is where 
the difference lies, the emotional system responds in a different way to the two scenarios. In the switch case, 
it does not get activated (or it only does so to a small extent); in the footbridge case, it gets activated and shouts 
“NO!”, thus potentially/typically overriding the response of the reasoning system. Ex hypothesi, this is because 
in the footbridge case, but not in the switch case, the action involves being close to and pushing the individual, 
which is proposed to be emotionally more salient (see Section 3 for more). 
Greene observes that the output of the reasoning system happens to be consistent with what is most 
plausibly prescribed by consequentialism, whereas the output of the emotional system is clearly non-
consequentialist. From now on, I follow Greene (2014) in referring to these two types of output as 
“consequentialist*” and “non-consequentialist*” (with asterisks), which does not imply that these judgments 
are the result of endorsing such theories. In other words, Greene’s terms “consequentialist*” and “non-
consequentialist*” are behaviourist constructs: they are neutral as to whether the motivation behind the 
judgment is in fact consequentialist or non-consequentialist in nature; for example, they are independent 
from whether or not the judgments have been made in the light of, say, the utility principle. 
                                                                    
63 Strictly speaking, this is the moral psychology version of the trolley problem. The normative version asks what is 
in fact morally permissible to do in these cases. Note also that some authors use the term dilemma to refer to the cases 
separately (hence “trolley problems”). 
64 As emphasised in Chapter 1, we should distinguish between questions of moral psychology and those of normative 
ethics. We may be tempted to ask: OK, but do most people get it right, or are most of us wrong? Such questions are 
normative questions, however, and we will not be concerned with them here. Instead, in the context of moral 
psychology, Chapter 1 urges that we should ask questions of the following type: What is the relevant difference between 
the mental representation of the two cases that, if the relevant principles are applied to them, they yield different 
judgments? 
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 As mentioned before, the two proposed systems are thought to work independently of each other. 
Nevertheless, their outputs need not be in direct competition. In many cases, they can be expected to provide 
identical behavioural or decision-making rationales. For example, if the question were whether it is 
permissible to throw the switch if the numerosities of the potential victims were reversed, it is very unlikely 
that anyone would judge any of the actions permissible, since neither system would be expected to produce 
such a response. (This is indeed the case as confirmed by Mikhail’s “disproportional death” scenario—see e.g. 
Mikhail, 2009.) Note also that the claim is not that both systems are always engaged, and sometimes they 
compete, sometimes they do not, either. On the contrary, the crucial difference between the switch and the 
footbridge cases is supposed to be that in footbridge, but not in switch, the emotional system provides a strong 
negative output. In the latter case, therefore, the “emotional” system is either silent or simply not engaged to 
a sufficient degree to compete successfully with the reasoning system. (As alluded to above, this formulation 
allows for individual variation as well; and indeed some people do say that the action is impermissible even in 
the switch case.) 
1.2. A tale of two systems: The DP framework 
The general theoretical framework that provides the background for Greene’s dual-process theory of 
moral judgment is a general dual process (or dual “systems”) theory of the mind, which I will refer to as “DP” 
or the “DP framework” below. There are dual-process theories of memory (Atkinson and Shiffrin, 1968; 
Reber, 1993), attention (Schneider and Schiffrin, 1977), reasoning, decision making and social cognition 
(Evans, 2008), as well as “broad” dual-process approaches to the human mind in general (Kahneman, 2011). 
What they all emphasise is the distinction between two different types of cognitive processes (or sometimes 
systems), often referred to as automatic and controlled.65 
Automatic processes are fast, effortless and (not so surprisingly) automatic, meaning that their operation 
does not require any/much attentional resources, central access or conscious control. Furthermore, they 
involve parallel—i.e., simultaneously executable—processing, meaning that dissociated (i.e. separate) 
automatic processes generally do not interfere with each other. For instance, looking at an array of three dots, 
we realise immediately that we’re seeing three dots (cf. Chapter 1, Section 3.1.1). There is no need to attend 
to the dots individually, there is no need to count them, and in fact there is no need to pay attention to them, 
either. The realisation that there are three dots in front of us just happens to us, as it were, even if we are 
                                                                    
65 The terms “automatic” and “controlled” were first introduced by Schneider and Shiffrin (1977—also, Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1997), whose work primarily concerns attention. Their papers have had a considerable effect on other types 
of dual-process theories (but see Frankish & Evans, 2009), especially those in the domain of social cognition. 
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engaged in another cognitive task, such as talking to someone on the phone or wondering about what we need 
to buy in the supermarket. 
Controlled processes, in contrast, are slow, often effortful, involve central access and require conscious 
attention. For example, finding the derivative of a function involves consciously applying a rule. It is by no 
means automatic, and even after a considerable amount of practice, it may still take a relatively long time 
(depending, for example, on how complex the function is). Furthermore, it is close to impossible to do any 
other task requiring controlled processing at the same time. This is thought to be due to the limited capacity 
and serial (as opposed to parallel) nature of controlled cognition. For example, imagine having to find the 
derivative of a function while at the same time trying to reconstruct the ontological argument. In contrast to 
the previous examples, we also have much more access to how we execute tasks requiring controlled 
processing. (In the parlance of Chapter 1, Section 5, these processes are both operative and express.) 
The reason why the two kinds of processes have these different (to some degree opposing) characteristics 
makes sense in the light of the trade-off between efficiency and flexibility to which they are thought to provide 
complementary solutions. Greene proposes that automatic processes invariably achieve their efficiency by 
relying on statistically reliable cues to respond to the things they are designed to process information about.66 
An example is provided by Paul Whalen and his colleagues, who investigated how the amygdala (a collection 
of nuclei in the medial temporal lobe) rapidly responds to fearful facial expressions (Whalen et al. 2004). They 
found that the amygdala is engaged even if only eyes (with all other facial features removed) are presented and 
there is no conscious awareness of the presence of them.67 Thus, instead of a holistic analysis of faces, the 
mechanism relies on the presence of enlarged eye-whites as a shorthand. In contrast, controlled processes do 
not typically rely on such cues, and thus provide us with a less epistemologically dubious source of knowledge. 
(Enlarged sclera may be useful for detecting fear rapidly in the social environment, but the correlation 
between enlarged sclera and fear is at best imperfect.) 
The contribution of the DP framework to Greene’s dual-process theory should be apparent enough. On 
Greene’s theory, two proposed systems function in accordance with the respective operating properties of the 
two kinds of processes identified above. The emotion system68 processes information automatically, it is fast, 
                                                                    
66 “All automatic settings rely on specific cues that are only imperfectly related to the things they’re designed to 
detect” (2013, p. 227). 
67 This was achieved by “masking” the eye-stimuli, that is, after a 17ms long presentation of the eyes, a masking 
stimulus was introduced for the duration of 183ms. All subjects reported that they were not aware of the presence of the 
masked stimulus. 
68 Greene frequently uses the term “automatic settings”, which denotes a broader category, however, namely all 
automatic psychological mechanisms, especially the innate ones. In contrast, the term “emotion system” is used here to 
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parallel (many tasks at a time), efficient, inaccessible and relies on simple cues for its operation.69 Hence the 
frequently documented disconnection between emotionally induced judgments and explicit rationales that 
could plausibly give rise to them (Haidt, 2001). For example, it is easy to say that pushing the man off the 
footbridge is wrong, but it is much more difficult to specify what exactly the relevant distinction between the 
footbridge and the switch scenario is that explains their differential status in terms of judged permissibility 
(Cushman et al., 2006). This indicates that whatever the explicit rationale, it is not causally relevant from the 
point of view of the judgment (at least not in its explicit form). By contrast, the reasoning system processes 
information in a controlled way (i.e. not automatically), it is slow, serial (one task at a time), inefficient and 
its operation is largely consciously accessible. Thus, we may reason our way to the belief that the two cases 
(footbridge and switch) are morally equivalent (i.e. equivalent in terms of permissibility), but this may take 
time and effort. 
Importantly, Greene’s account of automaticity may be taken to defuse the Argument for Moral Grammar, 
the central argument of LA (Chapter 1, Section 3.2). This is how: judging novel actions in moral terms might 
not require an analysis of action in terms of abstract representations and principles. Instead, it may be based 
on simple cues that some actions manifest. Such a simple knee-jerk-type process could in principle rely on any 
easily perceivable and reliable cues (whatever reliability means in such a context). For instance, it could be that 
we judge actions that are performed by agents with three legs as impermissible. By such a procedure, we could 
judge a potentially infinite set of actions in terms of permissibility. More realistically, there might be such a 
cue based difference between the relevant actions in the switch and the footbridge cases. If so, LA’s emphasis 
on principles defined over abstract representations appears overstated and potentially entirely superfluous. 
1.3. Evolution and the dual-process theory: A small detour 
A guiding notion of the DP framework (especially Greene’s version of it) is that certain apparently 
complicated problems can have simple solutions. One example is provided by the Whalen study concerning 
fear detection mentioned above. An interesting parallel to this idea comes from evolutionary game theory. 
The problem of cooperation is a fundamental problem in such diverse scientific disciplines as evolutionary 
biology or economics: if agents are in general expected to behave according to their best interests, rather than 
those of others, how is it possible for cooperation to emerge (either in the animal kingdom or social systems), 
                                                                    
denote the system that is engaged in the footbridge as opposed to the switch case, without any claim to the effect that 
this system can be non-controversially individuated (cf. fn. 60). 
69 Unconscious in terms of its operation, not in terms of its output, of course. 
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given that cooperation (at least the interesting kind) always requires individual sacrifice? One of the most 
popular ways of illustrating the nature of this problem is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). 
Imagine that two bank robbers are arrested after robbing a bank. The police, however, cannot prove their 
involvement in the robbery and can only charge them with a less serious crime, let us say embezzlement. They 
are taken to two separate rooms, where the police offer both of them a deal: if they testify against the other 
bank robber, the minor charge against them will be dropped (they can get off scot-free) – at least as long as 
the other bank robber doesn’t also testify, in which case both will receive a relatively serious prison sentence 
(say, 5 years). If one of them keeps silent while the other testifies, however, the stubborn one will have to take 
all the blame for the robbery, resulting in 10 years of prison sentence – the worst possible outcome. Finally, 
if both of them keep silent, then they will both have to face a less significant prison sentence for the lesser 
charge (say, 2 years). 
The dilemma is the following: collectively, they are better off if both of them keep silent, that is, if they 
cooperate—with each other, not with the police, of course. However, individually, they are better off if they 
do testify, a move that is referred to as defection in the literature (see e.g. Axelrod, 1984). Moreover, not only 
are they better off if they defect, they are better off irrespective of what the other prisoner does. That is because 
if prisoner B cooperates, then prisoner A can go free, while if prisoner B defects, defection for prisoner A is 
the only way of avoiding the worst possible outcome. If they both succumb to the irresistible force of this 
piece of reasoning, however, they both find themselves in a situation that is far from the best possible 
outcome—either individually or collectively. In fact, if only they both cooperated, they would both be better 
off individually as well as collectively.70 
This dilemma is not applicable exclusively to bank robbers, of course. In fact it captures the logic of many 
(if not all) cooperative situations, including collective problems, such as overfishing, use of publically available 
resources (such as social security), military standoffs, as well as quotidian situations where there is something 
to be gained from other people’s help and much to be lost from being taken advantage of. The crucial factor 
is the ordering of the outcomes. To be more specific, for a situation to qualify as an instance of PD, taking 
                                                                    
70 This tension is perhaps best captured by the application of two important concepts in game theory that can be 
used to assess the degree to which a pair of strategies (and the resulting outcome) is “optimal” (at least in a certain limited 
sense): Nash equilibrium and pareto-optimality. To simplify a little, a Nash equilibrium is a situation in which no player 
gains anything from changing their strategy—that is, it is a combination of the players’ “best” responses to each other’s 
strategies. It is easy to see that the only Nash-equilibrium in situations sharing the logic of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is 
mutual defection. A pareto-optimal outcome is one that is not pareto-dominated by any other outcome. An outcome is 
pareto-dominated by another outcome if the second is an improvement over the other at least for one of the parties 
involved and does not put any of the other parties at a disadvantage. In the PD, all of the outcomes are pareto-optimal, 
apart from mutual defection. 
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advantage of the other party (T for “temptation”) has to be more advantageous for the individual than mutual 
cooperation (R for “reward for mutual cooperation”), which, in turn, has to dominate mutual defection (P 
for “punishment for mutual defection”), which, finally, still has to be preferable to being taken advantage of 
(S for “sucker’s payoff”). In sum, T < R < P < S (see Figure 2.1 below).71 The gains, in the meantime, can be 
positive, negative, relatively insignificant or of great importance—none of these factors changes the essential 
logic of the PD. 
 
Figure 2.1: The payoff matrix of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
 
Superficially, no matter how the game is presented, it may seem like it cannot be solved, at least certainly 
not in a mutually beneficial way, since defection is the only rational strategy. However, when the 
mathematician and political scientist Robert Axelrod invited scientists to submit strategies for playing PD 
games in the form of computer programs, not only were a number of programs rather successful at playing 
the game, but the top ranking eight strategies were all “nice”, in the technical sense of never being the first to 
defect in any encounter (ranking was based on the number of points they gathered in a series of encounters). 
Not only that, but only the eight best strategies were in fact nice, all the rest were “nasty” (meaning that they 
defect at times, even if “unprovoked”). The simple reason is that the logic of the game changes when it is 
iterated, that is, when players engage in encounters repeatedly. In such circumstances (at least when the 
repetitions are not predictably finite), if a player (be it a computer program or an organism) can monitor the 
other player’s moves and keep track of them, it can take advantage of cooperative relationships by building 
up “trust” and thus repeatedly reaping the reward for mutual cooperation. On the opposite side of the coin, 
if the other player is also capable of keeping track of the first’s moves, it will also be capable of “retaliation” 
                                                                    
71 Technically speaking, (T + S)/2 also has to be less than (or at most equal to) R. 
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(i.e. defection in response to defection), when the first player is acting in an uncooperative way. 
Consequently, the price of defection for the other party increases. 
Surprisingly, Tit-for-Tat, the winning program submitted by the psychologist Anatol Rapoport, is not 
only nice, but also deceptively simple—so much so that its strategy can be captured by a short statement: 
“Cooperate first, then copy what the other player did last”. Thus, Tit-for-Tat does satisfy the criterion that a 
successful strategy playing the iterated PD should be able to keep track of the other player’s moves, but it does 
so in the simplest possible way. In fact, in Axelrod’s competition, it was the shortest program to be submitted 
(shortest in terms of the number of internal statements of the program). The PD provides a good example of 
a complex problem being solved by a simple mechanism. 
To return to our original concern, Greene’s claim is that the emotion system is constituted by a set of 
devices that collectively solve the (iterated) Prisoner’s Dilemma, or more broadly, the problem of cooperation 
(at least within groups). In other words, moral emotions regulate our social interactions with others so that 
we (tend to) avoid the worst outcomes in cooperative situations (such as punishment for mutual defection, 
or the sucker’s payoff in the Prisoner’s Dilemma—or more generally, in situations structurally isomorphic to 
it). They also do it in a simple way, just as Tit-for-Tat does: instead of having to solve the complex dilemma 
in an effortful way by reasoning about what the best strategy might be, moral emotions compel us to act (in 
Greene’s characteristic words, they “do this thinking for us”—2013, p. 62) in a way that typically benefits us 
in the long run. (It is worth mentioning that Greene is by no means the first to propose the idea that human 
moralistic emotions may serve such a regulatory/strategic evolutionary function. Most notably, see Trivers, 
1971; Frank, 1988.) 
Consider the situation in which the prisoners cooperate mutually. Apart from the material gain (in this 
case, a relatively minor prison sentence), the prisoners develop mutual trust and gratitude (or even friendship), 
internally offsetting the temptation to defect. In the case of mutual defection, on the other hand, mutual 
contempt is expected, both parties ensuring that they cannot be taken advantage of (avoiding the sucker’s 
payoff). The two symmetrical mixed outcomes may trigger shame or embarrassment in one party, while 
disgust or anger in the other. The former may be understood as a signal to the cheated party, expressing a 
desire that the cooperative relationship is to be restored, while the latter two may function as an avoidance 
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mechanism and as a potential threat for the other party (increasing the price of unilateral defection), 
respectively.72 
Thus, these strategic (or moral) emotions fit the profile of automatic processes, as described above, just as 
the emotions elicited by the footbridge dilemma did. We have no insight into how (and why) we experience 
moral emotions: we just do so, and the fact that we do so seems the most natural thing in the world. Recall 
the trolley cases: pushing the man off the footbridge is just obviously (intuitively) wrong. Similarly, feeling 
gratitude when someone helps us is so natural it would be difficult to imagine it could be any other way. 
1.4. The efficiency-flexibility trade-off 
As suggested above, another point of convergence between such evolutionary accounts of moral emotions 
and Greene’s theory of moral judgment is that both emphasise the simplicity of the processes involved—at 
least as far as emotions are concerned. Navigating the social world is a complex problem, but as Axelrod’s 
Prisoner’s Dilemma competition illustrates, complex problems can have simple solutions. 
Recall Greene’s distinction between the two systems. It is possible to figure out by conscious reasoning 
what the best rational strategy is, but this may be costly and inefficient, especially if simple rules of thumb can 
result in comparable success. Incidentally, this observation applies just as well to situations one would be less 
reluctant to identify as moral. In such situations, one may consult a normative theory prescribing that a 
certain moral principle be followed (e.g. “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time 
will that it should become a universal law,” or “always maximise expected utility”). Yet figuring out what acts 
are consistent with such principles may be a difficult task requiring reflection and conscious deliberation, and 
this is rarely feasible in many (perhaps most) everyday situations, when we have neither the time nor the 
capacity to sift through such complex chains of reasoning. 
On the other hand, to the extent that from time to time we also need to act more flexibly (e.g. when we 
encounter novel problems—i.e. ones which no automatic settings were designed to solve), we cannot always 
rely on such simple solutions, and for a simple reason. As pointed out above, the two systems are thought to 
provide complementary solutions to a trade-off problem between efficiency and flexibility. If the emotion 
system provides solutions in the way Greene proposes, the mechanisms involved cannot modify our responses 
according to changing circumstances. But we can. In an alternative world which is full of people with enlarged 
                                                                    
72 These latter emotions are in line with subsequent developments in abstract theorizing about cooperation and 
successful cooperative strategies, which include the incorporation of “punishment”, “forgiveness” or “reputation” into 
the models (see e.g. Nowak & Sigmund, 1998). 
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scleras, the social fear detection mechanism described above would presumably be continually responding,73 
but a control mechanism (“I know not all these guys are afraid”) could override this, likely producing more 
adaptive behaviour. To consider a more realistic scenario, take hunger. Hunger is a motivational state 
produced by an “automatic setting” designed to detect when the body is in need of sustenance. The proximate 
function of the hunger-producing mechanism is to engage other mechanisms involved in food-seeking 
behaviour. In some circumstances, food-seeking behaviour can be counter-productive, however. For example, 
I might need to finish my chapter before the deadline, which, let’s say, is in 10 minutes’ time. In such a 
situation, the best response seems to be to suppress the behavioural command temporarily. This requires 
some degree of flexibility, which is exactly what the automatic settings are incapable of on Greene’s account. 
(I will return to this observation in the next section, where the examples used will be from the domain of 
moral cognition.) 
 
To summarise the important points of this subsection briefly: the main explanandum of the dual-process 
theory are the differential judgments elicited by the switch and the footbridge cases (and structurally identical 
moral dilemmas). The explanans goes along the following lines. There are two proposed systems: the emotion 
system and the reasoning system. The former is hypothesised to be engaged in the footbridge case but not in 
the switch case. In contrast, the latter is hypothesised to be engaged in both scenarios, the output being the 
same rationale (acceptable), because the outcome (what the reasoning system is hypothesised to “care” about) 
is identical in both cases.  
In the following section, I discuss what I take to be Greene’s flagship examples of the empirical evidence 
in favour of the dual-process theory of moral judgment (Section 2.1). I first present the evidence (2.1), then 
point out some empirical problems with it, on the basis of which I argue that none of these data provide 
powerful evidence in favour of the dual-process theory of moral judgment (2.2). After that, I consider a 
general problem for the dual-process theory (as well as other theories of moral judgment), namely, the 
appraisal problem (Section 3.1). Then, I consider Greene’s response(s) to the appraisal problem (Section 3.2). 
Finally, I discuss to what extent Greene’s theoretical elaborations are motivated by either the dual-process 
theory itself, or by the DP framework more generally (Section 3.3). Having concluded that the explanatory 
and theoretical contributions of either are rather minimal, I move on to the defence of LA from direct 
criticism (Section 4). 
                                                                    
73 Unless of course it is capable of adaptation. 
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2. The dual-process theory: An appraisal of the 
evidence 
2.1. The flagship examples 
So far, the claim that the switch and the footbridge dilemmas engage the two systems (and particularly the 
emotion system) differentially has been just that: a claim. To address this concern, Greene et al. (2001) 
presented subjects in an fMRI scanner with a series of intuitively moral—as well as some intuitively “non-
moral”—dilemmas. The subjects were asked to decide whether acting in the relevant case (e.g. pushing the 
man off the footbridge in the footbridge case) was “appropriate” or not.74 The moral dilemmas were 
subdivided into two categories: “personal” and “impersonal”, the former being deemed structurally 
analogous to the footbridge, the latter to the switch dilemma. Greene’s lurking hypothesis motivating the 
division (as mentioned in Section 1.1 above) is that it is the “up-close and personal” nature of footbridge-type 
dilemmas that explains the heightened emotional activation, which in turn, explains the psychological 
difference between the two dilemmas, given the presumed lack of such emotional activation in the switch 
case. 
Sure enough, Greene and colleagues did find a differential activation in the medial prefrontal cortex 
(including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex or VMPFC), the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) in the case of “moral-personal” dilemmas—all areas previously associated with 
emotional processing (see e.g. Maddock, 1999).75 In the “impersonal” (both moral and non-moral) dilemmas, 
in contrast, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was differentially active—a region previously 
associated with controlled cognition, such as behavioural inhibition, working memory and planning (e.g. 
Milner & Cohen, 2001). 
A subsequent study using a similar distinction between non-moral, moral impersonal and moral personal 
dilemmas (Greene et al. 2004) found that when subjects are confronted with personal moral dilemmas, there 
is increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as well as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. While 
the former has been implicated in conflict detection involving a concurrent activation of more than one 
                                                                    
74 This probe is problematic for obvious reasons, but I won’t press the issue here. 
75 It is common knowledge that different cognitive tasks activate various brain regions differentially. Due to the 
increased rate of action potentials of neurons in the relevant region, there is an increased local consumption of oxygen 
leading to decreased levels of oxygen in that region. This, in turn, sets off a haemodynamic reaction whereby local blood 
flow increases, culminating in a discharge of oxygen as a consequence of which the magnetic properties of the blood are 
altered (from oxygenated to deoxygenated). This is the change detected by BOLD fMRI (i.e. blood-oxygen-level 
dependent functional magnetic resonance imaging). 
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behavioural responses (cf. the Stroop task),76 the latter has been associated inter alia with resolving such 
conflicts (MacDonald et al., 2000). Furthermore, consequentialist* responses were associated with a greater 
activity in the DLPFC. This, at the very least, is consistent with the dual-process theory, according to which 
the two systems compete in emotionally engaging situations, such as personal (as opposed to impersonal) 
moral dilemmas—hence the between condition variability in terms of the activation of ACC (conflict 
detection) and DLPFC (conflict resolution) in personal dilemmas, and the within condition variability in 
terms of DLPFC activation in case of consequentialist* moral judgment (conflict resolution in favour of the 
consequentialist* rationale). 
Both of these studies are merely correlational, and so the question of whether emotional or controlled 
cognitive processes (and/or systems) are causally responsible for the judgments has yet to be addressed. 
Evidence that the emotion system may indeed be causally efficacious comes from a number of different 
studies. First, frontotemporal dementia (FTD) is a neurodegenerative disease due to an abnormal build-up of 
proteins affecting parts of the frontal and temporal lobes of the brain. Its symptoms include the “blunting” 
of emotions, and it affects social cognition and behaviour. Mendez et al. (2005) compared the moral judgment 
of FTD patients with that of two control groups (a group of Alzheimer’s patients and a group of 
neurologically unaffected subjects) using Greene et al.’s battery of moral dilemmas. FTD patients (similarly 
to Alzheimer patients and control subjects) exhibited the usual response pattern in the impersonal condition, 
however, they proved significantly more likely than either of the control groups to endorse the 
consequentialist* judgment in personal moral dilemmas, such as the footbridge case.77 
Second, VMPFC is thought to be necessary for the generation of emotions and, in particular, social 
emotions. Koenigs and colleagues confronted patients with VMPFC damage with the same set of dilemmas 
as used in the Greene et al. (2001) study (Koenings et al. 2007). VMPFC patients tend to display an abnormal 
pattern in terms of emotional reactivity as measured by skin conductance responses (SCRs) to highly 
emotionally charged stimuli, including pictures of mutilated bodies or social disasters. They also tend to 
                                                                    
76 The Stroop task involves having to name the colour of a written word. The word may be congruent (e.g. “yellow” 
written in yellow) or incongruent (e.g. “blue” written in yellow) with its colour. If it is the latter, then the task involve s 
suppressing the automatic response (as reading is an automatised process—i.e. literate people “cannot help” reading a 
word when they see one), which is typically time consuming, hence the reaction time goes up (Stroop, 1935).  
77 “Significant” is a technical term here. It means that if there is no difference between these conditions (in this case 
in terms of consequentialist* vs. non-consequentialist* judgment), then observing such an outcome (i.e. such a 
distribution of judgments) as has been observed in the study has a probability that is below a predetermined threshold 
(often p < .05). This provides a decision procedure for keeping or rejecting the so-called null hypothesis according to 
which there is no difference (at least in null hypothesis testing—in more exact sciences, such as physics, the hypotheses 
tested tend to be more informative). 
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receive unusually low ratings on scales of guilt, embarrassment and empathy. Koenigs and his colleagues 
showed that, just like FTD patients, VMPFC patients tend to show a strong preference for consequentialist* 
judgments. A plausible interpretation of these results is that normal emotional processing is necessary for 
those judgments in which the non-consequentialist* rationale wins out—i.e. where, according to the dual-
process theory, there is a heightened emotional response. Accordingly, the authors concluded that emotions 
play “a necessary role” in the generation of the typical pattern of judgments at least as far as “personal” moral 
dilemmas are concerned (p. 908), just as predicted by the dual-process theory. 
Lastly, Greene et al. (2008) conducted an experiment in which they divided subjects into a control group 
and a “cognitive load” group. Participants in the cognitive load group were asked to carry out a task designed 
to engage their cognitive control system while making their judgments about “high-conflict” and “low-
conflict” moral dilemmas (a modified set of dilemmas as compared to the previous experiments—see more 
on why this was necessary below).78 What they observed is that on average, the reaction time (RT) of subjects 
in the cognitive load group in the case of high-conflict dilemmas was higher than that of subjects in the control 
group when they ended up choosing the consequentialist* option. Greene and colleagues maintain that this 
response pattern is predicted by the dual-process theory, since in cases in which the cognitive control system 
is engaged, generating the consequentialist* judgment may be met with difficulties due to the serial nature of 
the reasoning system. In contrast, when the non-consequentialist option is chosen, the cognitive load should 
not interfere with processing speed, since in that case, it is the emotion system that is responsible for the 
judgment—and that is exactly what they found. 
2.2. Difficulties with the flagship examples 
However convincing the collective force of these studies may initially appear, there are a number of 
problems, including outcomes not predicted as well as shortcomings in terms of experimental design that 
require closer examination. It is to these that I turn to in this subsection. 
First, it becomes clear from a close examination of the reaction time (RT) data that under no cognitive 
load, the consequentialist* and non-consequentialist* judgments were equally fast: only under cognitive load 
                                                                    
78 “High-conflict” dilemmas included Sophie’s Choice, for example: “It is wartime and you and your two children, 
ages eight and five, are living in a territory that has been occupied by the enemy. At the enemy’s headquarters is a doctor 
who performs painful experiments on humans that inevitably lead to death. He intends to perform experiments on one 
of your children, but he will allow you to choose which of your children will be experimented upon. You have twenty-
four hours to bring one of your children to his laboratory. If you refuse to bring one of your children to his laboratory 
he will find them both and experiment on both of them. Is it appropriate for you to bring one of your children to the 
laboratory in order to avoid having them both die?” 
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does RT increase selectively for consequentialist* judgments. This contrasts with what might have been 
expected on the basis of the theory, since even if there is no cognitive load, in high conflict scenarios when the 
emotional activation is presumably high, a consequentialist* judgment should prove more difficult (and 
therefore more time consuming) than a non-consequentialist* one (that of course should also depend on how 
strong the consequentialist* rationale is—but see more on this below).79 
Second, there was also no effect of cognitive load on judgment, that is, whether the consequentialist* or 
the non-consequentialist* option was chosen was not a function of condition. In other words, whether a 
participant’s attentional resources were engaged was inconsequential from the point of view of what option 
he or she chose. This is not predicted by the theory, either, which would presumably anticipate cognitive load 
to reduce the frequency with which subjects opt for the consequentialist* option, as the reasoning system is 
otherwise engaged. 
Third, when Greene and his colleagues re-analysed their data by dividing their participants into “high-
consequentialist*” and “low-consequentialist*” groups80 based on the percentage of non-consequentialist* 
judgments made when confronted with high-conflict dilemmas, the high-consequentialist* group was on 
average actually faster to make consequentialist* judgments that non-consequentialist* ones (this was a 
noticeable though non-significant effect, p >.06—i.e. what is sometimes referred to as a “statistical trend”). 
The opposite (though slightly less noticeable) effect was observed for the low-consequentialist* group (also 
non-significant).81 The first of these effects as well as the observation that generally, consequentialist* 
judgments tend not to be faster than non-consequentialist* ones (as might have been predicted by Greene’s 
theory) suggest that under normal circumstances, thinking in a consequentialist* way can be as fast (or even 
faster) than doing otherwise. This observation, in turn, raises the possibility that what Greene refers to as 
“manual mode” thinking may in fact be as automatic as “automatic settings” themselves are, at least as far as 
                                                                    
79 Another potential problem is that the RT increase for consequentialist* judgment under cognitive load is merely 
three quarters of a second. Whether this is theoretically (rather than statistically) significant is not something we learn 
either from a detailed examination of the paper in question or from that of the dual-process theory in general. That is, 
the theory is taken (in the paper) to predict a mere “difference” between the conditions, and no specific (or approximate) 
prediction is derived from it as to what the size of the difference should be. I should mention that it would be somewhat 
unfair to criticise Greene too strongly for this shortcoming since the theoretical vagueness that comes hand in hand with 
null hypothesis testing is a general—though unfortunate—feature of psychological theorizing, see e.g. Dienes (2008). 
80 In the paper, the authors refer to these groups as “high-utilitarian” and “low-utilitarian”, respectively, and the 
judgments as “utilitarian” vs. “non-utilitarian” (without asterisks). However, I opted for “consequentialist*” and “non-
consequentialist* here to increase internal consistency (and to be able to ignore what motivational factors are responsible 
for these judgments). 
81 Neither in the paper, nor in their supplementary materials are exact data provided concerning this latter 
comparison apart from a graph, but based on the error bars, one can decide whether the effects are significant. 
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the dilemmas used by Greene et al. are concerned (especially when it comes to people who, judged by their 
responses, tend to favour the first kind of thinking).82 
Consider now the increased RT under cognitive load in the case of consequentialist* judgments. Does this 
increase mean that the cognitive load interferes with consequentialist* thinking, as Greene et al. suggest? Not 
necessarily. It would be equally plausible to hypothesise that the interference is with conflict resolution, rather 
than with cost-benefit reasoning. That is, the RT increasing effect of cognitive load may be due to the lack of 
attentional resources necessary to resolve the conflict detected between the two competing outputs. 
This latter hypothesis challenges some of the central assumptions of the dual-process theory, such as the 
characterisation of the systems. It also raises concerns over the question of how automatic responses can 
become automatic. Although in the previous section, I put the emphasis on innately determined processes, 
there is nothing in the model that specifically predicts that only these can be automatic. In fact, Greene 
frequently emphasises that social or trial-and-error learning may result in developing new automatic 
responses. The social learning of fear (see e.g. Gigerenzer, 2014) is a good example (which, incidentally, may 
be aided by the fear detection mechanism briefly outlined in the previous section). In any case, even if in 
principle, such observations are reconcilable with the dual-process theory, they do appear to blur the 
distinction between the two systems as well as raise the possibility that ways of thinking (including cost-
benefit reasoning) may be automatic to varying degrees, rather than strictly either automatic or controlled. 
Finally, browsing through the dilemmas in the supplementary material of Greene et al. (2001), one finds 
cases such as “the architect”: 
You are a young architect visiting one of your construction sites with your boss. Your boss is a 
despicable individual who makes everyone around him miserable including you. It occurs to you that 
if you were to push him off of the building you are inspecting he would fall to his death and everyone 
would think it was an accident. Is it appropriate for you to push your boss off of the building in order 
to get him out of your life? 
The problem is that, presumably, very few people would experience the affirmative rationale as anywhere 
near strong enough to create a conflict situation (for more criticism concerning the same point, see McGuire 
                                                                    
82 One explanation might be the automatisation of an otherwise controlled reasoning process. Something along the 
lines of this possibility was also raised by Pizarro and Bloom (2003, especially p. 195, fn. 2). 
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et al. 2009). These issues make it difficult to interpret Greene et al.’s data (2001) as either a test of or evidence 
in favour of the dual-process theory.83 
3. The appraisal problem: Descriptive adequacy 
3.1. The problem 
There is a difficulty for Greene’s theory that we have so far largely ignored. I said that the footbridge and 
the switch cases engage the emotion system differentially. However, Greene owes us an explanation as to why 
this is the case: why is it that being “close up and personal” with the large person on the footbridge triggers an 
emotional response that is lacking in throwing the switch? This may seem a trivial problem (shoving a person 
is obviously more emotionally engaging than pushing a lever), but as we shall see, it is far from it. The 
difficulty of characterising what gives rise to the engagement of the emotion system is an instance of a more 
general problem, namely, the appraisal problem.84 
The appraisal problem concerns the question of how certain patterns in the input (i.e. behaviours) are 
recognised as being instances of certain more general categories. To illustrate the nature of this problem, let 
me return to Axelrod’s Prisoner’s Dilemma contest for a moment. I pointed out above that one of the 
convergences between evolutionary game theory and the dual-process theory was simplicity: the insight there 
was that difficult problems, such as the (iterated) Prisoner’s Dilemma may have simple solutions in the form 
of a strategy as simple as Tit-for-Tat. As Robert Trivers puts it: “The simplicity of the tit-for-tat strategy 
bypassed, in one step, the cognitive complexity that was often assumed to be required to get reciprocity going 
in our own species” (Trivers, 2002, p. 54). I also mentioned the possibility that emotions might jointly 
implement a sort of enhanced Tit-for-Tat. 
Nevertheless, there is one problem that has been largely (if not completely) overlooked in the literature on 
evolutionary game theory, where the focus is usually on strategies rather than the specific ways in which they 
are carried out—a problem that any organism playing Tit-for-Tat nevertheless has to solve: recognizing the 
acts of its interactants qua instances of cooperative and uncooperative behaviour in order to be able to react 
                                                                    
83 It is only fair to mention that in their 2008 paper, Greene and his collaborators did manage to pit consequentialist* 
vs. non-consequentialist* rationales more successfully against each other. Still, that study has its own problems, as 
discussed above. 
84 This problem is traditionally understood to be peculiar to the question of how situations elicit emotions (see e.g. 
Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001), but it can easily be extended—as I will in this section—to instances in which a 
theory is expected to clarify the link between an eliciting stimulus and a mental state (such as an emotion or the tokening 
of a concept). 
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appropriately by employing the relevant strategy (namely, by cooperating or defecting).85 This, in a nutshell, 
is the appraisal problem. 
The appraisal problem wasn’t really a problem for the computer programs in Axelrod’s competition, since 
Axelrod ensured that they could interact with each other by translating their responses into a common 
language and format. Thus, there was no need for programs to solve the question of how to appraise the 
behaviour of other programs. On the other hand, for living organisms, especially humans, whose social 
interactions range from simplest (e.g. kicking someone) to highly complex (e.g. knocking someone out to stop 
them from committing suicide), the appraisal problem is of paramount importance. 
Deciding whether an act is permissible in the context of the trolley dilemma constitutes a specific example 
of this problem, and understanding how it is solved is exactly the kind of task a theory in cognitive science, 
and a fortiori, a theory of moral cognition has to solve (see Chapter 1).  As Mikhail puts it: “the critical issue 
in the theory of moral cognition is not whether moral intuitions are linked to emotions—they clearly are—
but how to characterize the appraisal system that those intuitions presuppose” (2011a, p. 39). 
It should be evident that the appraisal problem is closely related to the Argument for Moral Grammar, 
discussed extensively in the previous chapter. Both AMG and the appraisal problem emphasise the variegated 
nature of the actions and situations that the individual has to cope with in terms of some process of 
evaluation.86 Of course, AMG goes further and offers a solution to a version of the appraisal problem 
(Chapter 1, Section 3.2). I mentioned above that Greene’s theory offers another solution: the emotion system 
relies on certain cues the presence of which sets off an emotional reaction that tends to result in judging the 
eliciting action as impermissible. In other words, there is no need for a “grammar” and there is no need for 
abstract representations and principles. Greene’s personal vs. impersonal distinction is essentially a proposed 
solution to the appraisal problem with respect to the trolley problem. 
Unfortunately, there are some serious problems with this solution. To begin with, the conditions for a 
dilemma being classified as “personal” originally included that the agent’s action would  result in a) serious 
bodily harm, b) to a particular person or group in a way that c) the harm does not result from deflecting an 
                                                                    
85 An analogous problem, of course, is to align one’s behaviour in such a way that it is deemed cooperative by the 
organism one is interacting with (or uncooperative—although there is a potential asymmetry here, as the individual 
advantages for displaying defection are different from the converse case for obvious reasons). That is, there are difficult 
computational questions on both the production and perception sides even of such a simple strategy as Tit-for-Tat (cf. 
Chapter 1, Section 3.4). 
86 There are some differences, of course. For instance, the appraisal problem is not specific to moral cognition. 
Further, AMG states the variability of action in terms of representation, while the appraisal problem does so in terms of 
external stimuli. 
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existing threat (see Greene et al. 2001, p. 2107). However, it was (admittedly) the researchers themselves who 
used these criteria to sort the dilemmas into groups of personal and impersonal, and the question of whether 
they actually correspond to the psychologically relevant criteria that are either separately necessary or jointly 
sufficient to evoke strong emotional responses is not addressed in those studies.87Furthermore, the personal 
vs. impersonal distinction generates some erroneous predictions. For instance, without qualifications, it 
predicts that any “personal” action engaging the emotion system would be judged impermissible, such as 
pushing someone out of the way of an oncoming trolley (cf. Mikhail, 2008b), which is clearly false. 
More generally, the problem of what makes an action personal needs to be confronted for the dual-process 
theory to be able to explain why the switch and the footbridge cases are judged differently if it attempts to do 
so by reference to a personal vs. impersonal distinction that is supposed to be exemplified by those cases. What 
exactly is involved in an action’s being personal? Does it involve touching? Does it have to be intentional? 
3.2. A second response to the appraisal problem 
3.2.1. The bifurcation of the “personal” dimension 
In a series of experiments, Greene et al. (2009) attempted to address the above raised questions by 
separating the variables that could potentially be taken to be relevant with respect to Greene’s “personal” 
dimension. In the first experiment (Experiment 1a) they created three brand new variants of the footbridge 
dilemma: (a) remote footbridge in which the agent has the option of throwing a “remote” switch, causing the 
man on the footbridge to be dropped on the track via a trap door; (b) footbridge pole in which the agent can 
push the man off the footbridge using a pole (rather than his bare hands); and (c) footbridge switch, which is 
identical to remote footbridge apart from the fact that the switch is on the footbridge near the person, rather 
than far away. These three variants in conjunction with the original footbridge dilemma separate the variables 
of spatial proximity (SP), physical contact (PC), and personal force (PF), the latter of which involves the agent 
impacting the patient (“patient” in terms of semantic role) using self-generated force (as opposed to an 
intermediate force, such as that of a gun). In short: footbridge (+SP, +PC, +PF), remote footbridge (–SP, –PC, 
                                                                    
87 As McGuire et al. put it: “there are no data demonstrating the necessity of all three criteria [(a)-(c) mentioned in 
the main text] in eliciting stronger emotional responses, nor do they correspond to well-established philosophical 
distinctions” (2009, p. 577). Although Greene acknowledges the difficulty of determining what exactly it is that renders 
an action personal as opposed to impersonal (Greene, 2008, fn. 2), he does not give up the idea that the distinction 
(perhaps once properly elaborated) may prove descriptively adequate and therefore solve the trolley dilemma. 
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–PF), footbridge pole (+SP, –PC, +PF), footbridge switch (+SP, –PC, –PF), so each possible pairing separates 
one variable.88 
The permissibility ratings (phrased in terms “moral acceptability”) were the following: footbridge: 31% 
(n=154), remote footbridge: 61% (n=82), footbridge pole: 31% (n=72), footbridge switch: 59% (n=160). The 
authors’ analysis (ANOVA, planned pairwise comparisons)89 revealed a significant effect of PF, but no effect 
of either PC or SP. In other words, the only relevant factor from the point of view of experimental subjects’ 
judgments seems to have been personal force (whether or not the specific definition used by Greene and 
colleagues is on the right track). The results of the statistical analysis can be understood intuitively: the 
scenarios involving personal force (footbridge and footbridge pole) received systematically worse ratings than 
the scenarios lacking it (remote footbridge and footbridge switch). No other listed factor can be associated with 
any such trend. 
However, in all four versions of the dilemma, the patient is harmed as a means to an end, namely that of 
saving the five. To put it differently, the agent’s goal is only achieved if the patient is harmed. This contrasts 
with the switch case in which whether the patient gets harmed is inconsequential from the point of view of 
the success of the action (i.e. if the patient were to be able to roll out of the way of the trolley, the five would 
still be saved). And notice that the switch case also gets systematically better ratings than any of the versions 
of the footbridge dilemma (Hauser et al. 2006: 85%; Greene 2013: 87%90), indicating that personal force may 
not be sufficient to explain the variability (at least not all of the variability) in terms of the ratings across all 
the scenarios. Further tests (especially Experiment 2a and 2b, the latter of which was a reanalysis of Cushman 
et al. 2006) showed that indeed, the effect of personal force depends on intention, that is, whether the patient 
is used as a means to an end or more generally, whether the harm is intentional. 
3.2.2. Modular myopia 
The question at this point is (again, taking much of the dual-process theory for granted): why do we have 
an automatic emotional response to cases in which the agent intentionally harms the patient, especially to 
thereby achieve an end—even if the goal state is, to some extent, preferable to the outcome that is to be 
expected without the intervention (i.e. even if the benefits outweigh the costs)? 
                                                                    
88 There is no version of the dilemma in which PF is present, but neither of the other two variables. However, it is 
difficult to conceive of a case with (+PF –SP). 
89 ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) is a statistical procedure for identifying the factors that explain the variability 
within a given data-set. Planned comparisons, rather than being post hoc, are part of the experimental design. 
90 Greene (2013) mentions the 87% figure (p. 220ff.), however, having browsed through the original papers and their 
supplementary materials, I could not locate the study from which it was taken. 
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Greene’s answer to this challenge is to propose a mechanism that he refers to as the “myopic module” 
(MM).91 To understand how this module is supposed to work, one has to know a bit about Mikhail’s theory 
of action representation (elaborated in Mikhail, 2011a; see also Levine et al. 2018), which he himself partially 
borrows from Goldman (1970) and Bratman (1987). To simplify grossly, the processing of an action plan is 
thought to involve representing it in terms of its causal and intentional structure. An action plan 
representation consists of a primary chain representing the succession of actions necessary for achieving the 
goal (or end) state in temporal order. Thus, the representation of throwing the switch involves the 
representation of the initiating movement, the movement of the switch, the movement of the track, the 
turning of the trolley, and the goal state: the five men saved. Secondary (or tertiary) branches may represent 
events that are expected to happen as a consequence of carrying out the action (such as the death of the man 
who happens to be on the side-track), but which are not causally necessary for the attainment of the goal.92 
Greene’s MM is posited as a mechanism for surveying or inspecting the primary chain of action 
representations, actively looking for instances of harm. When the MM finds one, it generates the quick 
automatic reaction that is responsible for the judgment that the action in the footbridge dilemma is morally 
impermissible. Hence, when the violent action is a means to an end, it becomes active, since only then is the 
harm part of the primary chain. In contrast, MM does not have the power to also analyse secondary (or 
tertiary) chains. Therefore, if the harm is a side-effect, MM is blind to it—or in other words myopic (and 
consequently, “manual mode” wins out in the absence of a salient emotional response). There are two reasons 
for this. First, the mechanism is held to work in (represented) temporal order, going through the steps of the 
action representation in a linear fashion. For MM to be able to inspect secondary chains, it would have to 
have a relatively sophisticated “queue” based memory system, which would allow it to return to the inspection 
of the secondary task once it is finished with the primary chain, which could be computationally costly (this, 
according to Greene, would be inconsistent with it being “automatic”). Second, representing an action in 
terms of goals and means to achieve them is a relatively trivial task, at least as compared to representing the 
side-effects of an action, which is much less so, mainly because there is no limit to the number and kind of 
potential side-effects of an action that could be considered by the mechanism (for more details, see Greene, 
2013, pp. 224–240). 
                                                                    
91 On the face of it, this name seems a gem of a tautology. On Fodor’s version of modularity theory (Fodor, 1983), 
modules are encapsulated, meaning that the flow of information into the module is severely restricted. In this sense, all 
modules are myopic. Nevertheless, Greene refers to a specific kind of myopia to be discussed in the text, which renders 
the terms slightly better motivated. 
92 Note that technically speaking, intentional and causal chains are understood as separate types of representations, 
but  shall ignore that complication here. 
 75 
3.3. Evaluation 
The myopic module is an attempt at explaining the difference between the moral permissibility ratings of 
the dilemmas discussed above (as well as others). Whether it is successful is an interesting question that is 
beyond the scope of this chapter. Here, I am merely concerned with its relationship with Greene’s dual-
process theory as well as the DP framework more generally. 
3.3.1. Greene’s dual-process theory 
Greene’s initial claim that “automatic settings” rely on simple cues is already indirectly questioned by the 
MM hypothesis.93 Recall the Whalen et al. (2004) study, which Greene uses as an illustrative example of how 
the emotion system works (i.e. it is supposed to rely on simple cues). The representation of an action in terms 
of a primary chain of necessary causal steps will on any reasonable theory count as richly conceptual. Also 
notice the way in which the dilemmas are usually presented: the subjects are asked to read the stories from a 
vignette, which results in a conceptual re-description of the events involved (à la Mikhail, 2008b). The “cues” 
necessary for the engagement of emotion systems will, by necessity, have to be in a format that is available to 
such systems, but that format is neither low-level nor perceptual, as Greene’s theory would suggest.  
In fact, the very idea of proposing a mechanism that is supposed to be looking for simple cues seems ill-
conceived if the simple cue turns out to be something as elusive as a representation of harm, as in the case of 
MM. My point here is not that such a mechanism (i.e. one looking for instances of harm) is implausible. It is 
that harms (even “personal” harms) come in all sorts of forms—in fact, a potentially infinite variety of forms. 
This introduces a new microcosm of the productivity problem. Consequently, there is no reason to expect 
that a (simple) cue based recognition of harm may work, even in principle, because there is no reason to expect 
all forms of harm (or even HARM) to share a single cue.94 Something has to give: either MM does not execute 
an automatic process as understood by Greene, or automatic processes do not have the property Greene 
attributes to them. This is no mere “semantic” quibble, either: it entails that the above proposed simple 
perceptual cue-based solution to the appraisal problem is unsuccessful. Therefore, the Argument for Moral 
Grammar remains unscathed.95 
                                                                    
93 To repeat the quote from fn. 66, Greene asserts that “all automatic settings rely on specific cues that are only 
imperfectly related to the things they’re designed to detect” (2013, p. 227).  
94 Also note that a perceptual/behavioural definition of PERSONAL FORCE will be at least as hopeless as a 
perceptual/behavioural definition of FORCE. 
95 There is another interpretation of the dual-process theory that is independent of the simple cue assumption. This 
merely emphasises the idea that moral judgment is based on (at least) two separate systems (e.g. Cushman et al. 2010). 
This story is easily reconcilable with LA, however. 
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3.3.2. The DP framework 
In my view, the problematic aspect of Greene’s theory is inherited squarely from Greene’s adoption of his 
version of the DP framework. In this framework, automatic processes are mostly innate (potentially learned) 
knee-jerk like heuristic responses to predictable patterns in the environment. This picture of automatic 
processes is clearly suggested by Greene’s own examples, one of which—namely the fear detection mechanism 
discovered by Whalen et al.—I also rehearsed above. The DP framework thus understood licences a futile 
search for those simple cues the system responsible for moral judgment is supposed to exploit. No such search 
is likely to deliver successful theories. And if they do, it will be an accident (as in the case of MM—that is, 
assuming it is successful). 
That the criterion according to which automatic processes are based on the exploitation of simple or low-
level/perceptual cues is moribund becomes obvious by illustrating automatic processes by such cognitive 
capacities as face recognition or language comprehension. The process of recognising a face does not involve 
central access or conscious reasoning, such as the following: “judging by the long hair and certain 
characteristic features including the relative positions of the nose and eyes, this person is a female, so I can 
narrow my search by eliminating all the men I know as possible candidates, etc.” Rather, when we recognise 
a face, we do so without any conscious effort, and without any insight into how we actually do it. Mutatis 
mutandis for understanding a sentence in one’s first language. To illustrate the parallel nature of these 
processes, we can also understand a sentence in our first language and recognise a face at the same time—think 
of watching a dialogue in a film and recognising one of the actors or actresses involved. Yet no one would 
seriously argue that either face perception or language comprehension is based on some mechanisms 
exploiting simple cues.96  
Of course, it would be premature to question the appropriateness of the distinction between two types of 
processes. We may choose instead to purge the characterisation of automatic processes of the “simple cue” 
assumption. So perhaps the problem is not with DP per se, but merely with Greene’s take on it. Drawing this 
conclusion would be missing a by now rather obvious point: there is no clear sense in which the DP 
framework is a framework of anything in particular. For example, theories of language comprehension or face 
recognition are not articulated within DP, and nor is it easy to see how they would benefit at all from being 
so. To take language, for example, none of the fundamental hypotheses and assumptions concerning the 
nature of language competence guiding contemporary research in linguistics are derivable from DP: for such 
                                                                    
96 This arguably would be more plausible in the case of face recognition; for example, we might recognise a face by 
virtue of a characteristic nose. Tellingly, although such a strategy is generally available to us, it is only employed by those 
(so-called ‘prosopagnosics’) whose face recognition mechanism is deficient. 
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purposes, more substantive frameworks are required, such as Chomsky’s generative programme. In contrast 
to such rich theoretical frameworks, DP has very little to contribute to the explanatory project of either 
linguistics or the study of other cognitive domains.97 So, I submit, is the case with the study of moral 
cognition. 
 
In conclusion, the dual-process theory offers a reasonably attractive surface explanation of why we judge 
certain cases of harm morally permissible, while slightly different ones as not permissible. It has the (somewhat 
dubious) advantage of being intuitively appealing, and it is also held to be supported by a considerable amount 
of (neuroscientific and psychological) evidence. However, to the extent that it makes falsifiable predictions at 
all, those predictions are sufficiently vague as to be difficult to evaluate (cf. Section 2.2 above). Moreover, 
Greene’s apparent solution to the appraisal problem in terms of a simple cue based mechanism is deemed to 
failure, as in fact amply illustrated by his very own model. Not only is Greene’s elaborated dual-process theory 
(positing MM) compatible with LA, it also reinforces its central argument, namely, the Argument for Moral 
Grammar. 
In Section 4 below, I move on to considering more direct objections made against the Linguistic Analogy. 
I will tackle five such criticisms one by one and show that the thesis of first chapter—the case for LA as the 
general framework for the study of moral cognition—remains largely unaffected by them. 
4. LA: Objections and replies 
As I suggested in the previous chapter, the most typical objections against LA tend to concern its nativist 
aspects (e.g. Prinz 2008a. 2008b, 2009, 2014; Sripada, 2008; Sterelny, 2010), especially the moral version of 
the PoS argument (as best articulated in Mikhail, 2008a), that, together with the Argument for Moral 
Grammar jointly make the case for a Universal Moral Grammar or UMG (Mikhail, 2007). Such objections 
are not objections against all versions of LA, and certainly not against the version I endorse in Chapter 1 which 
understands LA as a research program or explanatory framework, but only against its “strong” version, 
according to which the success of LA is predicated upon either a very a close correspondence between the 
respective explananda (language and moral cognition) or the applicability of both of the two crucial 
                                                                    
97 Cognitive scientists and philosophers of cognitive science are well aware that much of our cognitive life (including 
our moral thinking and reasoning) is automatic, inaccessible, and unconscious (cf. e.g. Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). 
Making such assumptions with respect to a cognitive capacity requires no DP framework. 
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arguments of the Chomskyan generative framework to the domain of moral cognition. What I hope to be 
clear on the basis of the previous chapter, however, is that the success of LA as defended here depends on 
neither of those things. 
Therefore, the task of the following section is not all that difficult. In what comes below, I address some 
of the most salient criticisms levelled against the Linguistic Analogy more or less in increasing order of 
importance. 
4.1. Language vs. moral cognition 
The claim that differences between the nature of the psychological underpinnings of language and moral 
cognition endanger the prospect of basing a theory of moral cognition on the Linguistic Analogy is one that 
has been made by most critics of LA (e.g. Dupoux & Jacob, 2007, 2008; Prinz, 2008a/b, 2009; Sterelny, 2010 
etc.). For instance, Mallon points out (Malllon, 2008) that making the analogy with language invokes a host 
of properties of language that then will be expected to characterise moral cognition too, even though there is 
no conclusive evidence that this is indeed the case. For instance, language competence has an innate universal 
basis, is vulnerable to selective deficits, it exploits combinatorial representations, and operates based on 
unconscious rules and principles. It is not clear whether these are applicable in the case of moral cognition. It 
has also been pointed out for example by Jesse Prinz that language may not be the “best” analogy, due to some 
disanalogies between the language and moral cognition. Capacities other than language, such as vision and 
motor control, may share relevant features with moral cognition that might render such other analogies more 
appropriate in certain respects. Thus, one may propose a “vision analogy” or the “motor analogy”, which 
might potentially prove equally as good as or even better than LA (Prinz, 2008a).  
These are all interesting points, but besides being inconclusive even against the strongest version of the 
analogy, they fail to address the reasons why LA was endorsed in the previous chapter. For instance, two of 
the potential disanalogies hinted at by Mallon (i.e. universal innate basis and the existence of selective deficits) 
affect neither the usefulness of LA nor the applicability of the crucial distinctions and arguments advanced 
herein.98 The other potential disanalogies (i.e. combinatoriality and consciousness) are treated elsewhere 
(Chapter 1, sections 3.2 and 5, and Section 4.3 in this chapter). As for the appropriateness of other analogies, 
partly for historical reasons perhaps, for better or worse, we have LA, and we have no motor analogy. That a 
motor analogy might be “better” is a weak and unsubstantiated claim. As argued before, ultimately, the 
success of LA is predicated on whether it provides a correct analysis of the explanandum (Chapter 1, Section 
                                                                    
98 These are addressed in Hauser et al. (2008b), for example. 
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3), the explanans (Chapter 1, Section 4), and the question of when the latter may be deemed adequate 
(Chapter 1, Section 6). I argued above that it does indeed do this. Furthermore, LA’s success also depends on 
the extent to which the theoretical concepts and distinctions introduced in Chapter 1 contribute to the 
inquiry into moral cognition in a fruitful way. This is difficult to assess as things stand, yet I do think we have 
already encountered some positive signs in this respect in the foregoing discussions. 
4.2. “Internal” vs. “external” principles 
One principle that is often implicated in discussions of the Linguistic Analogy is the Principle of Double 
Effect (or PDE), which, inter alia, is often held to explain—or at least contribute to the explanation of—the 
psychological difference between the switch and footbridge scenarios in terms of moral permissibility, as well 
as numerous others. On the PDE, an act having a bad outcome that otherwise would be impermissible may 
be deemed permissible if the outcome of the act is not intended only foreseen, and the act is performed to 
achieve a greater good, which cannot be achieved otherwise.99 Now, one point that critics of LA have made is 
that proponents of LA have assumed (or that LA suggests) that PDE is not only descriptively adequate but is 
also represented in I-morality (Mallon, 2008; Nichols, 2005). This assumption, they point out, is not 
warranted, nor is the idea that PDE is innate and part of a universal moral grammar (cf. the previous footnote). 
Nichols goes further and proposes a model on which PDE is a consequence of two separate cognitive 
mechanisms that are unlikely to be parts of an I-morality—the existence of which both Nichols and Mallon 
are sceptical of in general. In Nichols’s model, what is presupposed are the availability of non-hypothetical 
rules100, such as the prohibition against murder, and a general reasoning capacity directed at figuring out how 
to minimise bad outcomes and maximise good ones. The two systems may be described as deontological and 
utilitarian, respectively.101 According to Nichols, these capacities (i.e. non-hypothetical rule reasoning, and 
reasoning about achieving ends), jointly enable humans to reason in line with PDE, that is, they account for 
PDE’s descriptive adequacy (which we will just assume for present purposes).102 Furthermore, since neither 
                                                                    
99 As evident from this formulation, this principle is of considerable complexity. With the assumption of descriptive 
adequacy and the idea that it is untaught (since it is generally not even available to conscious reflection), nor is it obvious 
how we could “internalise” it based on experience, the PDE is often taken as one of the most potent example of the case 
for the strongest version of LA, as both the Argument for Moral Grammar and (given the assumed PoS situation) the 
argument for universal moral grammar may be applicable in its case. 
100 Non-hypothetical imperatives are imperatives the application of which does not depend on the individual’s 
purposes or interests. This contrasts with hypothetical imperatives that do. Non-hypothetical rules are not necessarily 
moral, since rules of etiquette also belong to this category (cf. Foot, 1972). 
101 Note how this model is similar to Greene’s model discussed further above. 
102 PDE’s descriptive adequacy is not a settled issue. For example, Greene et al.’s findings discussed in Section 3.2.1 
indicated that the means/side-effect distinction, which is at the core of the PDE, depends on the presence of personal 
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of the implicated systems is restricted to the domain of moral cognition, there is no need to posit a moral 
grammar or an I-morality. 
In Nichols’s rendition (based on Uniacke, 1998), PDE has four conditions. First, the intended action is 
permissible (that is, the intended consequences are the good ones). Second, the foreseen bad effect is not 
intended. Third, there is no way to achieve the good effect without also causing the bad effect. Fourth, the 
bad effect is not disproportionate to the good effect. Nichols’s two systems account takes it to be the case that 
if the first two conditions are violated, the action will be judged to be impermissible, because the deontological 
system gets activated (e.g. in the trolley cases due to the prohibition against intentional homicide). 
Furthermore, if the latter two conditions are violated, the utilitarian system gets activated and generates a 
rationale against endorsing the action as permissible. 
My point here is not to argue that Nichols’s simple quasi-empiricist model doesn’t work (although for 
related points, see Section 3 above or Mikhail, 2013, pp. 72-81), but to examine whether and if so to what 
extent the above criticisms cause problems for the framework presented in the previous chapter. To begin this 
examination, we must distinguish between two general points in the preceding paragraphs that are especially 
relevant in this context. First, as Nichols and Mallon emphasise, the PDE’s descriptive adequacy (to the extent 
that we accept this thesis) is no evidence that PDE is represented as such. That is, reasoning in line with PDE 
is not equivalent to reasoning in terms of it (whether this reasoning is consciously accessible or not). Second, 
Nichols believes that the truthmaker for PDE’s descriptive adequacy is not a moral faculty, but a hodgepodge 
of interacting psychological mechanisms (see also Cushman, 2016, for further possibilities along these lines). 
A preliminary thing to notice is that neither of these points pose a serious challenge to either the general 
framework or the key arguments presented in the previous chapter, since they do not show (a) that the 
explanatory aims as set by LA are problematic, (b) that the Argument for Moral Grammar (as endorsed here) 
is mistaken, and (c) that pursuing LA is either likely to be unfruitful or there are better ways of doing moral 
psychology than pursuing LA. Still, they are clearly relevant and consequently, they do deserve some further 
discussion.  
As per the inference from descriptive adequacy to psychological reality or strict adequacy, there are three 
observations to be made. First, although I do not wish to enter into gratuitous exegetical analysis, as a matter 
                                                                    
force. However there are conflicting data in the literature even regarding this (cf. e.g. the difference in Mikhail’s results 
regarding the “man in front” vs. the “loop track” scenarios, neither of which involves personal force). This is complicated 
by the fact that different studies often use different measures (e.g. modal vs. mean ratings) as well as different dependent 
variables (e.g. acceptability vs. permissibility). See also Cushman (2016), Greene (2013, pp. 217-224); Mikhail (2013); 
Zimmerman (2013). 
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of fact, rarely have proponents of LA drawn this conclusion as far as I am aware (an exception, mentioned by 
Nichols himself, is Harman, 2000, but his discussion is brief and admittedly rather speculative).103 More 
generally, it is something of a consensus in (at least some areas of) cognitive science that explanations at the 
functional level do not translate straightforwardly to those at the computational-algorithmic or the 
implementational level—as pointed out by Mallon himself (cf. e.g. Putnam, 1975; Fodor, 1974). This is 
reflected by our discussion in the previous chapter (Section 3.6) of the empirical adequacies (“mere” 
descriptive adequacy is not assumed to translate to “strict” descriptive adequacy) as well as of the distinction 
between model and mental principles, the former of which may only be a working hypothesis for the latter. 
As for the second point, that is, whether we need to posit no I-morality to explain PDE’s descriptive 
adequacy, the issues are a bit more complex. One thing to notice is that the inference from PDE’s descriptive 
adequacy to something at the psychological level of description explaining it appears to be entirely appropriate 
(if not deductively valid—as usual in this area of inquiry). Indeed, Nichols himself makes this latter inference, 
which is apparent from the kind of explanation he provides (this is true of other critics, such as Zimmerman, 
2013, for instance, or anyone involved in this debate I can think of). That is, judgments that we prima facie 
would categorise as moral are expected to be explained by reference to psychological processes. This is the 
most essential part of what Chapter 1 (and hence LA) assumes. Of course, it may turn out that there is no I-
morality (or specifically moral cognition) to speak of, and this would doubtless be detrimental to LA. 
However, Nichols’s is far from being a strong case in favour of this possibility. First, it only treats one set of 
examples, which it claims to explain without reference to an I-morality.104 But from this it does not follow 
that I-morality in general does not exist. Second, even worse, there is no reason (beyond perhaps some vague 
notion of simplicity) to prefer Nichols’s proposal to other proposals that do make reference to I-morality 
(such as Mikhail’s) even regarding this limited set of cases. On the other hand, there are quite a few reasons to 
disprefer it (see previous section or Mikhail, 2009, 2013). In any case, to come to general conclusions such as 
                                                                    
103 Here are two representative examples: “We can talk about the principles that characterize the computational 
system as being innate, if we like. However, it is crucial not thereby to imply  are represented in any explicit fashion” 
(Dwyer, 2008, pp. 410-411); “we are not concerned here with how the PDE or whatever mental operations it implies are 
actually implemented in our psychology, nor with whether those operations are modular in Fodor’s (1983) sense, or 
otherwise informationally encapsulated” (Mikhail, 2011, pp. 148-9). 
104 Although even this is far from obvious: the prohibition against killing—part of Nichols’s story—appears a moral 
faculty principle par excellence. Nichols might retort that this is not in fact a principle specific to moral cognition, as 
there are other non-hypothetical imperatives that are not uniquely in the domain of moral cognition (see fn. 100). We 
could respond to this by pointing out that although there might be shared mechanisms or representations in various 
different types of non-hypothetical rules or principles, that does not entail that there is not a special class of them that 
belong to the moral domain and whose moral-deontic status is generated by I-morality. 
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the one Nichols and Mallon prematurely makes in this regard, the kind of inquiry endorsed in the first chapter 
seems best suited (see arguments offered therein). 
Finally, notice that PDE is a conflict principle (in the sense of Chapter 1, Section 5), and we said little 
concerning how such principles relate to I-morality. The minimal job we assigned to the latter (in Chapter 1, 
Section 2) is the analysis of actions in terms of deontic concepts. Thus, the input to this process is supposed 
to be (some sort of) action descriptions, while the output is a deontic value “attached” to those 
representations. With this in mind, it will be important what exactly the kind of judgment is that is provided 
by conflict principles. It is immediately clear, to begin with, that faculty principles must be part of FM on the 
current framework (this premise may be empirically mistaken, of course, as discussed above and in Section 
4.5 below). If conflict principles produce judgments of acceptability, rather than moral impermissibility, they 
are not properly characterised as parts of I-morality so conceived. If, on the other hand, they supply moral-
deontic judgments (such as morally impermissible or obligatory, as argued for by Mikhail), then, again, they 
will be part of the domain of moral cognition on this narrow conception.105 Hence, the disagreement is not 
about the necessity of positing principles to explain moral judgments but (a) what the nature of the content 
of particular purported principles is, (b) whether they are innate (in some sense of the term), and (c) whether 
they are part of moral competence or performance and, relatedly, (d) whether they are operative or merely 
express. Whatever the outcome of such debates, it will not substantially detract from LA as defended here.106 
4.3. Is the Argument for Moral Grammar any good? 
The observation—discussed in Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2—that the Argument for Moral Grammar is not 
perfectly isomorphic to its linguistic counterpart is another example of the series of differences between 
language and moral cognition, which might be regarded as considerations in favour of dismissing LA (see 
Section 4.1). However, unlike in the previous cases, the particular ways in which the analogy is imperfect may 
have a crucial bearing on the success of LA. After all, the Argument for Moral Grammar is one of the central 
pillars of the Linguistic Analogy (as argued in Chapter 1, Section 3.2). I already discussed how I believe this 
                                                                    
105 Notice that it is not obvious that in cases for example where there is a violation of the proportionality condition 
of PDE (condition 4), why the judgment should be one about moral permissibility, as Nichols appears to assume. If it is 
the general reasoning system that vetoes the endorsement of the action, then the action is dispreferred in terms of utility, 
rather than in terms of moral permissibility. 
106 It is true that since Mikhail uses PDE as his flagship example of a universal and potentially innate operative moral 
principle, if these properties were not to characterise PDE, our subjective assessment of LA could suffer accordingly. Yet 
strictly speaking, LA per se is silent on whether PDE should have these properties. 
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argument differs from the Argument for Mental (Linguistic) Grammar, and how in spite of the disparity, the 
part of the conclusion of the argument that is significant for us remains intact. 
To reiterate, although at times, Mikhail seems to argue for the idea that the productivity problem cannot 
be solved without positing a moral grammar (in the sense of a combinatorial system), the core of the 
argument is that representations and processing principles (potentially of all three types) are required to 
explain how the productivity of action representation does not pose a problem for moral cognition. As 
discussed before, the difference between language and moral cognition is that in the case of the former, the 
principles must be (recursive) combinatorial principles, that is, principles that explain how larger linguistic 
structures (such as phrases) can be constructed out of smaller structures, often of the same kind. In contrast, 
a theory of moral cognition need not posit a combinatorial system of its own, since the combinatorial system 
responsible for productivity is most plausibly not specific to moral cognition.107 Nevertheless, importantly, 
the fact that moral thinking appears designed to meet the productivity challenge posed by the combinatorial 
nature of the representation of action needs to be accounted for. As far as anyone knows, positing principles 
(constraint, processing and output) in the domain of moral cognition is the best (only?) way of doing so (see 
also Section 4.4 below). 
Given our rather extensive discussion of this issue, the current analysis of what I take to be the best critique 
of the Argument for Moral Grammar will be brief and opportunistic. Dupoux and Jacob (2007) point out 
four reasons why an explanation of moral competence need not presuppose a moral grammar, which 
correspond to four properties that generative linguistic grammars have but moral cognition does not (or does 
not obviously) exhibit, out of which I shall consider three. The starting point is the observation that generative 
grammars specify the syntactic mapping between phonological and conceptual structure. It is due to this 
mapping that we can construct a phonological representation on the basis of a thought (production) and vice 
versa (perception). Thus, the first dissimilarity is already apparent: in language, the mapping between the 
phonetic and the conceptual levels of representation is reversible: if I hear the phrase “Luca ate the brown 
                                                                    
107 Prinz also argues along similar lines: “Are moral rules combinatorial? This is a bit more complicated. As Hauser 
et al. point out, we certainly need a combinatorial system for categorizing actions. But notice that action categorization 
is something we do quite independently of morality. Our capacity to tell whether something was done intentionally, for 
example, operates in nonmoral contexts, and individuals who lack moral sensitivity (such as psychopaths) are not 
impaired in recognizing actions or attributing intentions. Psychopaths can recognize that someone is intentionally 
causing pain to another person. Moral rules take these combinatorial, nonmoral representations of actions as inputs and 
then assign moral significance to them. The distinctively moral contribution to a rule such as that killing is wrong is not 
the representation of the action (killing), but the attitude of wrongness. It’s an interesting question whether moral 
concepts such as “wrong” have a combinatorial structure; they may. However, by focusing on the combinatorial 
structure of action representations, Hauser et al. fail to show that representations specific to the moral domain are 
combinatorial” (Prinz, 2008, p. 160). 
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cow”, having constructed the phonological representation based on the sound signal, I can entertain the 
thought that LUCA ATE THE BROWN COW by virtue of the syntactic mapping. The same thought can 
also occur to me first (for example by remembering seeing Luca eat the brown cow), which is then mapped 
onto the phonological representational level by virtue of which I can utter “Luca ate the brown cow”. This 
does not seem to be the case with respect to moral cognition: I can evaluate Luca’s eating the brown cow as 
wrong (let’s assume I’m a moral vegetarian). Parallel to the case in language, this can be seen as establishing a 
mapping relation between an action description (Luca’s eating the brown cow) on the one hand and a moral 
concept on the other (or a “valence” as Jacob and Dupoux put it). Yet given the output alone, I cannot 
construct the thought that Luca ate the brown cow.108 
The second and third points are closely related: encapsulation and domain specificity. As for the former, 
Dupoux and Jacob point out that while in the case of language, the mechanisms responsible for the 
implementation of the syntactic mapping function are encapsulated in the sense that what is informationally 
available to them is strictly limited relative to central cognition and thus they are not even potentially affected 
by the knowledge and beliefs of the organism. In contrast, moral judgment is potentially sensitive to all sorts 
of information. For example, the judgment that fracking is morally wrong (ideally) rests on an understanding 
of what fracking is (fracturing a rock by pressurised liquid to extract gas and oil) and why it is environmentally 
harmful (e.g. it involves the transportation of huge amounts of liquid that is environmentally taxing). Thus, 
there is no way of specifying in advance just what kinds of information moral cognition/judgment has access 
to. 
Regarding domain specificity, Dupoux and Jacob observe that while syntactic rules (such as rewrite rules) 
are specific to language (what use would they have in other domains?), it is unclear whether moral principles 
are specific to moral cognition. For instance, the rewrite rule we considered above (NP → NP CP) applies in 
the domain of syntax alone. By contrast, the PDE may be applied to domains other than those of moral 
cognition. For example, it makes sense to assume that there is a prima facie prudential rule against making 
oneself look stupid. We can also draw a distinction between making oneself look stupid in order to do 
something, for example to get famous, and foreseeing that on the road to becoming famous one has to put 
oneself through situations in which one looks stupid as a byproduct of this process. We may reason in line 
with the prudential version of PDE that only the first option is prudentially disfavoured (“prudentially 
                                                                    
108 Unless of course the output is something like “Luca’s eating of the brown cow is/was wrong”, from which I can 
trivially construct “Luca ate the brown cow”. The point remains that the action description in this latter case will not be 
formed on the basis of the mapping. As Jacob and Dupoux put it, “morality is an evaluative system, not a generative 
one” (p. 376). (Cf. Chapter 1, fn. 17.) 
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impermissible” would sound odd). None of this plausibly involves moral evaluation (Nichols also makes a 
similar point, see 2005, p. 361, fn. 8). Relatedly, PDE applies to representations such as intentions, side-
effects, and so on, many of which seem also not to be specific to moral cognition. 
The first thing to notice is that none of Dupoux and Jacob’s criticisms appears to render the inference to 
moral principles endorsed in Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2 problematic. Nevertheless, the points raised are 
instructive. In what comes below, I shall concentrate on the latter two points of contention.  
The version of AMG endorsed here has it as its bottom line that moral cognition is underpinned by 
principles. Thus, one task for a theory of moral cognition is to posit (model) principles that are descriptively 
adequate. To take a toy example, consider utilitarianism as a descriptive theory—which of course it is not (the 
example is also used by Roedder & Harman, n.d.). According to the utilitarian principle, it is obligatory (or 
at least permissible) to perform an action if it increases overall utility or happiness and not so otherwise. This 
principle can be seen as an attempt to solve the productivity problem by proposing a calculus: a simple 
overarching principle that is defined over representations of (possible) outcomes in terms of overall utility.109 
The difficulty for utilitarianism as a descriptive theory of I-morality is how to turn representations of events 
into representations of (potential) overall utility. That is, the interesting theoretical work would be the 
specification of conversion rules. Once this step is completed, given a set of representations of possible 
outcomes in terms of overall utility, the selection procedure, which is mandated by the utilitarian faculty 
principle, would generate straightforward predictions as to which of the available action plans would be 
regarded as morally obligatory or impermissible to execute.110 
This toy example indicates a way in which issues of encapsulation and domain specificity may be raised 
with respect to moral cognition. Concerning encapsulation, we can see how the informational access of the 
moral principle is limited to a closed set of representational variables, and the operation of the mechanism(s) 
establishing the input-output relation need be only indirectly affected by the organism’s knowledge and 
beliefs. In regard to domain specificity, that the principles and representations are proprietary to the moral 
domain is not a requirement. Increase and utility are in no way specific to issues relating to moral cognition 
of course. Nevertheless, the important point is that the representations over which moral principles are 
defined need not be promiscuously variable to explain the fact that the kinds of information that are 
potentially taken into account in moral judgment (broadly defined) may be. On descriptive utilitarianism, 
                                                                    
109 For now, let us now ignore the obvious fact that the principle fails to satisfy descriptive adequacy.  
110 Note in passing that utilitarianism (understood in these terms) eschews the need for conflict principles, which is 
another way of saying that, at least in its canonical formulation, it doesn’t recognise prima facie wrongs. 
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moral cognition can make a judgment regarding the permissibility of fracking once it is processed in a format 
that represents its perceived overall utility. This format does not need to specify what fracking is. Moral 
cognition only cares about whether it increases overall utility or not. In other words, knowledge about 
fracking is not input to evaluation by a faculty of moral cognition, only to the analysis that defines how it is 
conceived of in terms of utility.111 This might be a difficult point to understand, so let me elaborate on it a 
little bit further. 
One observation about moral cognition is that it involves mandatory processing. That is, when we are 
exposed to an action (in the form of reading a vignette or perceiving a scene), we automatically evaluate it in 
moral terms. If I see an innocent person being slapped in the face for no reason, I cannot help but morally 
judge the action and the agent who performs it. This is similar to language processing and the construction 
of a 3D visual representation of the world on the basis of 2D input from the retina (Mikhail, 2008b). To sick 
with language, mandatory processing (one of the many hallmarks of modularity) takes place once the 
phonetic representation of the sound signal is constructed. If the input is analysed as noise, there is no 
linguistic processing taking place. The idea is that there is—to use Jackendoff’s term—such a representational 
“plane” in the case of moral cognition also—which is taken to be the very abstract “utility level” by descriptive 
utilitarianism (or a similarly abstract level by descriptive Kantianism, for example). Although we do not know 
what this representational plane is, the fact of mandatory processing in this domain appears to imply (or at 
least suggest) that there is one; otherwise, how would we be able to automatically respond to novel situations 
rapidly with a moral judgment? An informed (and quite traditional) guess is that it will have to do with the 
representation of action. 
Now, there are many ways in (or representational levels at) which an action can be cognised. For example, 
drilling a hole in someone’s head may be construed as a mechanistic process (this is based on a representation 
at Jackendoff’s “physical plane”), but it can be cognised is terms that we would readily perceive as morally 
salient: as X intentionally harming Y (Jackendoff’s “social plane”), as per social domain theory (mentioned in 
Section 5 of Chapter 1). The idea is that these representations are constructed simultaneously in the same way 
as the phonetic and syntactic representations of “my car” and “NP” are simultaneously constructed and 
processed by different mental mechanisms (those dedicated to phonology and syntax) when one utters “my 
car’s been stolen”. A difference may be that while we have no conscious access to syntactic representations, 
for all we know, we do have at least some degree of conscious access to the representational plane that moral 
                                                                    
111 Relatedly, that we make the means vs. side-effects distinction in situations that we do not represent in moral terms 
is not too illuminating in itself. After all, we don't make moral judgments about cases which we don't represent as 
involving prima facie moral wrongs (such as the example in the text). 
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cognition exploits. To be clear, the idea is not that HARM is an inherently moral concept (indeed it is not, 
see e.g. Sousa et al. 2014), but that there is a level of mental description of actions (which might be arbitrarily 
abstract) at which intuitive moral principles operate. 
This way of looking at what a theory of moral cognition has to achieve is closely related to Ray Jackendoff’s 
so called parallel architecture (Jackendoff, 2002, 2003). The idea in a nutshell is that the traditional 
components of linguistic analysis (phonology, syntax, semantics) have their proprietary representational 
levels and principles operating in parallel. For example, syntax only “sees” syntactic phrases (e.g. “NP”) and 
other syntactic features (“Determiner”), and its operations are defined over these representations. (As we saw 
in Section 3.2.2 of the previous chapter, to avoid the multiplication of rules to the point that they become 
completely theoretically useless, the principles of syntax need to be defined over representations that abstract 
away from fully specified lexical items.) This is an efficient arrangement as all the components of I-language 
can do their mandatory and automatic operations in tandem, with little or no regard as to what is going on at 
other representational levels (see Figure 2.2 below). 
 
Figure 2.2: The three levels of linguistic processing—phonology, syntax and semantics—
involved in the representation of the phrase “the dogs”. The indices show how the 
representations are bound together. For instance, the plural affix (‘Af’), which is 
represented at the phonological level as the phoneme /-z/ is bound to the semantic category 
plural (‘PLUR’), which is why we understand the phrase as referring to two or more dogs, 
rather than only one. Jackendoff calls attention to the fact that the bottom nodes in the 
syntactic tree are syntactic features rather than lexical items (as in the customary textbook 
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notation). This is because syntax is blind to the former (cf. encapsulation): to create a 
syntactically well-formed sentence, no reference to the particular lexical items need be 
made (which is why colourless green ideas may sleep furiously).  (The figure is based on 
Figure 4 of Jackendoff, 2003, p. 659.) 
To return to moral cognition, the suggestion is that theories of moral cognition may be understood as 
engaged in the task of discovering the appropriate representational plane for moral cognition and identifying 
the principles that operate on the representations located at this level of mental structure. It seems obvious to 
me, for example, that representing the head-drilling as merely a physical process does not result in a moral 
judgment at all (although this may be difficult to concede, which is likely to do with the fact that 
representations relevant to moral cognition are automatically constructed). Similarly, a tsunami, however 
deadly, does not seem to invoke the kinds of judgments we are interested in—unless it is seen in a different 
light, that is, represented at a different plane; for example, the tsunami may be seen as God’s punishment, 
involving an agent (God) and patients (the sufferers) with mental states and an internal source of energy. 
There is a rather widespread agreement that the domain of moral judgment is the action of intentional agents 
(often performed on intentional patients), but there is less agreement as to what the principles are, and what 
exact representations they operate on, which is part of the reason why the Linguistic Analogy may be 
particularly useful. Sadly, at this point, we have to leave this difficult problem behind. However, some of the 
issues raised in subsequent chapters will be related to the concerns raised in this section. 
4.4. Do we need principles at all? 
As we have repeatedly seen, the Argument for Moral Grammar may be successful even if what it is an 
argument for is not appropriately thought of as a moral grammar—in the sense of a system of combinatorial 
principles or rules, such as natural language syntax. This is because the idea that a potential infinity of actions 
can be evaluated through a faculty of moral judgment licenses the inference (for want of a better one) that 
moral judgment is underlain by a set of principles defined over some representations that are (by necessity) 
more abstract than the fully fledged description of any particular action that can nevertheless be evaluated 
morally. However, irrespective of the merits of this argument, its conclusion has been questioned on different 
grounds: some theorists believe that the very idea that moral principles describe something that has 
psychological reality is mistaken, even if “having psychological reality” is understood in the loose sense of a 
real reasoning pattern that emerges as a function of the operation of a diverse set of psychological mechanisms, 
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as suggested by Nichols or Mallon (Section 4.2). A prominent proponent of this line of criticism has been the 
cognitive scientist, Nicolas Baumard.112 
Baumard argues against the psychological reality of principles on account of some problems proponents 
of specific principles (either in descriptive or prescriptive guises) have had to face. These are the following. 
First, principles always seem subject to exceptions. For example, killing is judged to be forbidden, but killing 
in self-defence can be seen as permissible (ironically, the PDE was conceived of by Aquinas as an attempt to 
specify exactly when this is the case). Second, principles apparently guiding moral judgment seem to exhibit 
a degree of context sensitivity: they seem descriptively adequate in certain cases but not in others. Worryingly, 
the theories that propose them are rarely able to account for this variability in terms of applicability. It seems 
that theories merely redescribe situations in more abstract terms and attempt (with fluctuating success) to 
apply them in other cases. Thus, Baumard argues, principles “might be “folk theories” that people use to 
describe a situation and argue a position” (Baumard, 2016, p. 89).113 For example, the ownership of a specific 
object (such as a canoe) and a situation (no one can cross the river without it) might generate new express 
principles (such as “the owner of the canoe has a duty to help people who want to cross the river”). Tellingly, 
Baumard notes that “in reality, rather than an infinity of principles, what we have is a single mutualistic logic 
that applies in an infinite variety of situations” (ibid.). 
On the back of such considerations, Baumard criticises theories such as Mikhail’s on account of the latter’s 
subscription to—and dependence on—the existence of principles. More constructively, he advances 
alternative explanations of the results in connection with the trolley scenarios the explanation of which is 
often proposed in terms of principles such as the Action Principle and the Principle of Double Effect (see 
above). In line with his mutualistic approach to moral cognition (see also Baumard et al., 2013), he analyses 
the trolley cases as distributional situations in which a good (survival) is represented such that it must be 
dispensed as justly as possible for actions to be judged morally praiseworhty, given the relative position of the 
dramatis personæ.114 More generally, on Baumard’s theory, the judged moral (or deontic) status of an action 
                                                                    
112 Other eminent critiques of principles are moral particularists, such as Jonathan Dancy, who deny the existence of 
moral principles altogether and argue that moral judgments are made on a case-by-case basis “without the comforting 
support or awkward demands of moral principles” (Dancy, 1983, p. 530). For a critique of Dancy’s position, see Mikhail 
(2011, pp. 71-73). See also Williams (1985) for a related argument—which is also a criticism of earlier versions of LA—, 
and Mikhail (2017) for a reply. 
113 Zimmerman (2013) advances a closely related argument, and Greene’s line regarding PDE is also on this track: 
“people all around the world make judgments that are (imperfectly) consistent with the Doctrine of Double Effect while 
having no knowledge of the doctrine. This tells us that intuitive judgments come first, and that the doctrine is just an 
(imperfect) organizing summary of those intuitive judgments.” (Greene, 2013, p. 223). 
114 As noted by Baumard himself, this analysis may be somewhat more plausible in alternative variants of the trolley 
problem in which, for example, a buoy has to be distributed between a group of five drowning people and a lone 
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is a function of an analysis of how the relevant action is taken to affect individuals in terms of their system of 
values (done by what he refers to as “intutive axiology”). Any action that has the consequence of affecting 
others’ interests is subject to moral evaluation. The particular evaluation will depend on a conception of 
fairness, thus, it depends on assumptions about merit, costs of the action, magnitude of benefit to parties 
affected, goods to be distributed, and so on.  
To illustrate the explanatory potential of his theory, Baumard proposes a rather intriguing analysis of why 
“moral leaders”—that is, people who influence and engender what is subsequently seen as moral progress—
are special: 
“moral leaders direct other people’s attention to phenomena that their own less-developed intuitions 
had previously been insensitive to. They do not propose new moral principles. They activate our 
moral sense, showing us that certain people suffer more than we thought, or that helping them is 
easier than we thought. By changing how we conceive a situation, they show us that we have duties 
that we did not think we had. If their arguments are convincing and their vision wins out, their way 
of looking at the situation becomes so natural that their position comes to seem completely 
legitimate. The difference between the judgments of moral leaders and those of other people 
essentially results from the fact that, in the light of original thoughts or extra information, they 
envision costs and benefits in a different, innovative way” (Baumard, 2016, p. 112). 
This compelling analysis notwithstanding, there are two serious problems with Baumard’s criticism of the 
idea that principles are of central importance for a theory of moral cognition. First, he fails to distinguish 
between the many different potential senses of the term principle, such as those identified in Section 5 of the 
previous chapter, which results in him dismissing the relevance of all kinds of principles despite the fact that 
most of his critique only makes sense if seen as an attack against the proposal that specific types of principles 
(such as express faculty principles) be understood as the fundamental explanatory tools in the study of moral 
cognition. Second, in his own theory, Baumard himself appeals to a principle of a very general kind, namely, 
what we referred to earlier as a derivational principle. Therefore, Baumard’s attack on the conclusion of the 
Argument for Moral Grammar (as defended in Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2) is unsuccessful. I will consider these 
two issues in a bit more detail below. 
First, consider Baumard’s criticism. He notes that (i) principles are subject to exceptions and (ii) they are 
context sensitive and (iii) they are potentially infinite therefore useless as an explanatory device. Let us take 
                                                                    
drowning individual (see Thomson, 1985). However, my point here won’t be that the analysis is not plausible, so we 
might as well ignore this complication. 
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each of these points in turn. As for the first point, the claim that principles are subject to exceptions makes it 
sound like Baumard has processing principles in mind. Indeed, as alluded to above, conflict principles (such 
as PDE) have the function of arbitrating between the outputs provided by different faculty principles in case 
there is tension between what they require in a particular case. This means that (faculty) principles ought not 
to be expected to provide the final word on what moral judgment is made. Thus, this point, to me, appears a 
descriptive statement rather than criticism. I would also point out that the notion that processing principles 
are never operative would be a radical one, questioning much of the literature on normative judgment (e.g. 
Nichols, 2004; Sripada & Stich, 2007; Morris & Cushman, 2018; Schmidt & Rakoczy 2018, etc.), that 
speculate over how “norms” (i.e. rules or faculty principles) function and are acquired, for example. 
Second, that (some!) principles are context sensitive, again, does not seem to constitute serious criticism. 
In the case of context sensitive principles, one explanation might be that they take as input some contextual 
variable that limits their application. Finally, in line with what was argued in Section 3.2.2 of Chapter 1, we 
may indeed say that (faculty) principles are infinite, but only in the limited sense that we can attach a deontic 
value to a potentially infinite number of actions. Then, we may enshrine and expressly preserve each of these 
action descriptions in terms of “principles” arbitrating over them. This kind of reasoning may indeed produce 
arbitrarily numerous express principles (such as “you mustn’t steal my slippers in the morning when it’s cold 
and I’m trying to prepare my breakfast in the kitchen on the tiled kitchen floor”). But express principles are 
not properly regarded as the fundamental explanatory tool in moral psychology, and few argue that they 
should be (indeed, they are typically regarded as explananda, not explanans). Thus, none of Baumard’s 
considerations provide the slightest reason to doubt the conclusion reached and endorsed in the previous 
chapter. 
In fact, some of Baumard’s reasoning supports it. Consider what he takes to be the fundamental 
components of moral judgments: representations of costs, benefits and interests of the parties involved, and 
some notion of fairness that defines why a given action is judged to be moral or not, given such an analysis. 
Clearly, Baumard is proposing a principle so general as to define the entire domain of moral cognition. I do 
not aim to take issue with this theory (as a matter of fact, I happen to find it bold and fascinating). Rather, 
the point here is that Baumard implicitly subscribes to the kind of moral psychology that takes the notion of 
principles as its fundamental explanatory tool, and for some of the same reasons that Mikhail does, for 
example. To be specific, he recognises the potential infinity of situations about which we make moral 
judgments, and realises that this calls for a general explanation (see e.g. the quote above), and the fact that he 
refers to his proposed mutualistic principle as “logic” makes little difference in this regard. A rose by any other 
name would smell as sweet. Baumard also recognises that his logic needs to be defined over abstract 
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representational variables (such as costs, values, benefits). He also correctly notes (elsewhere in his book) that 
these representations are provided by systems outside of moral cognition (such as the “intuitive axiology” 
outputting representations of value).  
As noted above, Baumard’s principle is a derivational principle par excellence: it attaches representations 
of moral-deontic value to representations of actions as a function of the way they are represented at an abstract 
representational level. For example, prototypical killing may be represented as unfairly depriving an individual 
from a basic value, namely, his or her own life.115 So, by Mikhail’s standards (and mine), Baumard’s theory 
satisfies the three basic formal requirements a theory of “moral grammar” is expected to meet: it provides a 
set of structural descriptions, it provides deontic principles (albeit fundamentally only one), and it suggests 
(if not provides in explicit form) the conversion rules (e.g. the intuitive axiology) that take as input (e.g.) verbal 
or visual stimuli and has as output the structural descriptions over which his moral principle (or “logic”) is 
defined. True, Baumard’s account is clearly a rival of Mikhail’s, but it is a rival that shares (if only implicitly) 
the latter’s broad explanatory framework explicated and endorsed in this thesis.116 Consequently, it would be 
odd to consider it as a criticism of the Linguistic Analogy—which, paradoxically, Baumard himself does. On 
the contrary, in spite of his protestations to the contrary, if successful, Baumard’s theory would be testament 
to—rather than an indictment of—the value of LA as a framework for the study of moral cognition. 
4.5. Is moral judgment a natural kind? 
Since we already addressed this question indirectly in Section 4.2 above, I shall keep the discussion short 
here. To reiterate, the worry is that there might be no distinctive domain of moral cognition: there might be 
nothing at the level of psychological description corresponding to the term moral, as in “moral judgment” or 
“moral obligation”. We provisionally said in the previous chapter that “moral” in “moral obligation” signifies 
the fact that the obligation is intuitively judged to be of the moral type. We also treated moral judgment (in 
the narrow sense) as judgment about the moral-deontic status of actions. Now the current issue is raised by 
the possibility that at the psychological level, such judgments are not unified, or more appropriately, they fail 
                                                                    
115 Thus, we can provisionally accept the “norm” that killing is wrong. In fact, Baumard’s principle thus could be 
seen as a constraint principle of a general kind. 
116 The question of which theory fares better in terms of descriptive adequacy is an empirical issue that I  do not aim 
to address in this chapter or indeed elsewhere in the thesis. 
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to constitute a natural psychological kind.117 This would clearly be detrimental for LA, as indeed for any 
theory of moral cognition in general. 
An example of a version of this line of reasoning is advanced by Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley (2014), 
who argue that none of the proposed ways of unifying moral judgments as moral are successful (see also Stich, 
2006). These include the form, content, force, phenomenology and neural realisation of what are treated 
generally in the literature as instances of moral judgment, including judgments concerning fairness, authority, 
purity, intentional harm, and so on. Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley’s criticism against psychological 
theories assuming unification (including by the proponents of LA) is that, although such theories start from 
a closed set of cases (usually, cases involving some kind of harm, as in the case of Hauser et al., 2006; Mikhail, 
2011; or Turiel, 2002), they want to generalise to all and only moral judgments, where where this class (moral 
judgments) is supposed to capture to some extent what we would intuitively call “moral”. But, as they argue, 
it is not plausible to make such inferences. 
At times in their article, Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley seem to mistake what the proper explanandum 
of a theory of moral cognition is. For example, they have the following to say on this topic: “We are interested 
not in whether some individual could have a unified concept of moral judgment, but rather in whether there 
is any unified concept of moral judgment that is shared by the many people who engage in debates that are 
supposed to be about a shared topic in morality” (Sinnott-Armstrong & Wheatley, 2014, p. 453). Now, 
whether there is a shared concept of moral judgment is entirely beside the point. If there is such a concept, it is 
likely to bias the inquiry in obvious ways. But the purpose of a theory of moral cognition is to explain how 
moral cognition actually works, not to explain what we think about it. 
To be fair to Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley, they do not consistently make this error, and their point 
may be valid if understood as applying to the relevant phenomenon, namely, moral judgment itself, rather 
than our conception of it (as I believe they probably intend it). And of course, as suggested above, our 
conception of moral judgment is a guide for identifying our explananda. However, pursuing research in any 
area of inquiry is expected to shape and modify our initial conceptions about the relevant domain, which is 
exactly why we engage in the study in the first place. For example, if we consider the trajectory of chemistry 
from Empedocles to Mendeleev, a lot has changed regarding our understanding of what matter is. A similar 
process is likely to characterise the study of moral cognition, and this is nothing to be afraid of. 
                                                                    
117 In a nutshell, the terms of a perfect psychological theory would be natural kind terms, in that they would identify 
the psychological mechanisms and processes that support true scientific generalisations about our mental life. There are 
many ways of defining natural kinds (e.g. Fodor, 1974), but this will suffice for present purposes. 
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Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley themselves suggest that moral psychologists should be “splitters” rather 
than “lumpers”, that is, they should assume that the cases they observe are treated separately at the 
psychological level. Thus, judgments of moral obligation and permissibility concerning the trolley cases might 
be entirely different psychologically than the “same” judgments concerning Roy’s predicament related at the 
beginning of the first chapter, for example. Yet as they themselves admit, this is merely a rule of thumb, and 
it can be taken too far (for example, are the intuitions generated by the different trolley cases treated entirely 
separately at the level of psychological description?). Even worse, though, it is entirely vague. For instance, it 
is unclear what similarity metric should be used for lumping judgments together, as some lumping will always 
be required if we want to do science. Additionally, no matter what way we pursue the inquiry, that is, whether 
we are splitters or lumpers, we will run into errors, although errors of different kinds: missing generalisations 
vs. making ones that are inadequate. Which one of these errors we want to minimise is an entirely pragmatic 
question.118 
 
In this chapter, I first advanced a case study by reviewing an extremely influential theory of moral 
judgment, which uses an alternative framework for the study of moral cognition to the one endorsed in this 
thesis. I have argued that unlike LA, the DP framework does not supply the kinds of distinctions and research 
questions that are likely to be fruitful for moral psychology. In the second half of the chapter, I discussed 
some direct criticisms of LA and responded to these. In the next chapter, I move on to defend the descriptive 
adequacy of a particular principle of moral cognition—namely, the “Ought Implies Can” principle—in the 
face of putative empirical counterexamples. 
  
                                                                    
118 Of course, Sinnott-Armstrong and Wheatley advance arguments in favour of moral judgment not being unified, 
which is their reason for recommending the splitter strategy. Unfortunately, I cannot address these in any further detail 
here, but suffice it to say that the jury is still out regarding this question (cf. e.g. Joyce; 2016; Kumar, 2015). 
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Chapter 3: The “Ought Implies Can” Principle 
and Descriptive Adequacy 
Overview 
In this chapter, I argue that the “Ought Implies Can” principle (OIC)—according to which if an agent ought 
to perform an action, then they can perform it—, is a descriptively adequate principle of I-morality, that is, it 
correctly describes ordinary moral judgment. I proceed as follows. In Section 1, I propose that one way of 
selecting candidate principles of I-morality is by taking moral philosophy as the point of departure. 
Philosophical consensus regarding the “correctness”, conceptual coherence or normative adequacy of a moral 
principle provides prima facie evidence for the descriptive adequacy of that principle. In Section 2, I single 
out OIC as just such a principle, that is, one in the case of which there is a strong consensus among ethical 
theorists. Contra this consensus, in recent years, experimental philosophers have directly challenged the 
hypothesis according to which OIC is descriptively adequate. The first version of this challenge is presented 
in Section 3. In Section 4, I show how it can be resisted. I develop a methodological criticism of these 
experimental studies and present novel data that supports OIC’s descriptive adequacy. I address a second 
version of this challenge in Section 5, critically assess it and argue that it is inconclusive. Thus, the hypothesis 
according to which OIC is descriptively adequate remains plausible in the face of this empirical criticism.119 
1. Moral Philosophy, Moral Cognition, and 
Empirical Research 
The picture of moral psychology I have been defending so far should be clear enough: moral psychology 
is in the business of discovering the principles of I-morality and of articulating how they are implemented and 
acquired. But how can one discover what such principles are? A possible strategy is to collect data on moral 
judgments at large and attempt to systematise them by introducing principles that appear to capture the data. 
Then, we may further investigate whether these generalisations are on the right track by applying them to 
novel situations, and if so, explore what it is about the mind that makes them descriptively adequate. But of 
                                                                    
119 Sections 3 to 5 of this chapter are based on a paper I wrote in collaboration with Holly Lawford-Smith and Paulo 
Sousa titled Does Ought Imply Can? (Kurthy, Lawford-Smith & Sousa, 2017). All the studies presented here were 
conceived of and conducted collaboratively with Lawford-Smith and Sousa. I have decided to keep the use plural 
pronouns in the collaborative parts of the chapter. 
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course, such a method would be far too random. For a start, it is not clear just what kinds of judgment we 
should collect data on in the first place. Moreover, such data are likely to be compatible with a whole host of 
putative principles.  
Another—far more feasible—option is to start with candidate principles. But which ones? We may wish 
to proceed by considering introspective evidence, by consulting evolutionary theories or comparative data, 
by scouring the empirical literature for ideas, and so on. There is not a single correct answer to this question, 
and all of these methods are understood to be heuristic. One promising strategy—the one I endorse in this 
thesis—is to take moral philosophy as our point of departure: the fact that normative ethicists or meta-
ethicists agree on the correctness, conceptual cogency, or normative adequacy of a moral principle may be 
taken as prima facie evidence that the principle accurately describes ordinary judgment, and thus, potentially, 
the operations of I-morality.  
This strategy requires some clarification. When ethicists argue for and endorse a moral principle, they may 
do so for various reasons. Amongst these, a prominent one is that the proposed principle accords with the 
moral judgments the ethicist in question would naturally and intuitively make. In such a case, the ethicist in 
effect asserts the descriptive adequacy of the proposed principle as regards his or her I-morality. To the extent 
that this generalises to other ethicists, we can treat this agreement as indicative of a trend that may be worth 
investigating further, since its application might well extend to other I-moralities. 
Ultimately, however, consensus amongst ethicists does not obviate the need for the empirical work. One 
reason for this—besides the obvious issue of generalisability (philosophers are peculiar individuals, aren’t 
they?)—is that ethicists often reason about the principle in question, for example in terms of whether it is 
cogent, or rational, or normatively correct. These types of reasoning may strongly influence the ethicist’s 
verdict about whether the principle has to be accepted or endorsed. However, such reasoning is not relevant 
to the issue of whether a principle is part of (or, at least, an accurate description of) I-morality. After all, recall 
that the narrow function we assigned to FM in Chapter 1 was that of appending representations of moral-
deontic status to representations of actions. This is clearly not the kind of task reasoning about, say, 
conceptual coherence involves.120 Therefore, if one is interested—as we are—in whether the candidate 
principle characterises I-morality, there is simply no substitute for doing the empirical work. This involves 
                                                                    
120 Another way of putting the same point is this. When ethicists endorse/reject a normative or metaethical principle, 
they do so not only by testing the principle against their immediate intuitive judgments, but also by reasoning about it. 
The issue here is that I-morality only concerns one’s immediate intuitions, not how such intuitions are elaborated 
downstream by other cognitive systems, including “central cognition”. Thus, what ethicists say about a certain 
normative principle is only a partially reliable guide as to the operations of FM. It is in fact possible that what ethicists 
say about a certain principle reflects the working of other cognitive mechanisms. 
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finding out how ordinary people react to situations that the descriptive version of the principle would 
generate predictions about. This is why in this chapter I do both things. First, I focus on a principle largely 
agreed upon by ethicists. Second, I show that this principle correctly describes lay moral judgments. On the 
basis of these two lines of evidence, I conclude that such a principle is likely to be part of I-morality. What 
principle? You find the answer in the next section. 
2. “Ought Implies Can” as a candidate principle of 
I-morality 
As an example of a prominent case of broad agreement in the field of ethical theory, one of the most 
promising candidates is the “Ought Implies Can” principle (henceforth, “OIC” or “OIC principle”). 
According to OIC, if a person ought to perform an action, then he or she can perform it—where ought is 
predominantly understood to refer to a moral obligation, and can is taken to denote (physical) ability, or 
ability plus opportunity (see e.g. Vranas, 2007). OIC is often discussed in terms of its equivalent 
contraposition, which is arguably where its intuitive grip derives from (e.g. King, 2017). This has it that if a 
person cannot perform an action, then it is not the case that he or she ought to perform it.  
Take, for instance, Roy’s predicament familiar from Chapter 1, Section 1. To recall, in this little story, 
Roy is having a stroll next to a pond in which he notices a small child who is about to drown. This example 
served as an illustration of a case in which we automatically attribute a moral obligation to a person.121 Now 
assume that as soon as Roy notices the drowning child, he suffers a stroke, causing paralysis in one side of his 
body, as well as partial blindness, lack of speech and dizziness, thus rendering him completely incapable of 
swimming—or even walking for that matter. Now, according to OIC, Roy no longer has a moral obligation 
to save the drowning child simply because he cannot.122 
The OIC principle has been widely accepted by ethicists in various normative and descriptive guises 
(Griffin, 1992; Haji, 2002; Howard-Snyder, 2006; Sapontzis, 1991; Streumer, 2007; Vranas, 2007; 
                                                                    
121 The fact that the person is fictional need not be problematic from the point of view of moral psychology as long 
as FM does not have access to this information. This seems reasonable: when we think about stories we obviously know 
to be fictional, the moral judgments we make in connection with them seem no less automatic and intuitive. 
122 Just a reminder: of course we are interested in the descriptive (and ultimately psychological) version of OIC 
according to which, in such a case, we no longer attribute a moral obligation to Roy. Thus, the question cannot be 
whether it is true (in some sense) that Roy is under a moral obligation in this case, or whether asserting that he is is 
normatively adequate (for general comments, see Chapter 1, Section 1). 
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Zimmerman, 1996). It was famously endorsed by Kant,123 and indeed until recent years, the function of OIC 
in the moral philosophy literature was often that of an axiom the truth of which was held to be so evident as 
to require no defence (Howard-Snyder, 2006). OIC also features as a theorem in some standard formulations 
of deontic logic (Anderson, 1967; Kanger, 1971), where it is sometimes referred to as Kant’s Law (see generally 
Hilpinnen, 1971; McNamara, 2018). Furthermore, in the guise of the dictum “impossibilium nulla est 
obligatio” (i.e. “impossible obligations are invalid”), OIC has been enshrined in certain traditional as well as 
modern legal systems, such as Justinian’s Corpus Juris Civilis or Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, the civil code of 
Germany (Zimmermann, 1990, pp. 686ff.), and it has also been endorsed by legal theorists, such as Hans 
Kelsen (1991) or Lon L. Fuller (1969), among others.124 Finally, most tellingly perhaps, even the critics of the 
principle (e.g. Saka, 2000; Sinnott-Armstrong, 1984; Stocker, 1971) endorse some version of OIC, if not that 
which has been more or less canonically assumed or defended (more on which see Chapter 4). 
It is the OIC principle with which the rest of this thesis will be concerned. More specifically, I will be 
concerned with the question of whether OIC accurately describes the way humans intuitively think and 
reason morally (this chapter), and, if so, how a theory of FM or I-morality can account for this pattern in our 
judgment (next chapter). 
2.1. Shape 
The idea that OIC might be a descriptively adequate principle of I-morality should be understood in the 
following way. First, we do not expect individuals to endorse the principle as such: we merely require that 
particular moral judgments conform to it. In other words, we ought to avoid the conflation of express and 
operative principles. Second, there is no presumption of strict descriptive adequacy (cf. Chapter 1, Section 6; 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2). That is, we do not expect individuals to reason in terms of OIC, merely that they 
reason in line with it and thus that their judgment is accurately predicted by OIC. In yet other words, at this 
point OIC need only provide a functional description of moral judgment, not a computational/algorithmic 
one. The latter types of problem (algorithmic description) is an objective for future inquiry (but see also 
Chapter 4). 
                                                                    
123 For example, the following passage is from Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: “if the moral law 
commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better 
human beings” (1973, 6: 50; emphasis original). (See Stern, 2004; Ranganathan, 2010 on the extent of Kant’s 
commitment to OIC.) 
124 In the case of Kelsen, this is all the more significant since he also held there to be no “moral” limitations on the 
content of legal norms, as suggested by the formula, “Jeder beliebige Inhalt kann Recht sein” (see Grabowski, 2013, p. 
20, fn. 35, pp. 302-3). 
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2.2. Testing 
OIC has been largely endorsed by ethicists. So far so good. But, as I have explained earlier on, this is at best 
prima facie evidence for the claim that OIC is descriptively adequate. To make a stronger case for this claim, 
we need to collect data about everyday moral judgments. But what data exactly? One thing to note at the 
outset is that, in its standard formulation, OIC is stated in the form of a conditional that is transformable into 
a universal generalisation. That is, the conditional “if an agent has (or is understood as having) an obligation 
to ϕ, then the agent can (or is understood as able to) ϕ” should be read as the universal generalisation: “for all 
cases in which an agent has (or is understood as having) an obligation to ϕ, the agent can (or is understood as 
able to) ϕ”. However, it is logically impossible to empirically demonstrate the truth of a universal 
generalisation (no matter how many confirming instances we find, OIC is never proven to be descriptively 
adequate, since there is no logical reason why the next datapoint should not be a non-conforming instance). 
Therefore, if we want to know whether OIC accurately predicts how (ordinary) people think and reason, we 
should rather look at the cases that are most likely to go against it. If the falsifying instances are not 
forthcoming, we have a good reason to conclude that OIC is descriptively adequate. 
The contrapositive formulation comes in especially handy in this context: roughly, it states that “if an 
agent cannot ϕ, then that agent is not under obligation to ϕ” (interpreted descriptively, of course). Any 
instance in which an agent is conceptualised as unable to perform an action, but is understood, at the same 
time, as having an obligation to do so would be prima facie evidence against the principle being operative. 
(As we shall see later, the best candidates will be constituted by instances of self-imposed inability, that is, 
cases in which the agent is causally responsible for the emergence of his or her inability—see Section 5 as well 
as the next chapter). 
 
Fortunately, some data have already been collected regarding judgments in connection with scenarios 
relevant to the question at hand (Mizrahi, 2015; Buckwalter & Turri, 2015; Chituc et al., 2016; Turri, 2017). 
The conclusion of these incipient studies regarding the descriptive adequacy of OIC have been rather 
unfavourable towards it: in general, the conclusion seems to be that OIC fails as a descriptive principle. One 
of these papers, namely that by Buckwalter and Turri (2015), stands out in terms of significance, since it 
claims to have demonstrated OIC inconsistent judgment even in cases which have traditionally been thought 
of as paradigmatic “OIC supporting”. I address this study in detail in sections 3 and 4 below and conclude 
that, due to systematic problems in the study design, Buckwalter and Turri’s conclusion, namely, the rejection 
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of the descriptive adequacy of OIC, is not warranted. In Section 5, I consider another study arguing for a 
similar conclusion as that of Buckwalter and Turri (2015). 
3. First challenge: Buckwalter and Turri (2015) 
In a paper titled Inability and Obligation in Moral Judgment, Wesley Buckwalter and John Turri have 
recently presented evidence that ordinary people do not reason in line with the OIC principle (Buckwalter & 
Turri, 2015—see also Mizrahi, 2015, and discussion in Kurthy & Lawford-Smith, 2015): with a series of 
studies, they claim to have demonstrated that, in people’s judgments, obligations persist irrespective of 
whether those who hold them have the ability to fulfil them. In their studies, participants had to read stories 
in which a person is under an obligation but is subsequently described as unable to fulfil it.125 For instance, 
participants in one study were asked to consider a case in which an agent (“Walter”) promises to pick his 
friend (“Brown”) up from the airport (the promise creating the obligation) but later becomes involved in a 
car accident and thereby rendered physically unable to keep the promise. Participants were then presented 
with the OIC probe, asking them to choose one of the following randomly sequenced statements (the 
numbers are included merely for convenience here): 
1. Walter is obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, but Walter is not physically able to do so. 
2. Walter is not obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, and Walter is not physically able to do so. 
3. Walter is obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, and Walter is physically able to do so. 
4. Walter is not obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, but Walter is physically able to do so. 
In this and other scenarios—varying inter alia the source of the obligation involved (e.g. a promise or a 
social role), the type of inability (e.g. a physical restriction or a constraining feature of the environment), and 
the seriousness of the consequences of the obligation not being fulfilled (minor or fatal)—participants 
overwhelmingly chose the first option: “obligated, but not able” (option 1 above). On the face of it, this 
choice contradicts the OIC principle, since it attributes to the individual both an obligation and the inability 
to fulfil it. 
                                                                    
125 Buckwalter and Turri were also interested in probing whether people have more difficulty in perceiving inability 
when the source of the inability is mental rather than physical, e.g. due to clinical depression. Since this issue is tangential 
to the OIC principle, we leave it completely aside in this chapter. 
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Moreover, to confirm that participants understood the situation as involving a literal inability to fulfil the 
obligation, the studies included, after the OIC probe, an inability-comprehension probe, asking subjects 
whether the person under the obligation was literally unable to fulfil it. The great majority of participants 
confirmed that there was literal inability, and eliminating the few participants who denied literal inability did 
not change the general pattern of the results reported in the paper. Thus, Buckwalter and Turri conclude with 
the claim that “commonsense moral cognition rejects the principle that ought implies can” (2015, p. 1)—that 
is, in terms of our earlier discussions, OIC fails the test of descriptive adequacy by generating judgments that 
are not actually made by ordinary people. 
The studies in the paper testing whether ordinary people make judgments consistent with the OIC 
principle also included, after the inability-comprehension probe, a blame probe, investigating whether 
participants would consider the individuals in their stories blameworthy for not fulfilling their obligations. 
They found that the great majority of participants denied that the individual is to blame in this respect, and 
suggested on the basis of this finding as well as the results of a separate study focusing directly on the relation 
between blame and inability that, for ordinary people, “Blame Implies Can”. It is important to note that the 
traditional view of the relation between blame and obligation as far as inability is concerned is that the 
presence of an inability undermines blame by eliminating the perception of wrongdoing—in particular, by 
eliminating the perception that someone did something wrong in not fulfilling his or her obligation because 
in fact the obligation was cancelled by the inability (Hieronymi, 2004; Levy, 2005). Therefore, given that the 
above results indicate that the presence of an inability undermines blame without cancelling the obligation 
(and hence without eliminating wrongdoing), Buckwalter and Turri also suggest that the traditional view of 
the relation between blame and obligation does not appropriately describe the relation between these 
concepts in ordinary cognition, and may be an invention of philosophers trying to “validate excuses” (Turri 
& Blouw, 2015; see Section 5 further below). 
In the following section (Section 4), we first question the implication of the results reported in Buckwalter 
and Turri’s paper with new evidence based on the same scenarios of inability. We argue first that there are 
crucial problems with the design of Buckwalter and Turri’s studies (Section 4.1). Then, we report two studies 
indicating the main problem with this design—namely, it does not seem to provide an appropriate test of 
whether ordinary people reason in line with the OIC principle (Section 4.2). Next, we provide an overview 
of our new studies with an improved design (Section 4.3). After that, we report four studies showing that the 
great majority of participants make judgments compatible with the OIC principle and with the traditional 
view of the relation between blame, obligation, and wrongdoing (sections 4.4-4.7). We summarise our results 
in Section 4.8. In Section 5, we address and reject another empirical challenge against OIC, namely, that 
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provided by Chituc el al. (2016). Finally, we consider some broader issues, such as the type of reasoning 
involved in participants’ judgments, the extent to which our results might generalise to cases involving 
culpable inability, and a possible deflationary explanation of our results in terms of excuse validation. 
 4. Response to Buckwalter and Turri’s challenge 
 4.1. Potential problems with Buckwalter and Turri’s design 
Aspects of Buckwalter and Turri’s design, in particular the way in which the list of options of the OIC 
probe are framed, may make the option “obligated, but not able” the sole plausible answer, though in a way 
that is not inconsistent with the OIC principle. 
The stories in Buckwalter and Turri’s studies are characterized by an individual under an obligation who 
is eventually described as unable to fulfil the obligation. There is an obvious but trivial sense in which each 
story, taken as a whole, involves both an obligation and an inability. The inability creates tension with the 
expectation of fulfilment generated by the obligation. The option “obligated, but not able” matches this 
description of the story as a whole, while the other options do not, since they either exclude an obligation 
(“not obligated, and not able”) or include the ability to fulfil the obligation (“obligated, and able”; “not 
obligated, but able”). Moreover, the option “obligated, but not able” has an ordinary temporal reading (i.e. 
“obligated, but subsequently not able”) that mirrors the temporal narrative of the story (i.e. an obligation is 
made salient early in the story, then later an inability is made salient). This, too, renders the option “obligated, 
but not able” the best description, because it captures the temporal dimension of the contrast involved in the 
story as a whole. 
In sum, according to our interpretation, when participants choose the option “obligated, but not able”, 
they are not saying that the person is still under the obligation even when there is an inability to fulfil it. That 
would be inconsistent with the OIC principle. Rather, they are saying that the stories involve a contrast 
between a presumed obligation (made salient first) and an inability to fulfil the obligation (made salient 
second). This is not inconsistent with the OIC principle, because it may well turn out that the subjects of 
these studies would accept the obligation for as long as they think there is ability, and reject the obligation 
after the inability is made evident in the story. 
There is another aspect of Buckwalter and Turri’s design that may have contributed to the problem we 
have outlined, and consequently to the predominant selection of the “obligated, but not able” option. The 
instruction for the OIC probe (“choose the option that best applies”) implies that there is a factually correct 
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alternative among the options, and may suggest to participants that they are being tested on whether they 
interpreted the story correctly (as if the OIC probe had the same type of function as the inability-
comprehension probe—the second probe of their design described earlier). If participants understood the 
OIC probe in this way, then rather than providing their personal opinion on the relation between the 
obligation and the inability, they would simply provide the best description of what is involved in the story as 
a whole, which is plausibly the option “obligated, but not able”, as discussed above. 
Finally, it is important to note that none of the stories in Buckwalter and Turri’s studies explicitly state 
the obligation at stake in the story. In the promise scenario, the story says only that someone makes a promise; 
in their social-role scenarios, it says only that someone has a social role (e.g. that of a lifeguard); in another 
scenario, it simply describes a situation in which a small child is drowning and there is a stranger around who 
could easily help the child. Thus, the participant has to infer from the information given in the initial part of 
the story (i.e. from the fact that someone made a promise, that someone has a social role, or that someone 
could easily help) the existence of the corresponding obligations (i.e. the obligation to keep the promise; the 
obligation related to the social role; the obligation to help the drowning child). True, these inferences are 
somewhat obvious, and the fact that the obligations are left implicit in the stories is not a problem in itself. 
However, given the aforementioned problems, it may well be that at least some participants took the OIC 
probe to be a test on whether they believe that the initial situation described in the story entails an obligation, 
and chose the first option to confirm that they indeed believe that the relevant aspects in the story warrant an 
obligation. 
 4.2. Initial evidence for the relevance of the problems identified: Two 
studies 
 4.2.1. Study 1 
In this study, we test our main claim about what lead the great majority of subjects in Buckwalter and 
Turri’s studies to choose the “obligated, but not able” option. As we discussed above, we claim that there is 
an obvious sense in which the option “obligated, but not able” is the correct answer in the context of 
Buckwalter and Turri’s design because of two main factors: (i) the option describes the fact that each story as 
a whole involves a contrast between an obligation and an inability to fulfil the obligation, and (ii) the option 
mirrors the temporal narrative of each story (i.e. an obligation is made salient early in the story, then later an 
inability is made salient). 
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Two predictions follow from our claim. First, there would be a substantial reduction of “obligated, but 
not able” responses in the results if one were to simply replace the connectives “but” and “and” in the original 
options with connectives that more clearly convey the main point of the OIC probe (i.e. that make 
participants focus on whether there is an inferential relation between the attribution of an obligation and that 
of a corresponding inability). Second, there would also be such a reduction if one were simply to invert the 
order of the obligation and inability clauses of the original options (e.g. changing “obligated, but not able” to 
“not able, but obligated”), thus creating a mismatch between the order of the clauses and the temporal 
narrative of the story. Our first study tests these predictions. 
4.2.1.1. Method 
Participants 
Participants were 123 adults (56 female, 67 male; Mage = 36.84; SD = 11.19; range = 52; 98% reporting 
English as their first language). Our data collection methodology was similar to that employed in Buckwalter 
and Turri’s studies. In all studies to be reported in this chapter, participants were recruited, tested and 
compensated online. We used Amazon Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics as the online platforms. All 
participants were US residents. Each participant was paid $0.50 for approximately 4 minutes of their time. 
Furthermore, in all studies, we collected around 40 responses per condition. Participants were allowed to 
participate in only one of the studies (or conditions) reported in this chapter.126 
Design, Materials and Procedure 
The study used Buckwalter and Turri’s original design of the “Walter promise” scenario (Experiment 1, 
Physical condition), but without the question asking whether Walter is to blame, and crucially, with three 
types of between-subjects OIC probes: the original four options of Buckwalter and Turri’s design as described 
in Section 4.2.1 (Original condition); four options using “even if” and “because” as connectives, instead of 
“but” and “and” (Inferential relation condition); and the original four options with the order of the obligation 
and inability clauses inverted (Inverted order condition). The OIC-inconsistent and OIC-consistent options 
of the Original, Inferential relation, and Inverted order conditions were as follows (for the sake of simplicity, 
we leave aside the two options where Walter was described as able to fulfil his obligation): 
 
                                                                    
126 Our research design, including the procedure for informed consent, was reviewed by the Research Ethics 
Committee of the School of History and Anthropology at Queen’s University, Belfast, UK and by the Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Sheffield, UK. Written informed consent was obtained from all participants in all of the 
studies reported in this chapter. 
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1. (Original) Walter is obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, but Walter is not physically able 
to do so. 
(Inferential relation) Walter is obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, even if Walter is not 
physically able to do so. 
(Inverted order) Walter is not physically able to pick up Brown at the airport, but Walter is 
obligated to do so. 
2. (Original) Walter is not obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, and Walter is not physically 
able to do so. 
(Inferential relation) Walter is not obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, because Walter is 
not physically able to do so. 
(Inverted order) Walter is not physically able to pick up Brown at the airport, and Walter is not 
obligated to do so. 
4.2.1.2. Results 
The results of this study are shown in Figure 3.1. In the Original condition, we replicated the results 
reported in Buckwalter and Turri’s paper: 88% chose “obligated, but not able”, while only 12% chose “not 
obligated, and not able” (N = 41). In the Inferential relation condition, we completely reversed the earlier 
results: only 5% chose “obligated, even if not able”, while 88% chose “not obligated, because not able” (N = 
42; 7% chose the remaining two options where Walter is described as able). Finally, in the Inverted order 
condition, the two relevant options were equally chosen: 47.5% chose “not able, but obligated” and 52.5% 
chose “not able, and not obligated” (N = 40). 
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Figure 3.1. Percentage of responses consistent or inconsistent with the OIC principle in each of 
the three conditions. 
Confirming that there was a substantial reduction of the obligated/unable type of response in the 
Inferential and Inverted conditions, Chi-square tests (with obligated/unable responses coded as “1” and the 
remaining responses coded as “0”) show that these conditions differed significantly from the Original 
condition: χ2 (1, 83) = 47.82, p < .01, ϕ = .76, for Inferential versus Original; χ2 (1, 81) = 15.09, p < .01, ϕ = 
.43, for Inverted versus Original. 
4.2.1.3. Discussion 
The results of this study are consistent with our main claim about a problem with Buckwalter and Turri’s 
design—the subjects choosing the option “obligated, but not able” do not interpret it in a way that is 
inconsistent with the descriptive version of the OIC principle. If this option had been interpreted in terms of 
obligated at the time of the inability, the order of the clauses should not have mattered. It is also worth 
pointing out that the justifications following selections of the “obligated, but not able” response in the 
Original condition suggest that, with this option, the participants were merely acknowledging that the story 
involved both an obligation and an inability, irrespective of whether the obligation is perceived to be in force 
subsequent to the onset of the inability. The majority of participants provided justifications such as: 
“[Walter] promised that he would pick Brown up at the airport, which gives him an obligation 
to pick him up, but he was injured in a serious car accident and is therefore unable to do so.” 
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“He has committed to do it, and Brown is depending on him. However due to the car accident 
he won’t be able to make it.” 
“He is obligated because he promised but he is unable to because of the accident.” 
“He agreed to do it but he subsequently became physically unable.” 
“He promised that he will pick up Brown at the airport. He was in an accident so he is unable to 
actually carry out the task.” 
Finally, the results of the Inferential relation condition, using connectives that arguably make the point of 
the OIC probe more salient, suggest that ordinary people reason in a way that is consistent with the OIC 
principle, at least in this type of scenario. 
 4.2.2. Study 2 
Although our previous study suggests that Buckwalter and Turri’s design is problematic just in the way 
we discussed, one could still argue that (a) the Inferential relation condition merely distorted the results due 
to a different logical framing of the options, that (b) the results of the Inverted order condition do not 
establish directly that the response options of Buckwalter and Turri’s design fail to test whether participants’ 
reasoning conforms to the OIC principle, and that (c) the qualitative justifications to the “obligated, but not 
able” option of the Original condition do not establish conclusively that this option is understood in a way 
that is compatible with the OIC principle. In Study 4 below, we demonstrate that the inferential relation 
framing does not distort the results. In this study, by asking a follow-up question regarding the relevant 
response options of Buckwalter and Turri’s design, we provide more direct and conclusive evidence indicating 
that this design is problematic in the way we claim. 
4.2.2.1. Method 
Participants 
Participants were 43 adults (17 female; Mage = 32.84; SD = 8.47; range = 34; 100% reporting English as 
their first language). 
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Design, Materials and Procedure 
This study was also based on the story about Walter’s promise with one crucial addition. We asked a 
clarificatory follow-up question in relation to the options “obligated, but not able” and “not obligated, and 
not able”. This follow-up question appeared on a different page, after the participant had provided a response 
to the original OIC probe (see previous study). Participants choosing the “not obligated, and not able” option 
were confronted with the following question (Question A): 
You chose the option “Walter is not obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, and Walter 
is not physically able to do so.” With this choice, do you mean that Walter is no longer 
under the obligation to pick up Brown at the airport after he becomes physically unable to 
do so? (Yes/No) 
On the other hand, participants choosing the “obligated, but not able” option had to answer the following 
question (Question B): 
You chose the option “Walter is obligated to pick up Brown at the airport, but Walter is 
not physically able to do so.” With this choice, do you mean that Walter is still under the 
obligation to pick up Brown at the airport after he becomes physically unable to do so? 
(Yes/No) 
The order of the options (Yes/No) was randomised in both cases. Also in both cases, participants 
responding “no” were asked to explain their choice (“Please explain what you meant, then.”). After the follow-
up question, participants answered the inability-comprehension probe (i.e. the probe asking whether Walter 
was “literally unable”). We did not include a blame probe in this study either. 
The logic of this study is very simple. If the selection of the “not obligated, and not able” option is to be 
taken as consistent with the OIC principle, then participants should predominantly answer “yes” to Question 
A. Concomitantly, if the selection of the “obligated, but not able” option is taken to be inconsistent with the 
OIC principle, then participants should predominantly answer “yes” to Question B. To spell it out clearly: if 
Buckwalter and Turri’s design and conclusions are sound, then we should expect affirmative answers in both 
cases—but crucially so in the case of Question B, as it is the high relative frequency with which participants 
selected the “obligated, but not able” option that was interpreted as constituting the main evidence against 
OIC-consistent reasoning. 
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 4.2.2.2. Results 
The great majority of participants (74.4%) selected the option “obligated, but not able”, while only the 
minority (16.3%) endorsed the option “not obligated, and not able” (the remaining 9.3% chose “obligated, 
and able”). As in the Original condition of the previous study, and in Buckwalter and Turri’s paper in general, 
the selection of the apparently OIC-inconsistent option (vs. all the other options collectively) is significantly 
above chance level—goodness of fit against chance: χ2 (1, 43) = 10.26, p < .01, ϕ = 0.49. The overwhelming 
majority (93%) agreed that Walter is literally unable to pick up Brown form the airport. 
For the rest of the analysis, we exclude participants who denied literal inability. All 7 participants (100%) 
choosing the “not obligated, and not able” option answered “yes” to Question A, confirming that their 
reasoning is consistent with the OIC principle. Now, 23 out of 31 participants (74%) selecting the “obligated, 
but not able” option said “no” in response to Question B—goodness of fit against chance: χ2 (1, 31) = 7.26, p 
< .01, ϕ = 0.48—, indicating that, with their response, they did not mean that Walter is still under the 
obligation after he becomes physically unable to pick up Brown. 
 4.2.2.3. Discussion 
Since the great majority of the participants choosing the “obligated, but not able” option answered “no” 
to the follow-up question (Question B), our results indicate more directly and conclusively that the selection 
of this option does not track OIC-inconsistent reasoning. In other words, as we discussed above, Buckwalter 
and Turri’s design does not seem to be appropriate to test whether participants reject the OIC principle. The 
justifications of participants who chose the “obligated, but not able” option and answered “no” to the follow-
up question also support this interpretation. Some participants were emphatic that the inability annuls the 
obligation, suggesting that it did not even occur to them that their response could be taken as a case of 
obligation ascription after the accident: 
“Obviously Walter is no longer obligated to pick up Brown from the airport and anyone who 
tries to philosophically argue the case is limited in their scope of understanding of reality. Walter 
agreed to pick up someone from the airport but after being severely incapacitated due to a car 
accident he is no longer able (or obligated) to pick up the person and he should find an 
alternative.” 
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Furthermore, many participants pointed out that, in choosing the “obligated, but not able” option, they 
had intended to express the view that Walter is indeed obligated, but only up to the point at which he becomes 
incapacitated, which confirms our criticism of Buckwalter and Turri’s design: 
“I meant that Walter was obligated to pick him up until he became physically unable to do so.” 
“I meant that Walter was obligated to pick up Brown. However, once he was physically unable 
to, he was no longer obligated.” 
“He WAS obligated, but cannot physically do it so the obligation is no longer on him.” 
“He agreed to do it, so he is obligated once he does that. But after getting hurt, he is not still under 
that obligation.” 
“He had agreed on picking his friend up. But when he got into a serious accident, the obligation 
was suspended because he was no longer in the same position to help out his friend.” 
 4.3. The case against Buckwalter and Turri: Overview of new studies 
With our first two studies, we provided strong evidence that the design used in Buckwalter and Turri’s 
experiments does not constitute an appropriate test of whether ordinary people reason in line with OIC. In 
the studies to follow, we utilised a design that addresses most of the aforementioned problems and makes the 
task much clearer and simpler for the participants. We modified Buckwalter and Turri’s design in the 
following ways: 
(i) We changed some very trivial details of the stories to make it clearer to participants that the characters 
in the stories are unable to fulfil their obligation, and/or to avoid misinterpretations of the story. 
(ii) We changed the instructions of the OIC probe and the inability-comprehension probe to make their 
different purposes obvious to participants.  
(iii)  We positioned the inability-comprehension probe before the OIC probe, that is, just after 
participants read the story. And in case a participant denied that the character in the story was literally 
unable to fulfil their obligation, we explained to the participant that in fact the character was unable 
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to do so by emphasising the relevant elements of the story; then we asked the participant to assume 
that there was literal inability before answering the OIC probe. (In our studies, hardly any 
participants disagreed that the character was literally unable to fulfil their obligation and excluding 
these participants from the analysis changes nothing in terms of our results and conclusions.)  
(iv)  We simplified the OIC probe by reducing its four options to two: one consistent with the OIC 
principle, another inconsistent with it. (Note that the two eliminated options, which say that the 
character in the story is able to fulfil her obligation, are completely irrelevant to testing whether 
people make judgments consistent with the OIC principle.) 
(v) We phrased the two options of the OIC probe in a way that makes it clearer to participants what the 
point of the OIC probe is (e.g. using the connectives “because” and “even if” instead of “and” and 
“but”). 
(vi)  We included a justification probe asking participants to explain their OIC choice, in order to gain 
some qualitative insight into the reasons motivating participants’ choices. (This step was introduced 
after the OIC option was irreversibly selected, so there is no reason to suppose that it could interfere 
with the quantitative results of the OIC probe). 
The great majority of the above changes should not be controversial, as they merely clarify and/or simplify 
the task for the participants. Although changing the connectives of the options of the OIC probe may seem 
controversial, in Study 4, we demonstrate that our usage of “even if” and “because” is not problematic.  
Some of Buckwalter and Turri’s studies are, arguably, much less central to testing the OIC principle (e.g. 
Experiment 7, which tests whether the difference between moral and legal obligation is relevant to the 
principle). Accordingly, our studies focused on those studies that are most central to the OIC principle, 
namely, Experiments 1, 2, 4 and 5. 
 4.4. Study 3: Promise 
In this study, we used our new design to test whether people make judgments consistent with the OIC 
principle in relation to obligations generated by promises, using the “Walter” scenario familiar from the first 
two studies as well as from the first experiment reported in Buckwalter and Turri’s paper, where it was found 
that 80% of participants chose the “obligated, but not able” option, apparently contradicting the OIC 
principle. In addition, we used different ordinary expressions that are commonly thought to encode the 
concept of obligation (“obligated”, “duty”, “ought”), in order to see whether there is variation in judgments 
as a result of these. 
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 4.4.1. Method 
 Participants 
Participants were 127 adults (60 female; 67 male; Mage = 33.95; SD = 11.54; range = 53; 97% reporting 
English as their first language). 
 Design, Materials and Procedure 
After indicating informed consent, participants read the following story: 
Walter promised that he would pick up Brown from the airport. But on the day of Brown’s flight, 
Walter is in a serious car accident and is hospitalized. As a result, Walter is not able to pick up 
Brown at the airport.127 
We added “and is hospitalized” to boost the understanding that Walter is unable to pick up Brown at the 
airport.  
Participants were then presented with the inability-comprehension probe, whose instruction and 
question were as follows: “First, we would like to ask you a question to check whether you understood the 
story. According to the story, is the following statement true?” The statement that participants had to 
evaluate was: “Walter is literally unable to pick up Brown at the airport because Walter is hospitalized”. If 
they answered “yes”, they were presented with the OIC probe. If they answered “no”, they were given an 
explanation indicating that Water is indeed unable to pick up Brown because his “injuries are so serious that 
he requires hospitalization”; then they were asked to assume that this is the case before answering the OIC 
probe. 
The instruction and question of the OIC probe were as follows: “Now, we would like to know your 
personal opinion about the situation. There isn’t a correct answer here. Which statement best reflects your 
personal opinion about the situation?” Participants had to choose between two randomly sequenced 
statements, each consistent or inconsistent with the OIC principle. In order to probe participants’ judgments 
with different ordinary expressions that encode the concept of obligation (“obligated”, “duty” or “ought”), 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three phrasing conditions: 
                                                                    
127 Here and elsewhere, the divergences from the wording of the original stories as used in Buckwalter and Turri's 
studies are shown in italics. For example, in this case, the only change we introduced was the addition of the phrase, “and 
is hospitalised”. See the main text for more. 
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1. Under these circumstances, Walter is still obligated to (Walter still has a duty to / Walter still 
ought to) pick up Brown at the airport, even if he is unable to do so.  
2. Under these circumstances, Walter is not obligated to (Walter does not have a duty to / it is not 
the case that Walter ought to) pick up Brown at the airport, because he is unable to do so.  
After choosing one of the above statements, participants were asked to justify their choice: “Please explain 
why you marked this option”. 
Finally, participants answered a blame probe, enquiring about the degree to which they believed that 
Walter deserved blame for not fulfilling the obligation: “To what extent is Walter to blame for not picking 
up Brown?” Participants answered this probe on a seven-point scale, with “1” indicating “No blame”, “4” 
indicating “Moderate blame”, and “7” indicating “Full blame”. 
 4.4.2. Results 
Almost everyone (98%) agreed initially that Walter was literally unable to pick up Brown at the airport. 
The phrasing conditions produced no effect, χ2 (2, 127) = .01, p = .99, with 100%, 98% and 100% of 
participants choosing the option consistent with the OIC principle in the “obligated”, “duty” and “ought” 
conditions respectively. Across the phrasing conditions, 126 out of 127 participants chose the option 
consistent with the OIC principle—goodness of fit against chance: χ2 (1, 127) = 123.03, p < .01, ϕ = 0.98. 
Blame ratings did not differ across phrasing conditions either—F(2, 124) = 1.04, p = .36. In general, blame 
ratings were very low (M = 1.47; SD = 1.02), with 92 of 127 participants opting for the “1” rating (i.e. “no 
blame”). 
 4.4.3. Discussion 
With our improved design, we completely reversed the results of Buckwalter and Turri using three 
ordinary expressions that are commonly thought to encode the concept of obligation, suggesting that there is 
no variation in judgment due to the examined terminological variation in this domain.  
Participants’ justifications suggest that, actually, none of their answers were inconsistent with the OIC 
principle. Justifications of participants who chose the “not obligated” option often expressed that, given the 
inability, it would be unintelligible to attribute an obligation, or that it is self-evident that the obligation does 
not hold: 
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“It seems silly to say that it’s immoral to not keep a promise in extenuating circumstances like 
this.” 
“It makes no sense to say he should do something he isn’t able to.” 
“Because he is unable to do so, it is self-explanatory.” 
Sometimes they even explicated the OIC principle literally or in terms of its equivalent contraposition: 
“‘Duty’ assumes he will have the ability to implement his duty, just as a soldier is excused from 
duty when injured.” 
“I think that the existence of a duty presupposes the ability to fulfil that duty. If it is impossible 
for that duty to be fulfilled, it does not exist.” 
“If someone is unable to do something they can’t be obligated to do it.” 
Now, the justification of the only participant who chose the “obligated” option suggests that, instead of 
making a judgment incompatible with the OIC principle, the participant simply shifted the scope of the 
obligation at stake: 
“Walter made an agreement with full intention of keeping it and if he cannot fulfill the 
agreement, notice should be sent and a proxy should be appointed to carry out the agreement as 
specified.” 
In other words, rather than maintaining that Walter is still obligated to pick up Brown at the airport even 
if he is unable to do so, this participant seems to be saying that even if Walter cannot pick Brown up, he is still  
obligated to do something else to improve Brown’s situation. Since our scenario leaves open the possibility that 
Walter could still do something else in this respect, the response of this participant (and crucially the reasoning 
behind it) does not necessarily conflict with the OIC principle (this kind of justification will show up in later 
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studies; we will refer to it as the ‘scope-shifting problem’, because it involves participants’ changing the scope 
of the obligation to include new or alternative content). 
Finally, the great amount of “no blame” answers plus the overall low mean of blame ratings shows that 
participants think that Walter’s inability eliminated his blameworthiness for not picking up Brown at the 
airport, which is consistent with Buckwalter and Turri’s blame results. However, contrary to their results, our 
results also suggest that participants think that the elimination of blame was linked to the fact that Walter had 
no related obligation under the circumstances, and, consequently, to the fact that Walter did not do anything 
wrong in not picking up Brown at the airport. In other words, our results are more consistent with the idea 
that ordinary cognition is in line with the traditional view on the relation between blame, obligation and 
wrongdoing. 
 4.5. Study 4: Playground safety worker 
Social roles are normally seen as another source of obligations. In this study, we tested whether people 
make judgments consistent with the OIC principle in the context of an obligation entailed by the social role 
of a playground safety worker. The scenario we utilised corresponds to that used in the second experiment of 
Buckwalter and Turri’s paper, where it was found that 98% (“duty” phrasing condition) and 88% (“ought” 
phrasing condition) of participants chose the “obligated, but not able” option, apparently contradicting the 
OIC principle. In addition, we tested whether the framing of our options in terms of the connectives “even 
if” and “because” inadvertently biased participants towards choosing the option that is consistent with the 
OIC principle. 
 4.5.1. Method 
 Participants 
Participants were 86 adults (40 female, 45 male, 1 “other”; Mage = 37.67; SD = 13.25; range = 53; 98% 
reporting English as their first language). 
 Design, Materials and Procedure 
Participants read first the following story: 
Michael is a playground safety worker. He sees some broken glass in an area where kids 
sometimes play barefoot. But he is stricken by a sudden full body paralysis that immobilizes him 
to the extent that he cannot even speak. As a result, Michael is not able to remove the broken glass. 
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As the italics show, we introduced three modifications to Buckwalter and Turri’s version of the 
playground scenario. The first two of these were to boost the understanding of inability and/or to emphasise 
that there wasn’t anything else that Michael could have done to improve the situation (e.g. ask other people 
to remove the broken glass), and thus to try to avoid the scope-shifting problem identified in the discussion 
of Study 1. The last modification replaced the phrasal verb “pick up” with the verb “remove,” which arguably 
more clearly describes the content of Michael’s obligation in this situation.128 
Participants were then presented with the inability-comprehension probe, which asked them to evaluate 
the truth of the following statement: “Michael is literally unable to remove the broken glass from the area 
because he is completely immobilized.” Depending on their truth evaluations, participants proceeded to the 
OIC probe as specified in Study 1. 
The instruction and question of the OIC probe were the same as in the previous study. Since in Study 3, 
we provided evidence that different ordinary expressions encoding the concept of obligation do not affect the 
results of the OIC probe, we used only one phrasing for the statements of the probe in this study 
(“obligated”). However, participants were still randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the “explicit” 
condition, participants had to choose between the same type of “obligated” statements of Study 3, while in 
the “implicit” condition these statements were presented without the inability clauses and their connectives: 
1. Under these circumstances, Michael is still obligated to remove the broken glass, even if he is 
unable to do so (Under these circumstances, Michael is still obligated to remove the broken glass). 
2. Under these circumstances, Michael is not obligated to remove the broken glass, because he is 
unable to do so (Under these circumstances, Michael is not obligated to remove the broken glass). 
We included the implicit condition in this study because one may argue (rather implausibly in our view) 
that, rather than making more explicit the main point of the OIC probe, the connectives “because” and “even 
if” inadvertently bias participants to choose the option consistent with the OIC principle, thus distorting the 
results. Against this “framing” hypothesis, we predicted that there would be no effect of condition, since the 
fact that we asked the comprehension probe first plus the usage of “under these circumstances” and “still” 
already makes the main point of the OIC probe clear enough. 
                                                                    
128 The original story (Buckwalter & Turri, 2015, p. 5) read as follows: “Michael is a playground safety worker. He 
sees some broken glass in an area where kids sometimes play barefoot. But he is stricken by a sudden paralysis in his legs. 
As a result, Michael is not physically able to pick up the glass.” 
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After answering the OIC probe, participants answered the justification probe and the blame probe, 
similarly to Study 3. 
 4.5.2 Results 
Almost everyone (99%) accepted initially that Michael was literally unable to remove the broken glass. 
There was no effect of condition, χ2 (1, 86) = .387, p = .53, with 88% and 84% of participants choosing the 
“not obligated” response in the explicit and implicit conditions, respectively. Thus, altogether, the 
overwhelming majority of participants (86%) believed that Michael did not have an obligation under the 
circumstances—goodness of fit against chance: χ2 (1, 86) = 44.69, p < .01, ϕ = .72). 
Blame ratings remained low (M = 1.79; SD = 1.41), with 59 of 86 participants opting for “no blame”. A 
2(condition) x 2(OIC option choice) between-subjects ANOVA on blame scores revealed a main effect of 
option choice, F(1, 82) = 35.6, p < .01, ηp2 = .303, but no main effect of condition (p = .17) or interaction (p 
= .30). Thus, participants who chose the “obligated” option saying that Michael was obligated to remove the 
glass blamed him more (M = 3.67, SD = 1.67) than participants who chose the option that he was not 
obligated (M = 1.49, SD = 1.11). Accordingly, there was a significant correlation between option choice and 
blame ratings: rpb = .53, p < .01. 
 4.5.3 Discussion 
Once again, we completely reversed Buckwalter and Turri’s results. Furthermore, as we predicted, whether 
the OIC options involved the inability clauses and their connectives did not affect which option was chosen. 
This indicates that an argument according to which the effect observed in Study 3 depends on our specific 
framing of the options, and, in particular, on the usage of the connectives “even if” and “because”, is not 
plausible. Indeed, our results provide corroboration for our contention that it is Buckwalter and Turri’s 
design (rather than ours) that systematically distorts the results. 
Justifications for “not obligated” responses again showed that participants’ responses were consistent with 
the OIC principle. In contrast, the justifications of the “obligated” responses (12 in total) were more varied 
and, overall, did not clearly indicate that these responses were incompatible with the OIC principle. Evincing 
the scope-shifting problem discussed in Study 1, some participants seem to have shifted the scope of the 
obligation to the idea that Michael still has the obligation to do (or try to do) something else to improve the 
situation: 
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“He has the job of playground safety worker, and he has been presented with an unsafe condition. 
If he can’t remove the glass, he should call out to the kids to avoid the area, call out to another 
adult, or make some kind of effort to communicate the hazard.” 
“In some way if he knows there’s broken glass and no one else is notified, there needs to be a way 
he can communicate with someone he can or warn the kids about it.” 
Since these participants seem to have misinterpreted our scenario in that they still envisaged that Michael 
could do something else, like informing other people, to ameliorate the situation (or since the description of 
our scenario does not rule out the possibility that Michael could at least make an effort to improve the 
situation), their “obligated” responses are not incompatible with the OIC principle. 
Some participants seem to emphasise that Michael still has the obligation to remove the glass, not at the 
time of his paralysis but rather as soon as he recovers: 
“Well Michael may be unable to physically remove it himself, but he is obligated to do so in the 
sense that he should remove it as soon as possible.” 
“(…) Of course if his condition worsens or doesn’t let up then he cannot act on his obligation so 
he won’t clean up the glass, but with the knowledge he should do it, if he can.” 
This type of justification suggests that in fact the reasoning of these participants is in line with the OIC 
principle. 
Many participants seem to appeal to the connection between the obligation and the nature of Michael’s 
social role (note that the word “responsibility” is often used in the sense of obligation related to a social role 
[17, 18]): 
“It is still his responsibility as a playground safety worker.” 
“That’s his job.” 
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“It’s his property. It’s his responsibility to get it cleaned up even if he can’t do it himself.” 
“I believe as a worker and having knowledge makes you responsible.” 
From these justifications, one may take that these participants indeed reason in a way that is not consistent 
with the OIC principle—the participants seem to believe that obligations related to social roles continue to 
be in force independent of the circumstances, and hence seem to accept that Michael is still obligated to 
remove the broken glass in that situation of inability.  
However, it is still possible that these participants answered “obligated” simply to emphasise the 
obligations that are normally entailed by social roles, without necessarily rejecting the OIC principle. Because 
social roles are deemed to entail obligations, there is a sense in which the entailed obligations do not disappear 
in cases of inability, since the social role does not disappear with the inability (a playground safety worker does 
not cease to be a playground safety worker just because he is unable to fulfil his role in a specific situation). 
Accordingly, people may make a distinction between obligations that are normally entailed by a social role, 
and obligations that are in force at a specific point in time. This would make it possible for a playground safety 
worker qua playground safety worker to have an obligation to remove the broken glass, and yet this particular 
paralysed playground safety worker to not have that obligation. Thus, the above participants may be 
interpreting and answering the OIC probe simply in terms of the obligations that are normally entailed by a 
social role, in which case their responses are not necessarily inconsistent with the OIC principle, given that 
this principle has generally been assumed to be concerned with whether an obligation is still in force at the 
time of the inability. (It is important to note that this issue, which may have also prompted participants to 
choose the “obligated but not able” option in the related studies of Buckwalter and Turri, is different from 
the main criticism we delineated concerning the way this option is framed: even in the sense of a social-role 
obligation being in force, there is a trivial sense in which an obligation is involved in the story and leads one 
to choose the option “obligated but not able”. 
Finally, the large number of “no blame” answers and low mean of blame ratings, along with the positive 
correlation between these ratings and OIC responses (i.e. more blame, more “obligated” response) is more 
consistent with the idea that ordinary cognition is in line with the traditional view of the relation between 
blame, obligation, and wrongdoing. 
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 4.6. Study 5: Lifeguard 
In this study, we tested whether people make judgments consistent with the OIC principle, again in the 
context of an obligation entailed by a social role, but this time that of a lifeguard. While studies 3 and 4 
involved an “internal” inability coming from physical restrictions, this study involves an “external” inability 
coming from constraints of the environment like distance in space. Furthermore, while studies 3 and 4 
involved relatively minor consequences like not being picked up at the airport or stepping on broken glass, 
this study involves a life-and-death situation. The scenario we utilised corresponds to the one in Buckwalter 
and Turri’s fourth experiment, where it was found that 93% of participants chose the “obligated, but unable” 
option that apparently contradicts the OIC principle. 
 4.6.1. Method 
 Participants 
Participants were 42 adults (11 female, 31 male; Mage = 38.98; SD = 13.13; range = 49; 98% reporting 
English as their first language).  
 Design, Materials and Procedure 
Participants read the following story: 
Jessica is the only lifeguard at a remote ocean beach. Two struggling swimmers are about to 
drown, and no one else is around except Jessica. She rushes in to save them, but because of the great 
distance between the swimmers, it is physically impossible for her to rescue both swimmers. 
Jessica rescues one swimmer but not the other. 
We again introduced several small alterations to Buckwalter and Turri’s version. The main modifications 
of the original scenario were again introduced in order to boost the understanding of inability and/or to 
emphasise that there wasn’t anything else that Jessica could have done to improve the situation (e.g. ask for 
additional help). (Other minor stylistic modifications, not indicated here, were also introduced to improve 
readability).129 
                                                                    
129 The original story (Buckwalter & Turri, 2015, p. 5) read as follows: “Jessica is a lifeguard at a remote ocean beach. 
Two struggling swimmers are about to drown. Jessica rushes in to save them. But because of the very far distance between 
the swimmers, it is physically impossible for her to rescue both swimmers. Jessica rescues the one swimmer but not the 
other.” 
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The rest of the procedure was exactly the same as in studies 3 and 4: inability-comprehension probe 
(“Jessica is literally unable to rescue both swimmers because they are too far apart”); OIC probe with 
justification probe; blame probe. In this study, there was only one OIC probe condition, with the following 
options: 
1. Under these circumstances, Jessica is still obligated to rescue both swimmers, even if she is unable 
to do so. 
2. Under these circumstances, Jessica is not obligated to rescue both swimmers, because she is unable 
to do so. 
 4.6.2. Results 
Almost everyone (95%) agreed that Jessica was literally unable to save both swimmers. The great majority 
(79%) of participants felt that the agent was not obligated to save both swimmers—goodness of fit against 
chance: χ2 (1, 42) = 13.71, p < .01, ϕ = 0.57. 
Blame scores remained relatively low (M = 1.67; SD = 1.18), with 28 of 42 participants opting for “no 
blame”. However, in contrast with the previous study, participants choosing the “obligated” option did not 
ascribe significantly more blame to Jessica than participants choosing the “not obligated” one: t(40) = 1.64, p 
= .21, d = .49 (“obligated”: M = 2.11; SD = 1.45; “not obligated”: M = 1.55; SD = 1.09). Accordingly, there 
was no significant correlation between option choice and blame ratings: rpb = .19, p = .21. 
 4.6.3. Discussion 
Yet again, in sharp contrast to the findings reported in Buckwalter and Turri’s paper, the “not obligated” 
option was clearly preferred, even in a case in which the consequences are severe (the death of a swimmer). 
Moreover, again, while the justifications of the “not obligated” responses show that these responses were 
consistent with the OIC principle, the justifications of “obligated” responses (9 in total) did not clearly 
indicate that these responses were incompatible with the OIC principle. 
The great majority of “obligated” responses evinced the scope-shifting problem, in this case insisting that 
Jessica had a further obligation to try to save both swimmers: 
“Even if she thinks and it would be physically impossible, she should still make as much of an 
effort as possible to try to save both swimmers.” 
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“She should still make an attempt to do whatever she can do.” 
“It is her employment obligation to at least attempt to rescue both. One at a time.” 
“She should at least try to save them since we don’t know if she can fail or not.” 
“It is her duty as a lifeguard to do the best she can with what she has. Despite her being unable to 
rescue both people, she has to be moral enough to try to save both.” 
Since our scenario does not rule out the possibility that Jessica can try to save both swimmers, these 
justifications show that the related responses are not incompatible with the OIC principle.  
Again, some participants seemed to appeal to the connection between the obligation and the nature of 
Jessica’s social role: 
“The conditions of the rescue could change however her job as a lifeguard does not change” 
“She was the only one there, it was her job.” 
As we discussed in Study 2, these justifications may indicate real inconsistency with the OIC principle. 
Alternatively, similarly to what we suggested, they may indicate that, with their “obligated” response, the 
participants are simply emphasising the defeasible obligation that is entailed by the social role of a lifeguard, 
without yet accepting that the moral obligation was in force in that specific situation—that is, without 
rejecting the OIC principle. 
Finally, although the positive correlation between blame ratings and OIC option choices was not 
statistically significant, the large number of “no blame” answers and low mean of blame ratings are still more 
consistent with the view that ordinary cognition aligns with the traditional view of the relation between 
blame, obligation, and wrongdoing. 
 4.7. Study 6: Drowning child 
Studies 3, 4 and 5 featured obligations created either by the agent through a social action (a promise), or 
by the social role of the agent (safety worker, lifeguard). In this final study, we feature a case in which the 
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obligation does not come from a promise or a social role, but from the situation—a drowning child creating 
an obligation to help, just as in the example we considered at the beginning of Chapter 1 featuring Roy. The 
scenario corresponds to that in a particular condition (“recent”) of Buckwalter and Turri’s fifth experiment, 
where it was found that 88% of participants chose the “obligated, but unable” option that apparently 
contradicts the OIC principle. 
 4.7.1. Method 
 Participants 
Participants were 41 adults (12 female, 29 male; Mage = 37.29; SD = 12.00; range = 42; 100% reporting 
English as their first language). 
 Design, Materials and Procedure 
Participants first read the following story: 
Michael is relaxing in the park near a pond when he sees a small girl fall in. She is drowning and 
definitely will die unless someone quickly pulls her out. This part of the park is secluded and 
Michael is the only person around. But Michael is stricken by a sudden full body paralysis. As a 
result, Michael is not able to save the girl. 
We used “full body paralysis” instead of Buckwalter and Turri’s “leg paralysis” on the premise that this 
phrasing would be perceived as more of an incapacitating condition, and also as an attempt to preclude the 
scope-shifting problem (in a pilot study using the scenario with “leg paralysis”, a participant with an 
“obligated” response suggested that Michael should “at least try to crawl to save the girl”).130 
The rest of the procedure was the same as in the previous studies: comprehension probe (“Michael is 
literally unable to save the small girl because he is completely paralyzed”); OIC probe with justification probe; 
blame probe. As in Study 5, there was only one OIC probe condition, with the following two options:  
                                                                    
130 Buckwalter and Turri’s version (2015, p. 10) read as follows: “Michael is relaxing in the park when he sees a small 
girl fall into a nearby pond. She is drowning and definitely will die unless someone quickly pulls her out. This part of the 
park is secluded and Michael is the only person around. But Michael is stricken by a sudden paralysis in his legs. As a 
result, Michael is not physically able to save the girl.” 
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1. Under these circumstances, Michael is still obligated to save the small girl, even if he is unable to 
do so. 
2. Under these circumstances, Michael is not obligated to save the small girl, because he is unable to 
do so. 
 4.7.2. Results 
Almost all participants (98%) agreed that Michael was literally unable to save the girl. The great majority 
of participants (73%) thought that Michael was not obligated when there was an inability to fulfil the 
obligation—goodness of fit against chance: χ2 (1, 41) = 8.80, p < .01, ϕ = .46. 
Although “no blame” was still the modal rating (18 out of 41 participants), blame scores were noticeably 
higher in this study (M = 2.73; SD = 2.1). For example, a t-test revealed that the blame scores in Study 5 and 
Study 6 differed significantly, t(61) = 2.84, p < .01, d = 0.72 (equality of variances not assumed). Moreover, a 
t-test showed that, similarly to Study 4 (but unlike in Study 5), blame scores were significantly higher for 
participants choosing the “obligated” option than for those choosing the “not obligated” option: t(39) = 5.15, 
p < .01, d = 1.65 (“obligated”: M = 4.91; SD = 2.02; “not obligated”: M = 1.93; SD = 1.48). Finally, there was 
a strong, significant correlation between statement choice and blame ratings: rpb = .64, p < .01. 
 4.7.3. Discussion 
We again reversed the Buckwalter and Turri’s results, although, of our studies 3-6, this one had the lowest 
percentage of “not obligated” responses. However, an analysis of the justifications of “obligated” responses 
(11 in total) suggests that this study was beset by a major problem. About half of the participants do not seem 
to have maintained the assumption of literal inability when answering the OIC probe, mostly because they 
took the full bodily paralysis to be a controllable emotional reaction (involving especially fear): 
“He needs to overcome his fear and save the girl.” 
“You have to overcome your fear a person’s life is at stake.” 
“It was just an emotional reaction which he could overcome.” 
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“Michael is responsible to get control of himself and save the girl. He can control his emotion and 
reactions and needs to pull himself together.” 
“He is responsible to save her even if he SEEMS unable to do it. I believe his perception of being 
paralyzed is not real.” 
If these justifications indeed correspond to the reason why participants chose the “obligated” response, 
then their responses are not inconsistent with the OIC principle after all. 
Some participants’ responses revealed the scope-shifting problem again in terms of obligation to try, 
which, as we already discussed, is not incompatible with the OIC principle: 
“He is obligated to at least TRY. If he can’t, he can’t. Maybe the water is deep and he can’t swim. 
But he should at least try no matter what.” 
“I have never heard of a sudden full body paralysis like this, and it seems like Michael should still 
be trying to help.” 
A few participants emphasised that there was a (moral) obligation in the situation: 
“He had a duty to act, a moral obligation. His fear paralyzed him and he was unable to act.” 
“He is morally obligated to save the girl.” 
“Well I assume nothing has changed about the girls [sic] situation just because Michael can’t move 
so the obligation to save her is still there, even if he can’t move it still exists.” 
These justifications may indeed be taken to indicate a type of reasoning that is inconsistent with the OIC 
principle. 
The fact that the overall mean of blame ratings was a bit higher in this study (in comparison with studies 
4 and 5) is not incompatible with the view that inability undermines blame, since the mean was substantially 
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affected by the ratings of the participants with “obligated” responses that did not assume inability as shown 
by their justifications (with these participants eliminated from the analysis, the overall blame mean drops 
from “2.73” to “2.25”, which is much closer to, and non-significantly different from, the overall mean of 
studies 4 and 5). Moreover, a large number of participants still chose the “no blame” answer. Finally, these 
blame ratings plus the strong correlation between blame ratings and OIC choice indicate that ordinary 
cognition is in line with the traditional view of the relation between blame, obligation, and wrongdoing. 
 4.8. Summary of results 
In studies 1 and 2, we provided evidence indicating that there is a problem with Buckwalter and Turri’s 
research design, namely that it does not unambiguously test whether people reason in line with the OIC 
principle. In the following four studies, using an improved design, we showed that the great majority of 
participants judge that a person is not under an obligation if she is not able to fulfil it, completely reversing 
the results reported in the original paper (see Figure 3.2). Study 3 showed that the obligation to fulfil a promise 
is deemed annulled when the agent is not able to fulfil it. This study also indicates that this is the case 
irrespective of the particular term used to express the concept of obligation (“obligated”, “duty” or “ought”). 
Using a different scenario, Study 4 demonstrated that these results do not depend on our particular use of 
connectives—rather, it is Buckwalter and Turri’s results that appear fragile in this respect, as also shown in 
Study 1. Studies 5 and 6 extended these findings to cases in which the consequences are more serious (the 
death of a person). 
 
Figure 3.2. Percentage of responses to the OIC probe in studies 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
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Studies 4, 5, and 6 still saw a relevant minority of participants choosing the “obligated” response, 
suggesting that there may be some individual variation in this area. However, a substantial part of “obligated” 
responses still seems to derive from a misinterpretation of the OIC probe and/or the scenarios, as evinced by 
justifications demonstrating the “scope-shifting” problem, which appeared across all studies, by justifications 
showing that the participants did not keep the assumption of inability, which appeared in Study 6, and by 
justifications that seemed simply to emphasise the obligations normally entailed by social roles, which 
appeared in studies 4 and 5. Of course, if this is correct, it raises the question as to why there was such 
misinterpretation. The scope-shifting problem may be a result of participants’ inclination to blame the agents 
specifically for not trying to do their best to minimise the bad consequences of the situation, something our 
studies did not control for. The misinterpretation of “full body paralysis” in terms of controllable emotional 
reaction in Study 6 may have a similar explanation. An interpretation of the OIC probe in terms of whether 
the obligations are entailed by the social role (instead of in terms of the entailed obligations being in force) 
may be difficult to avoid completely in contexts involving social roles, since this may always be a possible 
reading of the statements. 
Moreover, one may raise the question of why there may have been an increase in misinterpretation 
between Study 3 and Study 6 correlated with the increase in “obligated” responses. There is a sense in which 
the consequence of the scenario in Study 6 (the death of a small girl) is worse than that of the scenario in Study 
5 (the death of an adult), which in turn is worse than that of the scenario in Study 4 (the risk of stepping on a 
broken glass), which in turn is worse than that of the scenario in Study 3 (not being picked up at the airport). 
(A small study asking participants to rate these scenarios in terms of their seriousness confirmed this 
hierarchy—N = 25, Kendall’s W = .78, p < .01). Thus, it is also possible that this increase in seriousness may 
have contributed to the increase in the amount of misinterpretation from scenario 3 to 6, by pushing 
participants to see the situation as less determined and hence to be more hopeful about a positive outcome. 
If our take on the minority responses is correct, the range of individual variation suggested by our sample 
is rather small—almost all participants make judgments consistent with the OIC principle in the types of 
scenarios that we probed. This raises two broader and complementary issues. The first issue concerns the type 
of reasoning involved in participants’ judgments—in particular, the type of implication connecting the 
concepts of obligation and ability. The second issue concerns the generalizability of our results to different 
types of contexts—in particular, to contexts involving culpable inability (Chituc et al., 2016; Henne et al. 
2016), the former of which we discuss below and the latter of which we address in the next section. 
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Since implication can take many forms, the unqualified version of the OIC principle underspecifies the 
nature of the inferential relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’. In the philosophical literature, the usual 
candidates for this relationship are presupposition (Hare, 1963), conversational implicature (Sinnott-
Armstrong, 1984), pragmatic-logical inference (Joerden, 2012), and conceptual or analytic entailment 
(Vranas, 2007; Zimmerman, 1996). This issue is important because each account of implication (insofar as 
they are understood as hypotheses about ordinary cognition) will entail different predictions about people’s 
judgments. For instance, because on the conceptual-entailment account the inference is logically necessary, 
attributions of inability (to X at time Y) would preclude attributions of obligation (to X at time Y) across all 
types of context. In contrast, because on the conversational-implicature account the inference is defeasible, 
attributions of inability would preclude attributions of obligation in some contexts but not in others. The 
homogeneity of our results is consistent with any of these accounts—e.g. it may be that our participants 
reasoned in terms of conceptual entailment or it may be that they reasoned in terms of conversational 
implicature, but our studies were limited to contexts where the implicature is not cancelled (although see 
some general arguments against pragmatic accounts in the next chapter—see also King 2017). Accordingly, 
our results raise doubts about Buckwalter and Turri’s claims, whatever interpretation of implication the 
authors may have in mind (Buckwalter and Turri are not explicit in their article about whether they have a 
specific version of the OIC principle in mind). However, some results in the literature related to contexts of 
culpable inability suggest that at least the traditional conceptual-entailment account is not correct, which 
leads us to the second part of the empirical challenge against OIC. 
5. Second challenge: Chituc et al. (2016) 
In order to probe whether ordinary people reject the OIC principle in terms of the conceptual-entailment 
account, Chituc et al. (Chituc et al. 2016) presented participants with two types of scenarios of inability. 
Some scenarios (“low-blame scenarios”) were similar to those of our studies in that their main character did 
not have control (or had little control) over the source of the inability (e.g. one could not fulfil a promise 
because one’s car broke down unexpectedly). In relation to these scenarios, Chituc et al. obtained results that 
were overall similar to ours (i.e. the majority of participants gave responses consistent with the OIC principle), 
which provides further evidence in favour of our claim that Buckwalter and Turr’s conclusions are 
problematic. 
However, the other scenarios (“high-blame scenarios”) differ from those of our studies in that their main 
character had total control over the source of the inability (in fact, the inability was intentionally created by 
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the character himself). In their first experiment, for example, participants were presented with the following 
vignette: 
Adams promises to meet his friend Brown for lunch at noon today. It takes Adams thirty minutes 
to drive from his house to the place where they plan to eat lunch together. Adams decides that he 
does not want to have lunch with Brown after all, so he stays at his house until eleven forty-five. 
Because of where he is at that time, Adams cannot meet his friend Brown at noon, as he promised. 
(Chituc et al. 2016, p. 21) 
Participants were then asked whether they agree with the statement “At eleven forty-five, it is still true that 
Adams ought to meet Brown at noon,” which they answered by choosing a point on a scale from -50 
(“completely disagree”) to 50 (“completely agree”), with 0 as the midpoint (“neither agree nor disagree”). In 
this condition, 60% of participants provided a response inconsistent with the OIC principle (i.e. answered 
above the midpoint). Moreover, in their third experiment, they obtained a similar result using a different high-
blame vignette (50% of participants provided OIC-inconsistent responses in this new condition). With these 
results (and others to be discussed below), Chituc et al. claim that the conceptual-entailment account cannot 
be correct. 
Although our studies did not address high-blame contexts, we would like to make two comments about 
Chituc et al.’s related results. First, as the qualitative data of our studies show, participants are prone to 
misinterpreting the scenarios and/or the OIC probe in a way that renders their OIC-inconsistent responses 
of questionable value as evidence concerning whether they reject the OIC principle. Now, it is possible that 
this tendency to misinterpretation was even more accentuated in Chituc et al.’s high-blame scenarios, given 
that their cases of self-imposed inability are somewhat bizarre from the perspective of the protagonist’s 
behaviour (namely, making a decision to self-impose an inability after making a promise to a friend without 
even notifying them). Thus, we believe that one has to be cautious about whether Chituc et al.’s high-blame 
results demonstrate that the conceptual-entailment account is incorrect (for a detailed discussion of cases of 
self-imposed inability from the perspective of the conceptual-entailment account, see Zimmerman, 1996, pp. 
96-113—see also Chapter 4, especially sections 2 and 4.1). 
Second, even supposing that Chituc et al.’s studies indeed reveal that ordinary people reject the OIC 
principle qua conceptual entailment, it is still plausible to suppose that there is a very stable inferential relation 
between the concepts of obligation and ability—i.e. that the OIC implication is a core element of the set of 
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inferential relations normally associated with the folk concept of obligation. Ordinary people seem to 
understand obligations as having a behavior-regulating role—i.e. obligations are deemed social or moral 
constraints on actions (Beller, 2008). Accordingly, it would seem rather incoherent to think that such a 
constraint should still be in force when it cannot be effective, namely, when the action in question cannot be 
carried out (see the next chapter, especially Section 1). Cases of self-imposed inability may simply constitute 
exceptions to this. If so, OIC needs to be elaborated to accommodate the relevant judgments. (In Section 4 
of the next chapter, I discuss a different approach on which the theoretical significance of such examples is 
diminished.) 
We turn now to the discussion of our blame results and of our perspective on how ordinary people 
understand the relation between blame, obligation/wrongdoing, and inability. In all our studies, a large 
number of participants attributed no blame to the individual for the fact that the obligation was not fulfilled. 
The mean blame ratings were low in all studies too. They were highest in Study 6, but this was likely due to 
the fact that some participants did not maintain the assumption of inability appropriately. Thus, overall, our 
results suggest that, for ordinary people, inability undermines blame, which is consistent with the results on 
blame in Buckwalter and Turri’s paper. Contrary to their claim that blame attributions are unrelated to 
obligation attributions, the low percentage of the “obligated” responses plus the correlations between blame 
ratings and OIC probe choices (i.e. more blame, more “obligated” responses) in our results are consistent with 
our hypothesis that ordinary cognition is in line with the traditional view that, in cases of inability, blame 
reduction is mediated by obligation/wrongdoing elimination. 
However, there is another set of results in Chituc et al. (2016) that apparently goes against our perspective 
on how ordinary people understand the relation between blame, obligation/wrongdoing, and inability—
indeed, these results apparently go even against the aforementioned hypothesis that, even if not analytical, the 
OIC implication is a core element of the set of inferential relations normally associated with the operative 
concept of obligation. (This is something that is not explicit in Chituc et al.’s discussion: while some of their 
results, as discussed above, go against the conceptual-entailment account of the OIC implication but not 
necessarily against other accounts, some of their results, to be discussed next, go against a much broader range 
of accounts.) 
In their second experiment, Chituc included only a low-blame scenario of inability (in this scenario, the 
character cannot keep the promise to meet with his colleague at noon because his car unexpectedly breaks 
down). They asked participants how much they agreed with statements saying that the character ought to 
keep the promise, is to blame for not keeping the promise, and can keep the promise (the same agreement 
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scale was used, as explained before in relation to their first experiment). Restricting the analysis to participants 
who disagreed with the “can” statement, since these are the relevant cases for our discussion, Chituc et al. 
found a correlation between blame and obligation responses (r = .24, p < .01), but while they found a 
correlation between blame and ability responses (r = .24, p < .01), they did not find a correlation between 
obligation and ability responses (r = .07, p = .37). This suggests that when people give OIC-consistent 
responses, they are simply engaging in excuse validation (Turri & Blouw, 2015)—that is, they are denying 
obligation to be consistent with a primary reduction in blame attribution based on the situation of inability, 
rather than because of an inferential relation between the concepts of obligation and ability. In other words, 
it suggests that the relation between obligation and ability is completely mediated by blame attributions. 
However, the above pattern of correlations was not replicated in their Experiment 3 in the context of its 
moral/unable conditions, since they found no correlation between blame and ability responses while 
observing a trend (r = .18, p = .09) between obligation and ability responses.131 Furthermore, we carried out 
further analyses of the results of Experiment 3 (based on Supplementary Data S4 available at the publisher’s 
website), showing that the relevant correlations go in the direction of our picture. (The following correlations 
were not reported in the original article.) If one restricts the analysis to participants who disagreed with the 
“can” statement—thus including only those subjects whose responses are mostly relevant to our discussion—
, one finds that there is a correlation between blame and obligation responses (r = .40, p < .01), but while there 
is still no correlation between blame and ability responses (r = .03, p = .79), there is a correlation between 
obligation and ability responses (r = .32, p < .01). Thus, although we acknowledge that this is still a 
contentious issue, and that it is still possible that our results were prompted by an excuse-validation bias, we 
believe that our overall picture on the relation between blame, obligation/wrongdoing and inability remains 
more plausible. 
6. Conclusion 
To conclude, our studies provide strong evidence that despite Buckwalter and Turri’s claims to the 
contrary, people do make judgments largely compatible with the OIC principle, at least certainly in cases in 
which the inability is not self-imposed. Furthermore, although we acknowledge that this question is far from 
                                                                    
131 It is worth noting that the non-moral conditions of Chituc et al.’s Experiment 3 are completely irrelevant to our 
issue here, since these conditions do not involve non-moral obligations as Chituc et al. appear to claim; rather they 
involve what is discretionary—a decision to go to the cinema does not involve a non-moral obligation or an obligation 
of any description, it simply involves what is under someone’s discretion. 
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settled, we believe that our results are best explained by maintaining that there exists a strong inferential 
relation between the concepts of obligation and ability in ordinary cognition. Consequently, the empirical 
results discussed in this chapter do not cast serious doubt on OIC is a descriptively adequate principle of I-
morality or FM. Finally, our results are also consistent with the idea that ordinary reasoning is in line with the 
traditional view that blame reduction is related to obligation elimination via the elimination of wrongdoing. 
In the next chapter, I consider some of the consequences of taking seriously the main conclusion of this 
chapter, namely, that OIC is a descriptively adequate principle or moral cognition. 
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Chapter 4: OIC Meets Cognitive Science—
Hypotheses, Old and New 
Overview 
In this final chapter, I review the ways in which the descriptive adequacy of OIC has been explained in the 
literature, criticise these hypotheses and propose some of my own based on LA. I proceed as follows. In 
Section 1, I review some of the ways in which philosophers have rationalised OIC. Aspects of these accounts 
will be reflected in the hypotheses to be discussed subsequently. In Section 2, I introduce and criticise the 
hypothesis according to which OIC captures a semantic relation between the lexical concepts OUGHT and 
CAN. In Section 3, I discuss and reject the view according to which the descriptive adequacy of OIC is due 
to the pragmatics of communication. In Section 4, I first propose a novel explanation of why such semantic 
and pragmatic accounts of OIC are deemed to failure, then, I illustrate the way out of this conundrum by 
proposing some hypothesis sketches of my own. On my favoured hypotheses, OIC’s descriptive adequacy is 
a consequence of the operations of FM. These are not expected to be the final words regarding the question 
of how to explain OIC’s descriptive success, but they do provide a novel conceptualisation of the debate. 
1. Three rationales for OIC 
In the previous chapter, the central argument was that OIC is descriptively adequate, that is, it accurately 
describes, generates, and thus predicts ordinary judgments of the relevant type. It is time to consider how OIC 
is implemented in the human mind, that is, what it is at the level of psychological explanation (cf. Chapter 1, 
sections 4 and 6) that accounts for the descriptive adequacy of the principle. As I did in Chapter 3, I shall 
proceed from moral philosophy to moral psychology. That is, I will introduce some of the ways in which 
ethicists have interpreted OIC: (i) as a logical or conceptual principle, (ii) as a normative/moral principle, and 
(iii) as a principle of practical rationality. In later sections, I revisit these interpretations and translate them 
into the language of the LA framework. 
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To begin with, we have a conceptual interpretation of OIC (Haji, 2002; Vranas, 2007; Zimmerman, 
1996). According to it, OIC constitutes a conceptual truth, with “S ought to ϕ” entailing “S can ϕ”.132  On 
this view, contradicting OIC amounts to a sort of “conceptual” confusion.133 There is some plausibility to 
this. After all, as pointed out above, when ethicists say that Walter ought to pick up his friend, what they 
mean is that Walter has a moral obligation to do so (some argue, plausibly in my view, that must expresses this 
relation better than ought—McNamara, 1996; von Fintel & Iatridou, 2008). Now obligations (whether moral 
or otherwise) are often understood both in the philosophical literature (Zimmerman, 1996) and in ordinary 
thought (Jackendoff, 1999) as constraints on what actions/options are available to the agent, given a certain 
code of conduct (e.g. morality, the law, and so on). If so, what sense exactly could we possibly make of a 
requirement that constrains an unavailable action? 
Another way of conceiving of OIC appeals to the notion of fairness (e.g. Copp, 2008; Fischer, 1999, 2003; 
for criticism, see van Someren Greve, 2014).134 According to this view, OIC is a moral principle grounded in 
the relation between obligation and blame. Recall Walter’s predicament from the previous chapter. Imagine 
that Walter’s wife and lifelong critic Susan insisted that Walter is still under obligation to deliver his friend 
from the airport in spite of knowing full well that this has now been rendered impossible: let us assume that 
both of Walter’s legs are broken and he’s currently in a coma. Wouldn’t this be inconsiderate and unfair of 
Susan? Suppose that Walter still has the obligation to pick up his friend. Violating an obligation constitutes 
wrongdoing and warrants blame. Since we already know that Walter will not fulfil this obligation, the 
persistence of it would necessitate Walter’s future wrongdoing in spite of the clear sense that he has done 
nothing wrong. Thus, by insisting on the obligation, Susan would be indirectly blaming Walter for something 
that is clearly beyond his control, which, on the face of it, seems completely unfair towards him. 
                                                                    
132 Where S and ɸ are placeholders for an agent and an action, respectively. With this formula, we also assume that 
the referents of ought and can are fixed (Kurthy and Lawford-Smith, 2015)—they are usually taken to refer to a moral 
obligation and some form of ability or physical possibility (see more on this in Section 2 below). 
133 Kant also defended a similar view: “duty commands nothing but what we can do […] For if the moral law 
commands that we ought to be better human beings now, it inescapably follows that we must be capable of being better 
human beings” (Kant, 1793, pp. 47-50; original emphasis—though see Stern, 2004). 
134 Copp: “It would be unfair to expect a person to do something, or to require that she do it, if she cannot do it. 
Similarly, morality would be unfair if it allowed that a person might be [...] morally required to do something that she 
cannot do” (2008, p. 71). Fischer: “what justification could be offered for [OIC]? It is most natural, I think, to say that 
[OIC] is valid because if it were not, then there could be cases in which an agent ought to do X but in fact cannot do X 
(and never could do X). Thus, given the connection between its being the case that an agent ought to do X and the 
agent’s being blameworthy for not doing X, there could be cases in which an agent is blameworthy for not X-ing and yet 
he cannot X. And this seems unfair” (1999, p. 124). Note, however, that Fischer subsequently rejects OIC, although he 
does so somewhat hesitantly. 
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Third, one might read OIC as a systemisation of rational deliberation. This view puts the emphasis on the 
realisation that insisting on the obligation in cases such as Walter’s would be entirely pointless, even irrational 
(see e.g. Sapontzis, 1991; Griffin, 1992; Joerden, 2012)135—unless of course Susan’s intention is to blame 
Walter (see above). Picture Susan standing beside Walter’s bed in the hospital, telling Walter (who is 
unconscious, remember) that he ought to/must go and pick Brown up from the airport. Her behaviour could 
be fairly described as completely futile and irrational—on the reasonable assumption that her goal in insisting 
on Walter’s obligation is to make sure that Brown will not be stranded at the airport. In any case, Susan 
certainly seems to be wasting her time: she could go and pick up Brown herself, she could call a cab for him, 
she could give him a call to let him know Walter won’t be able to get him, or she could go home and organise 
her stamp collection. According to this latter interpretation, OIC is thus a principle of practical rationality.136  
Let me explain why these rationales for OIC are relevant in the context of the present project. Having 
argued in the previous chapter in favour of the descriptive adequacy of OIC, given the LA framework 
expounded and defended in the first half ot the thesis, the problem at hand is to find some ways to account 
for the results in terms of our moral competence. The first step in this direction is the generation of a 
hypothesis space: a space of possibilities as to the psychological facts (mechanisms, representations and 
processes) that account for OIC’s descriptive adequacy. The above proposals indirectly offer some 
preliminary ways of creating such a hypothesis space. Why do we reason and make judgments in line with 
OIC? Perhaps because our concepts force us to. Or perhaps because we deem it fair to do so. Or perhaps we 
recognise that it is the rational thing to do. These accounts begin to look like psychological accounts of the 
descriptive adequacy of OIC. However, they are not detailed enough to be of sufficient use relative to the 
                                                                    
135 Sapontzis: “it would [...] be pointless to hold that moral agents are obligated to do things they are constitutionally 
incapable of doing” (1991, p. 391). Griffin: “Action-guiding principles must fit human capacities, or they become 
strange in a damaging way: pointless” (1992, p. 123). Joerden: “Whoever commands a person P to perform a certain act 
must assume that P can actually perform this act. Otherwise, the commander finds himself in a pragmatic self-
contradiction that can be described in short with the following clause: “I know that you cannot lift this rock, nonetheless, 
I command that you lift it” (2012, p. 205, emphasis original). 
136 Beyond such considerations concerning fairness and practical reasoning, the OIC principle is significant in 
philosophical theorising for a variety of other reasons. I will only mention two. First, it has been used to argue against 
the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas. In a nutshell, since performing two incompatible actions is impossible, one 
cannot be obligated to perform both (see Mason, 1996). Second, it has been held to have repercussions for the correct 
formulation of consequentialism/utilitarianism (Mason, 2003). Roughly, it may be argued that any form of 
consequentialism that requires us to do what is beyond our capabilities is in violation of OIC and is or should be 
discarded. Suppose it is psychologically impossible to abandon our families and promote the welfare of those the 
improvement of whose condition has a larger impact on overall well-being. According to the argument under 
consideration, a version of consequentialism entailing such obligations is mistaken. 
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standards of LA. In the following sections, these interpretations will resurface in the guise of somewhat more 
elaborate hypotheses. 
In the next two sections, I review and reject the two dominant accounts of the descriptive success of OIC. 
I argue that given their obvious shortcomings, other accounts are should be offered, namely, ones that take 
the import of the first half of the thesis seriously. I set to this task in Section 4. 
2. The Semantic Hypothesis (SH) 
The most general, least computationally or mechanistically committed, and arguably boldest hypothesis 
about the psychological underpinnings of OIC is what Leben (2018) refers to as the Semantic Hypothesis 
(henceforth, SH). On this account, OIC captures a meaning relation between the lexical items ‘ought’ and 
‘can’. More specifically, this relation is understood to be that of entailment. Consider sentences (1) and (2) 
below: (1) is generally understood to entail (2). 
(1) Dimebag was murdered 
(2) Dimebag is dead 
On the prevailing, truth-based definition of entailment, p entails q (‘p’ and ‘q’ being sentential variables), 
if and only if the truth of p necessitates the truth of q. In the example above, if (1) is true, then so must (2) be. 
Thus, because, as specified in the definition, and as also illustrated by the example, entailment is generally seen 
as a relation between sentences, the way in which to frame OIC as per SH is something like this: the sentence 
type ‘S ought to ϕ’ entails the sentence type ‘S can ϕ’. 
This formulation of OIC is in fact overly simplistic, since OIC is often taken to concern the relation  
between a moral obligation and ability (plus opportunity) (Vranas, 2007), yet ought and can admit of many 
other interpretations, depending upon context. Whether this variation constitutes a case of true polysemy or 
not is debated in the literature (cf. Kratzer, 1977), but that some oughts do not entail can is not controversial. 
For instance, when one says “children ought not to suffer”, it does not seem to be the case that the person is 
attributing an obligation to anyone, and indeed the OIC inference is not customarily made in such situations: 
it is perfectly OK to insist that children ought not to suffer even if we accept that their suffering is inevitable 
(for whatever reason). Such uses of ‘ought’ are referred to as evaluative as opposed to the deliberative use we 
are after, such as when ‘ought’ refers to an obligation. The hypothesis should be then formulated as follows: 
the sentence type ‘S oughtD to ϕ’ entails the sentence type ‘S canA ϕ’—where ‘oughtD’ and ‘canA’ signal that 
these two modals receive a deliberative-moral-deontic and ability reading, respectively. Or, equivalently: the 
 137 
sentence type ‘S has the moral obligation to ϕ’ entails the sentence type ‘S has the ability (and the opportunity) 
to ϕ’. 
It is already worth paying attention to the fact that although such hypotheses of semantic entailment are 
not necessarily psychologically “innocent”, they are nevertheless psychologically underspecified. That is, 
when we agree that (1) entails (2), for example, we had better assume that there is something about the lexical 
concept MURDER(X,Y)—where X and Y are argument places for the murderer and the murdered, 
respectively—that makes it the case that its instantiation licences the inference: MURDER(X,Y) → 
DEAD(Y).  Thus, we cannot think “Dimebag was murdered” without thinking—or at least being disposed 
to think—that “Dimebag is dead”. However, beyond the claim that such inferences are in fact made, the 
semantic qua conceptual hypothesis has little to say about what makes this the case from the point of view of 
psychological systems and processes. Similarly, although we may hypothesise (as in fact Jackendoff, 1999 
does) that from OUGHTD(S,ϕ) licences the inference CANA(S,ϕ), this is hardly more than a mere restatement 
of the semantic relation (defined at the level of sentences) at the lexical-conceptual level (defined in terms of 
conceptual relations).137 
2.1. Against SH 
SH suffers from a very serious prima facie shortcoming, namely that it fails what I like to refer to as the 
“bachelor test”, that is, a standard test for semantic entailment (cf. Henne et al. 2016). Consider (3) and (4): 
(3) John is a bachelor 
(4) John is married 
Since (3) entails the negation of (4), competent speakers of English would deem the assertion of (3) 
incompatible with that of (4). Thus, (3) and (4) are contradictory. 
Now consider (5) and (6): 
(5) Walter ought to pick up Brown 
(6) Walter cannot pick up Brown 
                                                                    
137 This is not the way Jackendoff states the inference. Instead, he asserts that the expectation that an agent is able to 
carry out an action that is deemed obligatory derives from a constraint on the first argument place of OUGHTD (i.e. 
what we might refer to as the ability constraint). It is worth noticing, however, that this is not so much a novel hypothesis 
about OIC as the reformulation of conceptual OIC in terms of conceptual argument constraints.  
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On the face of it, (5) and (6) do not have the status of contradiction: it seems more or less all right to say 
“Walter ought to pick up Brown, but he cannot” (and this is not a matter of lexical choice either:  substituting 
“ought to” for “is obligated to” or “must” does not seem to make much of a difference in this respect).138 
Granted, this much is based on pure introspection, but recall that towards the end of the previous chapter 
(Chapter 3, Section 5), I suggested that Chituc et al.’s data (Chituc et al., 2016) can be seen as a significant 
empirical challenge against such semantic entailment theories (Henne et al., 2016). Their data shows that, in 
cases of self-imposed inability, not only is the conjunction of sentences like (5) and (6) not seen as 
contradictory, such statements are in fact endorsed simultaneously. 
This is not to say that SH is thereby refuted. Indeed, there are ingenious defences of the semantic-
conceptual view in the literature, for example in terms of an elaboration of OIC specifying the referents of 
temporal indices of the modals ‘ought’ and ‘can’ (Zimmerman, 1996, pp. 95-113; see also Streumer, 2003). 
Peter Vranas also makes the point that the fact that a contradiction follows the conjunction of sentences such 
as (5) and (6) does not entail that the contradiction is psychologically transparent: we might need to think 
deeply to realise that there is a contradiction.139 Although such arguments may have some merit, this does not 
change the fact that OIC does not fit the prototypical entailment model comfortably. Let me put it this way: 
although sentence pairs such as (3)-(4) are customarily used in semantics textbooks as illustrations of semantic 
entailment, it may be safe to assume that sentence pairs such as (5)-(6) will never be. This suggests that we 
might have to look elsewhere for an explanation of the descriptive adequacy for OIC. 
3. The Pragmatic Hypothesis (PH) 
It is typically assumed that if SH is rejected then some version of what Leben refers to as the Pragmatic 
Hypothesis (or PH for short) should be adopted. The starting point of (all versions of) PH is that, as 
purportedly illustrated by the lack of contradiction in judging both (5) and (6) true at the same time (or in 
asserting them simultaneously), there seems to be no semantic entailment relation between the terms ‘ought’ 
                                                                    
138 Leben makes the point that although “it sounds normal to say, ‘I ought to help, but I can’t’ […], it sounds odd to 
say, ‘I can’t help out, but I ought to’” (2018, p. 161), suggesting that the lack of incompatibility with respect to (5) and 
(6) might be due to the fact that, if they presented in succession, the ‘ought’ in (5) is understood to refer to a so -called 
prima facie (as opposed to an overall or all-things-considered) obligation, or it may even be read as an evaluative rather 
than a deliberative ‘ought’ (see above). Although the argument has some merit, this does not change the fact that OIC 
does not fit the prototypical entailment model comfortably. 
139 “Conceptual entailment need not be transparent: it may take some thought to realize that ‘A is sufficient for a 
condition which is necessary for B’ implies ‘B is sufficient for a condition which is necessary for A’”  (Vranas, 2007, p. 
170). 
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and ‘can’. Thus, proponents of PH typically hold that SH is too strong as an account of OIC.140 Nevertheless, 
as a testament to the intuitive call of OIC, they maintain that there is some kind of inferential link between 
the terms involved (see the previous footnote), but this link, they contend, is one that is relative to 
communicative contexts. Roughly, the idea is that a statement of the form: 
(7) S ought/is obligated to ϕ 
is often taken to carry an “assumption” (shared by the interlocutors, at least in successful communicative 
exchanges) to the effect that the agent (S) in fact can perform the action (ϕ); this could be schematically 
represented as: 
(8) S can ϕ 
As mentioned above, there are two main versions of PH. They disagree over what the nature of this 
assumption is, that is, they have different ideas as to the nature of the pragmatic inference between the ‘ought’ 
and the ‘can’ sentence. On the presupposition view, (7) presupposes (8), and (6) presupposes (7), in the same 
way as (9) presupposes (10):141 
(9) The King of France is bald 
(10) There is a King of France 
On the other main version of PH, the relation between (7) and (8) is understood as (generalised) 
conversational implicature.142 To borrow from Sinnott-Armstrong, “saying p conversationally implies q when 
saying p for a certain purpose cannot be explained except by supposing that the speaker thinks that q and 
thinks that the hearer can figure out that the speaker thinks that q” (1984, p. 256). Thus, for instance, (11) 
conversationally implicates (12), because, although (12) is not entailed by (11),143  uttering (11) would be odd 
and unhelpful if the speaker did not think (12) also to be true, which is something both speakers are aware 
of.144  
                                                                    
140 As also noted by Leben (2018), versions of PH are typically understood not so much as versions as denials of OIC 
(in the form of SH). However, strictly speaking, versions of PH are explications of the link between ‘ought’ and ‘can’, 
and, as such, they are properly understood as accounts of OIC. 
141 Besch (2011), Cooper (1966), Driver (2011), Hampshire (1951), Hare (1951, 1963), Martin (2009). The 
originators of this view are Hampshire (1951) and Hare (1951). 
142 Forrester (1989), Littlejohn (2009), Oppenheim (1987), Saka (2000), Sinnott-Armstrong (1984), Turri (2017), 
Vallentyne (1989), Vogelstein (2012). The originator of this view is Sinnott-Armstrong (1984). 
143 For example, (11) is consistent with the negation of (12). 
144 The relation between (11) and (12) is a generalised implicature, because it does not depend on specific aspects of 
the context. This contrasts with particularised implicatures, in which special reliance on the context is necessary. 
Consider, for example, the following exchange: Speaker 1: “Is Frank coming to the dinner?” Speaker 2: “He’s ill”. Speaker 
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(11) John has two brothers 
(12) John does not have more than two brothers 
On this view, the relation between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ statements is tied to the purpose of the ‘ought’ 
statement.145 Sinnott-Armstrong postulates three main uses of ‘ought’ statements: (a) advising, (b) blaming, 
and (c) deliberation.146 Sinnott-Armstrong’s point is that only in contexts in which an ‘ought’ sentence (or 
statement) is used for the purpose of advising is a corresponding ‘can’ sentence conversationally implicated.  
This view is attractive at first sight because not only does it account for the failure of the entailment view, 
but it also systematically predicts the contexts in which the implication is not made. For example, in contexts 
in which an agent is culpably responsible for his or her inability to perform an action, it seems all right to insist 
that the agent has an obligation to perform it in spite of the inability (cf. Chapter 3, Section 5). 
3.1. Against PH 
Just like in the case of SH, both versions of PH are deeply problematic. King (2017) mounts an incisive 
attack on all available pragmatic accounts of OIC, showing that ‘ought’ and ‘can’ sentences fail both the 
paradigmatic test for presupposition—i.e., the constancy under negation test (King, 2017, pp. 4-13)—as well 
as (pace Sinnott-Armstrong) the calculability and cancellability tests for conversational implicature (ibid., pp. 
13-20).  
But the crucial point from our perspective is that, as King observes, such accounts fail to capture the fact 
that OIC is not first and foremost a communicative principle, and it is (or seems to be) operative in contexts 
not involving communicative exchanges of any kind at all, such as in private deliberation. Consider the 
following case: 
Suppose Nicole is teaching a discussion-based class. Everyone in the class speaks up a lot, except one 
very quiet student. She thinks to herself, this student really ought to speak up more. He does himself 
and everyone else a disservice by not contributing! Not only that, it seems like he’s always passing 
notes with the student sitting next to him. How incredibly rude! She eventually discovers that this 
student is mute. Those notes? That was him occasionally asking comprehension questions to the 
                                                                    
2’s utterance implicates that Frank is not coming, but it wouldn’t obviously do so without reference to the particular 
communicative context (namely, Speaker 1’s inquiry concerning Frank’s involvement). 
145 Which, I believe, renders somewhat problematic the idea that the implicature is generalised (see the previous 
footnote). I shall not be concerned with this potential difficulty, however. 
146 Though, as noted by King, Sinnott-Armstrong’s use of the latter term is somewhat non-standard, referring to 
something like hypothetical reasoning. 
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student sitting next to him. Of course she no longer thinks he ought to speak up more. In fact, she is 
mortified that she ever thought he ought to. (King, 2017, pp. 20-21)147 
Now, it seems exceedingly far-fetched to explain such inferences as being due to some unspecified 
conversational principles, and the prominent pragmatic accounts are certainly powerless to provide much 
help. 
The third serious problem versions of PH are confronted with is that of making sense of the all important 
contraposed version of the OIC principle—that is, “Cannot Implies Not Ought” (see also Kurthy and 
Lawford-Smith, 2015; Southwood, 2016, p. 70, fn. 2). Assume that OIC is accounted for in terms of 
conversational implicature. The main issue is this: if “S ought to ϕ” conversationally implicates “S can ϕ”, 
then it is unclear why one can infer “it’s not the case that S ought to ϕ” from “S cannot ϕ”. King’s example is 
“I went to a birthday party yesterday”, which conversationally implicates that the speaker did not go to her 
own birthday party (King, 2017, pp. 17-19). It is easy to see that one cannot infer “I did not go to a birthday 
party yesterday” from “I went to my own birthday party yesterday”. More generally, pragmatic inferences do 
not support contraposition, only conceptual or logical entailment does.148 
4. OIC and FM 
It seems that we are facing a conundrum. In the literature on the OIC principle, there are two major 
options. Some interpret OIC qua SH, while others endorse some version of PH. However, neither SH nor 
(either version of) PH appears very plausible on closer inspection: it seems that OIC is neither best understood 
as a semantic nor as a pragmatic principle. At least prima facie, this indicates that something has gone seriously 
wrong in the OIC literature, and that some other interpretation is called for. In this section, I first provide an 
analysis of why such a situation might have emerged, then, I put forward an alternative interpretation of OIC 
that avoids the problems with the extant accounts. 
                                                                    
147 King’s scenario is in terms of “ought”, but it is easy to paraphrase it as one involving (non-contractual) moral 
obligations—for instance by adding the assumption that unless children in Nicole’s class verbally contribute to the 
discussion, newborn puppies will be killed by an evil wizard. 
148 For instance, “S is a bachelor” entails “S is not married” and, contrapositively, “S is married” entails “S is not a 
bachelor”. And of course “if p then q” is famously logically equivalent to “if not q then not p”. 
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4.1. Problems with extant accounts of OIC 
Let us consider SH first. The “bachelor test” argument (Section 2.1) is what we might refer to as an internal 
critique: it suggests that SH fails on its own terms. But there are some external reasons to question the very 
idea that SH can provide the right type of account for OIC’s descriptive success. To wit, the problem here is 
that, as an explanation, SH does not interface too well with the study of moral cognition, especially as pursued 
within an LA framework. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the empirical evidence supports the existence of a 
moral faculty (or FM); that is, a specialisation for moral judgment—as indicated by its ontogenetic trajectory, 
automaticity and effortlessness, as well as other types of evidence. Our relevant lexical concepts are likely to 
tap into (the outputs of) FM, but the nature of this link is far from being well understood. Take, for instance, 
the argument is Section 2.1, namely that OIC fails the semantic entailment test. The current point is that if 
the descriptive adequacy of OIC is due to the properties of FM or I-morality, then there is no strong reason 
to believe that it shouldn’t fail it, that is, that OIC should have a semantic counterpart. 
As so often has been the case in this thesis, an analogy from language helps illuminate the problem at hand. 
We considered some of the (operative) representations linguists have posited to explain aspects of I-language, 
such as its syntax, which included representations of phrase types, such as NP or CP (e.g. Chapter 1, Section 
3.2.1).149 It is quite obvious that, as laymen, we have no intuitions about the semantic relations the concept NP 
enters into (assuming we have one); perhaps it enters into none. If that is how we use the term concept, and 
entailment is understood as due to a certain relation between concepts (qua mental representations), it is far 
from obvious whether semantic relations, such as entailment, will be of any interest at all from the point of 
view of the study of I-morality. The operative representation of NP evidently enters into (non-semantic) 
relations with other representations and principles hosted by the language faculty, namely, syntactic ones 
(such as the rewrite rules mentioned in Chapter 1). There is no reason whatsoever to expect there to be express 
semantic relations mirroring these operative ones. 
As another example, compare the case of moral-deontic reasoning to the case of depth perception. The 
problem the visual system faces is that of producing a 3-dimensional representation of the world on the basis 
of 2-dimensional retinal images. Stereopsis is the disparity between the retinal images of the two eyes and it is 
one of the cues the visual system exploits to solve this problem (i.e. to compute depth). Humans are capable 
                                                                    
149 As also mentioned before, linguists need to posit the existence of technical terms such as ‘NP’, because without 
doing so, they would be powerless to explain fundamental aspects of our language competence. The best explanation of 
the utility of positing such terms of art is that there is something like a functionally equivalent representation operative 
in the mind. See e.g. Jackendoff: “It is obvious that speakers don't have a direct counterpart of the symbol NP in their 
heads. Rather, what is significant about the symbol is only that it differs from the other syntactic categories, not how it 
is labeled” (2002, p. 24). 
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of estimating depth relying on this cue alone (Julesz, 2006), which means that—although depth perception 
is much more complex involving many separate cues, such as motion parallax or oculomotor cues—
information about binocular disparity is input to a mechanism which computes a 3-dimensional “image” 
partly on the basis of information related to stereopsis. Now, the point is that any statement about the 
discrepancy of retinal images will be semantically compatible with any statement about the 3-dimensional 
nature of an object (cf. e.g. “there’s no binocular disparity, but the object is/seems 3-dimensional”). That is 
because, although we may have concepts about such things as stereopsis, binocular disparity or depth (cf. 
NP), those concepts do not constitute the information/representations over which the computations of the 
(relevant part of the) visual system are defined. Rather, they are concepts about the information that enters or 
leaves it. 
As indicated by the empirical evidence mentioned earlier, our competence with reasoning in terms of 
moral obligations (and other moral-deontic representations) indicates a broadly parallel situation in the case 
of moral cognition.150 This competence may not stem from semantic entailments between such concepts as 
OUGHTD (or OBLIGATION)—again, were the term ‘concept’ is understood along the lines indicated 
above. Thus, it may be that we do in fact judge an agent as unable to perform an action as not morally 
obligated to perform it (as suggested by the evidence presented in the previous chapter), and yet find nothing 
semantically wrong with a sentence that states the opposite. This is even consistent with an overall judgment 
according to which the agent is morally obligated to perform the action, because what we are hypothesising 
about are representations output by a specialised faculty, which might be consciously accessed to various 
degrees or even overwritten by processes downstream it—for instance, by a reasoning system à la Greene 
(2013) or central cognition à la Fodor (1983, 2000). Indeed, the blame validation hypothesis with respect to 
OIC-consistent reasoning (according to which subject might assert an obligation in some cases to indirectly 
blame them—see Chituc et al. 2016) is most naturally understood in such a way.151 
Nevertheless, we also have to be careful to avoid seeing the parallel between language (or depth perception) 
and moral cognition as too strong in this instance. To wit, drawing the distinction between operative and 
express representations in the case of language does not appear at all problematic: syntactic representations 
                                                                    
150 Of course, there is the thorny issue of whether such competence is accurately characterised as moral—after all, 
the human adeptness with deontic reasoning is not limited to moral contexts, however one delineates what exactly the 
latter involves. On the other hand moral-deontic reasoning does not obviously reduce to “pure” deontic reasoning either 
synchronically or ontogenetically. I will ignore this issue here (but see also Chapter 2, sections 4.2 and 4.5), because it i s 
not easily resolved and would lead us too far off the track. 
151 This is the converse of the excuse validation hypothesis mentioned in the previous chapter, which asserts that the 
reason why we deny the obligation in non-culpable situations is because we wish to indirectly excuse the relevant agent, 
so cases in which OIC holds are not due to competence factors. 
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simply do not feature in our practical reasoning, or indeed in any other type of quotidian reasoning.152 Thus 
representations of syntactic phrase types are purely operative (and mutatis mutandis for depth perception). 
By contrast, the very reason why moral considerations may enter into our deliberations is presumably to do 
with the fact that I-morality (narrowly defined) interfaces with action planning in some ways (cf. Sterelny, 
2010). Otherwise, judging actions to be morally obligatory or forbidden would have no consequences for our 
actions, which is clearly not the case.153 Although we did draw a distinction between perception and 
production in the first chapter (Section 3.4), clearly, the connection (just as in the case of I-language) must be 
non-zero. 
Still, the point remains that the relation between I-morality or FM, on the one hand, and lexical concepts 
on the other is so ill-understood that relations such as semantic entailment should be treated with caution in 
the context of the study of moral cognition. For example, even if, as it might be, in talking about moral 
obligations and prohibitions (that is, when we token the lexical concepts OBLIGATION and 
PROHIBITION), we rely directly on the representations the principles and operations of the FM are defined 
over, it is not clear that OIC must be (reflected in) a semantic relation.154 This is because it does not follow 
from this hypothesis that in ordinary reasoning, we access all operative aspects of these representations as well 
as all their causal-inferential roles (where ‘inferential’ is understood loosely).155 Thus, once again, the 
usefulness of semantics for the study of moral cognition (and ipso facto for the study of OIC as a principle of 
I-morality) must not be assumed or overstated.156 
Given the rather extensive discussion above, we can afford to give short shrift to OIC qua PH. After all, if 
semantic relations are not expected to mirror the workings of a domain specific faculty (as I argued above), it 
is even less apparent why we should expect communicative principles do the same. More generally, the idea 
                                                                    
152 For one, I have no qualms with referring to syntactic processing as a form of reasoning: this is one of those issues 
that are called “purely semantic” in ordinary discussions. The point is that even if syntactic processing is a form of 
reasoning, it is not the ordinary type of reasoning we pre-theoretically refer to as such. 
153 As an aside, I mention that in our earlier understanding of psychopathy, the idea was that it is psychopaths’ moral 
competence that is damaged or missing—both perception and production-wise (e.g. Blair, 1995). More recently, 
evidence has indicated that the problem may be with the interface between judgment and practical reasoning (cf. e.g. 
Aharoni et al. 2014; Cima et al. 2010). 
154 This possibility is not out of the question. Moral-deontic reasoning is universal, and so are concepts such as 
OBLIGATION or PERMISSION (as documented by Brown, 1991). This contrasts with the concept NP, which is very 
far from universal, as opposed to the operative syntactic representation, which is universal. 
155 Yet another way of making the same point is to say that there is no guarantee that lexical concepts about the 
information presumed to be available to (or computed by) a putative cognitive system will provide us with a good 
characterisation of the computational properties of that system. Put this way, the point appears uncontroversial as far as 
contemporary (philosophy of) cognitive science is concerned. 
156 Although this point might appear trivial (especially with the help of LA), rarely does one see it asserted or even 
mentioned in the moral psychology literature. 
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that OIC be understood as a principle of language or (even worse) language use is an unwarranted assumption 
that has nevertheless been taken for granted in the literature on OIC. I suggest that this assumption should 
be suspended. 
4.2. New hypotheses 
As we have just seen, in the debate on OIC, theorists have proposed to explain the OIC principle either in 
terms of semantic relations among lexical concepts, or in terms of the pragmatics of language use. Both of 
these proposals fail. Instead, motivated by the theoretical approach defended in the first half of this thesis, I 
propose to look elsewhere. In this section, I propose an account of OIC according to which the descriptive 
adequacy of this principle is due to the operations of I-morality or FM. As suggested by previous discussion 
(Chapter 1), there are (at least) two general versions of this account. First, OIC may be understood as a 
processing principle, governing the synchronic operation of FM (as we shall see, there are different versions 
of this hypothesis, too). Second, OIC may be understood an acquisition principle, governing the diachronic 
functioning of FM. Currently, evidence cannot obviously adjudicate between such proposals, but they do 
fare better in terms of the explanation of the descriptive adequacy of OIC than any of the extant accounts. 
4.2.1. OIC as a processing principle (descriptive adequacy) 
Let us first consider the hypothesis that OIC is a processing principle. Since I distinguished between three 
different types of processing principles, there are three potential versions of this hypothesis. However, for 
pragmatic reasons (because it seems prima facie implausible), I ignore the possibility that OIC is a conflict 
principle. Thus, the two other remaining options are either that (i) OIC is a constraint principle (regulating 
input to FM and shaping the extent and kind of its domain specificity), or that (ii) OIC is an faculty principle, 
contained “within” FM, regulating the output of FM. 
In this first case, we would be assuming something along the following lines: the mind computes 
something functionally equivalent to (the contrapositive version of) OIC as a constraint on obligation 
attribution so that whenever an agent (S) is understood157 to be unable to carry out an action (φ), or whenever 
φ is deemed impossible for S, the output is something like ‘φ is not obligatory’. Thus, it may be that moral-
deontic status is always assigned to action representations irrespective of whether or not they are represented 
as impossible. 
                                                                    
157 The italics are to indicate that what matters is how our idealised subject mentally represents the situation, rather 
than how the situation is as a matter of fact. (Contrast this with some other accounts of OIC that are concerned with 
whether or not the agent is actually unable to perform the action, see e.g. Zimmerman, 1996).  
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Second, it may be that OIC is a constraint principle on what kind of representations moral-deontic 
computations are performed on. This may be illustrated by assuming that the action representation is indexed 
with a binary variable representing the relevant value of the possible/impossible (able/unable) dichotomy. If 
the action is indexed with the value “impossible”, then deontic computations are not performed over it—in 
this case, the result would be something like “deontically unvalenced” or “not deontically determined” (or 
simply, “no output”) rather than “not obligatory”.158 In contrast, on the previous model, OIC is a principle 
of FM: in that case, to stick to the tag metaphor, FM computes “not obligatory” on all representations with 
the impossibility tag (of the requisite kind), rather than such representations not satisfying the input 
constraints of FM.159 
Such accounts can be interpreted as a substantial hypotheses about FM/I-morality, or of how FM outputs 
OIC-consistent intuitions in the form of the assignment of moral-deontic status to action representations. 
That is, they both assume that the computation of impossibility is prior to or simultaneous with the 
assignment of deontic status to action representations. The first can be understood as specifying the 
representations on which deontic computations (i.e. the computations of FM) are performed. That is, the first 
proposal is an elaboration of our model of FM, and as such, we may refer to it as an “intra-faculty” principle. 
Meanwhile, the second hypothesis can be understood as a “cross-modal” or “inter-faculty” principle, that is, 
as an informational constraint principle on the input to FM. 
Yet another possibility is that the computations of FM are independent of modal concerns, such as 
whether something is possible: FM computes representations of, say, the logical form ‘O(S,ϕ) at t1’,160 but in 
some cases, the outputs are blocked or overwritten by some other reasoning mechanisms. For instance, it is 
rather straightforward to interpret the intuition behind the fairness-based defence of OIC in such a way. To 
wit, the moral faculty does its proprietary computations and outputs a certain moral-deontic status (of action 
                                                                    
158 Of course the modal tag is a functional assumption. For instance, one way of “impossible” representations (acts 
represented as impossible) may fail to be inputs to FM is by FM operating on an action representation tree defining a 
possibility space for the agent. FM could operate on such action trees, assigning deontic status only to potential actions. 
The question of how the potential actions are selected would have to be answered by a theory more general than that of 
FM. 
159 The parenthesised clause is important, because even on this hypothesis, we ought not to predict that FM accepts 
representations of all kinds (however modally tagged). For example, an object flying faster than the speed of light may 
be represented as an impossible event, but presumably, such representations are not subject to deontic status at all: FM 
does not accept them as input. I would presume the same to be true of all non-action event representations (and many 
many others besides), but I won’t argue that point here. 
160 Standing for something like “action ϕ is obligatory for agent S at time t”. (Here, I am assuming that the argument 
structure of deontic concepts minimally consists in agent and act representations—such complex mental representations 
are supposed to be at least part of the output of FM. This assumption is somewhat controversial, but one can substitute 
one’s favourite candidate. 
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ϕ for agent S at a time t). However, due to an independent conception of fairness, we deny that there is an 
obligation because we believe it would be unfair to make/insist on such a judgment. But the computations 
influencing this (overall) judgment are downstream from the processing that results in computing moral-
deontic status for actions. So in a sense, “we” (i.e. more central reasoning mechanisms) end up rejecting the 
output of the mechanisms dedicated to the attribution of moral-deontic status. On this type of account, OIC 
is not a principle peculiar to FM (unlike in the case of the previous two hypotheses), rather, it derives or results 
from other components of the mind. 
As an analogy, consider watching a cartoon. As a matter of automatic processing and more specifically 
due to the engagement of the “theory of mind” mechanism (e.g. Leslie, 1994; Baron-Cohen, 1995), we 
interpret the cartoon as depicting agents with intentions, beliefs and other mental states (“Tom intends to 
avenge Jerry’s insolence”). On reflection though, we know of course that these mental states we attribute to 
the characters are not strictly speaking appropriate:161 we reject their objective reality as well as that of the 
characters for that matter. (This is also an instance of what Pylyshyn [1984, 1999] refers to as cognitive 
impenetrability: the phenomenon whereby the computations carried out by a mental mechanism or module 
cannot be altered by the operations or representations of central cognition, such as the explicit beliefs and 
desires of the agent.) 
4.2.2. OIC as an acquisition principle (explanatory adequacy) 
 I shall briefly mention another interpretation of OIC in the context of moral psychology, just because I 
am not entirely convinced that it is a non-starter. Note first that there has been an ambiguity inherent in our 
discussion of OIC as a descriptively adequate principle of moral cognition. First, OIC may be understood as 
applying at the level of synchronic moral judgment.162 This is the type of account we have been assuming so 
far. Second, it also seems plausible to assume that moral rules (or faculty principles)163 tend to concern things 
(actions) that we are generally capable of performing. So might OIC be a diachronic influence on possible 
                                                                    
161 And neither is the impression that the characters are physically continuous three (or even two) dimensional 
entities—another trick our visual system plays on us (cf. Pinker, 1997, Chapter 1). 
162 This classification may be rendered more complex by making the Chomskyan distinction between the problems 
of production and perception that is standard in modern psycholinguistics (i.e. in this case, how our behaviour is driven 
or guided by deontic reasoning and how we predict, understand and evaluate other agents’ behaviour in terms of moral 
concepts). Although it is reasonable to expect shared mechanisms and representations, it is also reasonable to expect 
significant dissimilarities (see the application of this distinction in reasoning research—producing and evaluating 
arguments—e.g. in Mercier, 2016, where the difference between the two is rather striking). 
163 In this subsection, I revert to referring to faculty principles as “rules” (as per Dwyer, 2008). By “norm”, I mean a 
pattern in a group or a community that tends to result in the acquisition of rules in the relevant group or community. 
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moral rules? An affirmative answer to this question would suggest an understanding of OIC as an acquisition 
principle. 
Again, like in the previous case, this proposal need not be tied to a strong nativist framework. For instance, 
it might be understood as a specification of Sripada and Stich’s moderate or mild nativist model of rule 
acquisition and the psychology of rule based thinking (Sripada & Stich, 2007—they refer to it as “norm 
acquisition”, but see fn. 163). Stripada and Stich posit what they refer to as the Acquisition Mechanism, which 
provides the input to the so-called Rule Database (what they refer to as a “Norm Database”). Whatever gets 
in to the Rule Database (as a function of the Acquisition Mechanism) will procure the characteristic 
functional role of (normative) rules in the cognitive economy of the individual—such as an intrinsic (i.e. non-
instrumental) compliance motivation, and an intrinsic punitive motivation (in case of violation).164 Their 
theory leaves the question open as to what informational constraints the Acquisition Mechanism and the 
Rule Database have, but that is all right, after all, it is but an empirically informed theory sketch. As Stich 
himself puts it elsewhere, “one of the components in [their] theory is a norm database, and it is the job of the 
theory to tell us what can and cannot end up in that database. In so doing, the theory will give us an increasingly 
informative account of the natural kind that we call ‘norms’” (Stich, 2009, p. 224, emphasis added). Thus, if 
one is in favour of the Stich-Sripada model, one can interpret OIC as characterising or being due to the 
operations of the Acquisition Mechanism. This will be only the beginning of a fully explanatory account (e.g. 
how is OIC implemented and by what algorithm), but if OIC satisfies the expectations of explanatory 
adequacy, then it can drive research on such more delicate issues. 
Of course the most obvious doubt for this interpretation becomes apparent when considering how strange 
a system of norms (or rules for that matter) having no regard for performability would be. In line with the 
proposed “rationales” for OIC discussed in Section 1, such a system would be pointless and/or unfair, since 
agents could not help but violate the prevailing norms requiring actions that are impossible to perform. Still, 
the question remains: is the the fact that there are no rules that require actions that are impossible to perform 
due to some general concern for avoiding pointlessness and unfairness, and to that extent, do we assume norm 
acquisition to be a “rational” process, or is it due to a representational constraint on the mechanism(s) 
dedicated to the acquisition of rules, and to that extent, do we regard norm acquisition to be a process that is 
rational to a much more limited degree (cf. Fodor, 1981)? 
                                                                    
164 Together (database + device(s) implementing motivational profile), these are referred to as the Execution 
Mechanism. Thus, for better or worse, Sripada and Stich do not draw a sharp distinction between the production and 
the perception problems (see Chapter 1, Section 3.4). 
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The motivation behind the second option may be that we already know that rule acquisition can be 
automatic and may rely on input only minimally informative about the presence or absence of norms, 
indicating a poverty of stimulus situation. An example is the phenomenon of “promiscuous normativity” in 
children, whereby they infer the presence of a norm on the basis of the performance of a single action 
(Schmidt et al., 2016). Of course this is in no way a definitive argument in favour of the hypothesis that OIC 
is an acquisition principle. After all, if norm acquisition operates via observing others perform actions (let’s 
say when certain cues are simultaneously present), then at no point would there be an opportunity for 
inferring and acquiring norms/rules prescribing actions that are impossible to perform (this would account 
for the presumed explanatory adequacy of OIC in a “cheap” way). Yet no one assumes that rule acquisition 
(whether moral or nonmoral) proceeds with exclusive reliance on actions seen performed in the presence of 
certain cues. For instance, not only do we acquire rules about what is obligatory to do, but also (perhaps even 
more importantly) about what is forbidden, that is, what is obligatory not to do, only a subset of which are 
we likely to see performed. 
Whatever the merits of the above speculations, one thing is obvious: we can learn any rule whether or not 
it regulates a possible or an impossible action. Let us say there is a norm in tribe X according to which agents 
of type A have to jump 5 metres high every time they hear the sound of a whistle. Unfortunately for them, 
though, type A agents cannot jump even 2 metres high. I’ve just come up with this scenario, and presumably 
the reader will have found it strictly speaking conceivable and will have learned it upon first exposure. The 
question, from the point of view of the study of moral cognition, and more particularly, FM, is how this 
learning happened and whether it is analogous to the way moral rules are normally acquired. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In the literature on the OIC principle, there has been a theoretical impasse: there are two general 
hypotheses of the presumed descriptive adequacy of OIC, namely, SH and PH, and yet both of them fail on 
their own terms. This is a problem if we take the bottom line of Chapter 3 seriously; that is, the conclusion 
that ordinary people do in fact reason in line with OIC. In this chapter, I proposed an analysis of why this 
situation obtains and provided a way out of the conundrum. This involves (i) assuming the theoretical 
framework of LA (as defended in chapters 1 and 2), and (ii) hypothesising that OIC is to be understood vis-
à-vis the (synchronic or diachronic) operations of FM. It rather straightforwardly follows from the marriage 
of these proposals that we have no good reason to maintain either SH or PH qua explanations of OIC’s 
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descriptive success. In the final part of the chapter (Section 4.2), I provided two general hypotheses as to the 
ways in which (ii) can be cashed out. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis, I hope to have achieved two things. First, I endorsed a version of the Linguistic Analogy as the 
best extant framework for the study of moral cognition, explicated my version of it in some detail, compared 
it favourably to another popular framework, the Dual Process framework, and defended it against influential 
criticism. Second, I provided a case study that demonstrates some of the main strengths of the LA by 
considering OIC as a candidate principle of the moral faculty. To this end, I first defended the sustained 
plausibility of the claim that OIC is a descriptively adequate principle of the human mind. Then, I considered 
the two predominant extant hypotheses—SH and PH—for why OIC is descriptively adequate. Although 
problems associated with these accounts are well known in the literature on OIC, LA offers a novel analysis 
of why these proposals are ultimately unsuccessful. Furthermore, LA also provides some novel hypotheses of 
OIC. 
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